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ABSTRACT
Richard of Saint Victor deliberately constructs his treatise De Trinitate with
trinitarian structures to sustain the hearts and shape the minds of his readers with the
contemplation of the Trinity. His work fits within a genre of writing in the Middle Ages
where the formation of the theological apprentice was at the heart of crafting one’s
theological work. And while probably not unique among other compositions on the
Trinity, Richard imbues his treatise with some “trinitarian dimensions” that make us
appreciate the level of his creativity as a theologian and the impact these further
dimensions had upon his readers’ spiritual formation.
Richard’s work has three major levels. Level one is a linear argument for the
Trinity. It begins by establishing that God is one substance, then that God is three
persons, and finally how the unity of divine substance fits with the triunity of persons.
That is one level. And to read the work the first time is to encounter and be taken by this
argument. Level two is the style and structure with which that argument is made. In
addition to arguing for the Trinity, Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly”; and to
discover Richard’s deliberate use of triads and an organization to his treatise reflective of
its main subject matter is to find delight in another dimension of the work. It is to read the
work again—a second time—with a view to how this linear argument is designed and
organized. Finally, in addition to the linear argument and its structure, there are also
“allusions” such as Richard’s attempt to make his triadic structures appropriate to each
person of the Trinity. So while at the level of (a) argument/content he makes a case for
xi

the Power, the Wisdom, and the Goodness of the Divine, and at the level of (b) structure
he builds with triads, he also appropriates the (c) significance for each person of the
Trinity: Power of the Father, Wisdom of the Son, and Goodness of the Spirit.
The dissertation consists of three sections: Section I, “Introduction & Background,”
establishes the context for the thesis; Section II, “Articulating the Trinity ‘Trinitarianly’
for the Formation of Souls,” argues the main thesis; and Section III, “Objections &
Response,” handles objections and is followed by a brief conclusion. The introductory
section answers questions leading up to a detailed study of the structuring of Richard’s
De Trinitate. Section II develops the substance of the thesis in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter
4 argues for the structural dimension of the thesis and is divided into five parts. Part one,
“Inventional, Ordering Devices,” shows how Richard structures his written works in
accordance with their main objects of study in order to aid his readers’ contemplation.
Part two, “Breadth: Beginning with the End in Mind” looks at the broader horizon of
Richard’s De Trinitate by showing how the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad structures the
linear layout of the treatise. Part three, “Depth: Richard’s Trinitarian Structures in Book
III,” looks at the detail of Richard’s work in book III where his trinitarian structuring is
the most ornate. In part four, “Perspective: Additional Trinitarian Structures and Triads,”
we show the declining intricacy of these trinitarian structures and triads in the rest of the
work. And part five, “Book VI and Discovering De Trinitate in Relief” brings all of these
dimensions together to reveal Richard’s treatise as a work of art still attached to the
marble from which it was carved and discovers the method by which he “drew out”
contemplations from his previous work. Then, in chapter 5, “Forging These ‘Trinitarian
Dimensions’ in the Faithful,” we show how Richard uses these forms to shape the
xii

trinitarian consciousness of his readers and consummate trinitarian love within his
community. Section III takes up objections to the thesis and gives a response, concluding
that neither forms of meditative practice in the 12th century nor borrowing paradigms
from theological predecessors accounts for the trinitarian structuring of De Trinitate. We
fittingly end our work with a summary of our findings and a meditative reflection on the
“craftsmanship” and “artistry” of Richard as a “constructive theologian.”

xiii

INTRODUCTION
There was a time when the theological task was about devotion to the one true God;
where imagination traced the vestiges of the Divine. Theology was caught up—
enraptured—by its object of study. As a result, the style as well as the substance of
theology was imbued with a spirit reflective of its focus. Theologians saw themselves as
made in the image of their Creator and undertook to study and write their theological
works in ways that gave evidence of this.1 To be creative was the grand duty of one
created by divine creativity. To write theology meant writing creatively, of “letting it be”
on the page so as to reflect the divine glory. To practice theology was not merely to study
about God; it was, rather, to worship Him. It therefore consisted of evangelizing one’s
own mind as well as others with divine meditations creatively “constructed” to sustain
the soul in a meditative journey of theological reflection and devotion toward God.
Richard of St. Victor’s treatise De Trinitate fits within this genre of composition in
the Middle Ages, where the formation of the theological apprentice was at the heart of
crafting one’s theological work. And while probably not unique among other written
compositions on the Trinity, Richard imbues his work with some “trinitarian dimensions”

1

As Richard writes, “If you marvel how God the Maker of everything brought into actuality from
nothing at the very beginning of the world so much and so many various species of things just as He willed,
think how easy it is for the human soul to fashion by means of the imagination any representations of things
whatsoever at any hour and to form some unique creatures, as it were, as often as it wishes, without
preexisting material and from nothing, as it were.” Grover A. Zinn, trans., Richard of St. Victor: The
Twelve Patriarchs, The Mystical Ark, Book Three of the Trinity, Classics of Western Spirituality Series
(New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 298. Richard of St. Victor, Mystical Ark IV.20. Hereafter referred to as
RSV’s Three Main Works.

1
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that make us appreciate the level of his creativity as a theologian and the impact these
further dimensions had upon his readers’ spiritual formation. In what follows we
demonstrate that Richard intentionally crafts De Trinitate with triadic structures and
forms that are suitable to the task of sustaining the hearts and shaping the minds of his
readers with the contemplation of the Trinity.
The Levels of De Trinitate
Richard’s De Trinitate contains three levels. On one level, the argument of the work
progresses in a linear fashion to make a case for the truth of orthodox, Trinitarian belief.
Richard establishes that God is one substance, that God is three persons, and how the
unity of divine substance fits with the triunity of persons. That is one level. And to read
the work the first time is to encounter and be taken by this argument. But at another level
is the style and structure with which that argument is made. It is to see, in addition to
arguing for the Trinity, that Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly.” And to discover
Richard’s deliberate use of triads and an organization to his treatise reflective of its main
subject matter is to find delight in another dimension of the work. One reads the work
again—a second time—with a view to how this linear argument is designed and
organized. Furthermore, one finds greater delight when reading it at this other level. In
the same way that the presentation of a culinary work might stimulate your senses as well
as your appetite, so too does a theological work impress when its arrangement is as well
cared for as its content. Thus to read De Trinitate attending to this other level—its
structure—is to delight in it in another way.2 Finally, in addition to the treatise’s
2

‘Delight’ in theological contemplation sustains interest in spiritual things. When there is always
something new to discover, the mind is enticed with a “holy curiosity” for further “treasures.” Delight thus

3
argument and structure, there are also trinitarian allusions such as Richard’s attempt to
make various triadic structures appropriate to each person of the Trinity. So while at the
level of (a) argument/content he makes a case for the Power, the Wisdom, and the
Goodness of the Divine,3 and at the level of (b) structure he builds on a triadic structure
to make this case, he also appropriates the (c) significance of each one to each person of
the Trinity: Power of the Father, Wisdom of the Son, and Goodness of the Spirit.
These three strata show the levels of his work. And just as the vessels within the
layers of an archeological investigation begin to reveal the way of life of a particular time
period or people group, so discovering these strata and treasures within De Trinitate
reveals something of the process involved in constructing a theological contemplation of
the Trinity. On the first level, they reveal the role of reason and its function within the
theological-contemplative process. Richard plainly and simply offers sound, logical
arguments for the belief that God is “one substance, three persons.” Two things are
noteworthy here. First, Richard does not offer an argument for the Trinity that excludes
other sources for the same belief (e.g., Scripture, experience). He is very explicit about
this in the introduction. There he notes that all resources—visible and invisible—are at
the disposal of the theologian who wishes to pursue, by means of them, the knowledge of

aids the mind in memory and recollection. Consequently, language of delight in Richard’s works should not
be regarded as simple rhetorical flourish. See Mary Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric,
and the Making of Images, 400-1200, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, 34 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117. See also Achard of St. Victor’s Sermon 13.33 in Hugh Feiss,
trans., Achard of Saint Victor: Works, Cistercian Studies, 165 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian
Publications, 2001), 249-50.
3

Since ‘God’, traditionally, can designate either the divine essence or the first person of the Trinity
(i.e., the Father) I prefer to use the term ‘Divine’ when speaking of the divine essence trinitarianly
conceived. This provides greater clarity in places where one or the other meaning can be clarified. In
allusions to Scripture or creedal formulas, I default to the traditional use of these words.

4
the triune God. Second, Richard is not overly ambitious with respect to what reason can
deliver when peering into the divine mystery of the Trinity; there is no denigration of the
mystery of God, nor circumscription of God within the confines of rational reasons in
such a way that God becomes “boxed-in” by a set of self-evident and necessary truths. As
Richard makes clear in The Mystical Ark, knowledge of the Trinity comes at the
intersection of the fifth and sixth levels of theological contemplation, where the faithful
soul reaches the heights of those things that are both “above reason” and “beyond
reason.” Here the traditional philosophical categories and distinctions that served earlier
stages of contemplation begin to bleed into one another. As Richard puts it:
There is nothing in which [imagination] is able to assist this work.
For where reason fails, what can imagination do? What would
imagination do there, where there is no changing and no shadow of
vicissitude; where the part is not less than its whole, nor the whole
is more universal than its individual parts; indeed, where the part is
not lessening the whole, and the whole is not made up from parts,
since that is simple which is set forth universally, and that is
universal which is brought forth in the particular as it were; where
the whole is single; where all is one and one is all? Certainly
without doubt human reason fails in these things. And what can
imagination do there? Without doubt in such a kind of
manifestation imagination can hinder it and is completely unable to
assist.4
But lest we think reason has failed in providing any sort of progress in trinitarian
contemplation, we need to see how Richard understands this. Reason succeeds in
affording the faithful soul with a fleeting glimpse but not a full gaze. Reason does
provide comprehension, just not full comprehension. As we stare into the brilliance of the
sun, we can see its contours, dimensions, and luminance. We can make various

4

Richard, Mystical Ark IV.4; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 263-264.
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inferences and judgments about it. Yet because we are blinded every time we gaze upon
it, we cannot fully see it. So too, reason provides the contours of the Trinity—that the
Divine is one and three—in such a way that one can believe but not fully comprehend. As
he says:
However, no corporeal sense teaches, nor does any human reason
fully convince us, that God is three in person in one substance and
one in substance in three persons. . . . And so corporeal things are
below reason, but divine things are above reason. . . . We call
“above reason” what we truly believe exists although we are able
neither to comprehend it by the intellect nor to prove it by a proof
from experience. . . . Therefore everything of that sort which
transcends the smallness of our capacity by the greatness of its
incomprehensibility ought rightly to be said to be above reason. . . .
Therefore so that we may be able in whatever kind of way to
hammer out the form of angelic similitude in ourselves, it is
necessary to suspend our soul with continual quickness in wonder
at such things and to accustom the wings of our contemplation to
sublime and angelic flights.5
For Richard, reason succeeds as it fails, like a mother who succeeds in bringing her
child to life even as she succumbs to the pains of childbirth. It marks the transition from
the terrestrial climb to the heavenly ascent. Reason gives way to wonder; and this wonder
shapes and forms the soul in such a way as to merit angelic flights into the mystery of the
Divine. Like the winged cherubim who guard the throne of God, such wonder tempers
the soul with an angelic disposition worthy of His presence. The corollary to this notion
of not denigrating the mystery of the Divine by the use of reason consists of this latter
point: that reason is one among many forms of investigation into the Trinity. Reason is
necessary but not sufficient for the theological contemplation of the Divine. It is part of a
theological process that includes discretion, wonder, virtue, discipline, patience, and
5

Richard, Mystical Ark IV.2; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 260-261.
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grace; all contribute to the formation of one seeking to be transfixed by the contemplation
of God. To assess Richard’s argument on the basis of his rational argumentation alone,
therefore, fails to see the important, but limited role reason plays in the theological
journey and to give reason a place and a standing that not even Richard himself affords it
in his own work.
On the second level, De Trinitate reveals the creativity and ingenuity with which
Richard crafted his treatise. At this level we see how his arguments and meditations
reflect the main aspects of the Trinity in an organizational form. Any treatise on the
Trinity requires showing that the Divine is one and that the Divine is three without any
sort of contradiction, but individual writers can choose how to do so. In Richard’s case,
he deliberately structures his De Trinitate in regular series of threes and ones. Three
unique arguments are given for the truth of one of his claims and then a summary is given
to show how all three of those arguments support and undergird that one claim. For
example, in book III, Richard uses three separate arguments to show that the Divine must
be a plurality of persons. The first is an argument from the fullness of goodness, the
second, an argument from the fullness of happiness, and the third is an argument from the
fullness of glory. Each of these arguments, on its own, establishes the truth of the claim
that the Divine must be a plurality of persons; but Richard goes further to show how all
three form the single substance of that conclusion. And this triadic structuring of De
Trinitate showcases how Richard deliberately crafts his content with forms that creatively
reinforce its trinitarian significance. After all, if a reader is frequently struck by how the
regular occurrences of three mutually exclusive and sound arguments come together to
undergird the same truth, how much more likely is he to be persuaded by the argument

7
that despite the triunity of persons, God remains one? Indeed, it is precisely this idea that
“one truth” can be learned in three different ways and yet remain one-and-the-same that
Richard uses for his final argument in De Trinitate VI.25.
So one way Richard fills out the trinitarian dimensions of his treatise is with the
triadic structures he uses to organize his rhetoric. Another way is by limiting himself to
strictly triadic illustrations and metaphors. The introduction alone shimmers with a
superabundance of triads: faith, hope, and love; faith, knowledge, consummation; first,
second, and third heaven; immortality, incorruptibility, and eternity; human, angelic, and
divine; inheritance, merit, and divinity; actuality, virtue, and intellect; faith, reason, and
experience. As the work progresses the triads come more in line with the trinitarian
divisions of persons (e.g., Unbegotten, Only-Begotten, and Neither-Begotten-NorUnbegotten), such that triadic distinctions come to be expected. But the fact that these
illustrations and metaphors are so widespread and non-triadic patterns and illustrations so
scarce, demonstrates just how intentional Richard is in structuring and styling his treatise
in this “trinitarian” way.
The third and final level of De Trinitate gets to the heart and soul of what Richard
does with the trinitarian crafting of his work. Here the trinitarian content mingles with a
trinitarian structure that further explicates the divine revelation of God as Father, Son,
and Spirit. Thus, as the linear argument proceeds to show that God is a triunity of
persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—it simultaneously reinforces the unique attributes
and properties of each divine person.6 In books I-II, for example, Richard makes the case
6

The tradition of appropriating certain properties to specific persons is a common one, dating back
to the patristic period and is therefore not unique to the 12th century or Richard in particular. For more on
appropriation of properties to divine persons, see esp. Dominique Poirel, Livre de la nature et débat
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for the Divine being one substance. He does this by arguing from supreme power,
wisdom, and essence; but in the process he provides individual associations with each
person of the Trinity. So while the one true God is omnipotent and omni-wise,7 and these
divine properties are identical with the divine substance, supreme power is uniquely
appropriated to the Father, supreme wisdom to the Son, and supreme goodness to the
Spirit. And this is just one among many allusions Richard makes throughout the work.
When one stands back to ponder the level of craftsmanship and care with which this
work was written, one cannot help but delight in its artistry and intricacy—even more so
in its design as formative literature. And if we imagine readers taking the same care in
reading De Trinitate as Richard took when composing it, then it’s not too farfetched to
see how these subtle trinitarian dimensions might strike the reader with a love for the
work that propels him further into it. Like the sudden discovery of rare coins on grains of
sand might compel an explorer to seek out further treasures beneath, these added
dimensions to Richard’s treatise on the Trinity surely invited further study; and upon
further study, functioned to reinforce its main subject matter in newly discovered ways.
So when we approach a work like Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate and a thesis
delineating the trinitarian dimensions with which it was constructed, we are not simply
providing some general thoughts about the relation of style to substance; we are rather at
the heart of theology itself—where Christian formation, discipleship, and devotion to
e

trinitaire au XII siècle: Le “De tribus diebus” de Hugues de Saint-Victor, Bibliotheca Victorina, 14
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), and n. 383 of this work.
7

While ‘omni-wise’ is not Richard’s, it adequately captures what Richard means when he
distinguishes between the Wisdom unique to Divinity and the wisdom in which man participates:
“sapientiam summam,” “sapientiam ipsam,” “plenitudinem sapientiae.” Richard, De Trinitate II.13. My
thanks to Dr. Dennis Martin for coming up with this term during our weekly Latin readings.
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God are the governing framework from which and by which theology is read and written.
It is written with a vow to maintain fidelity to the Scriptures as the divinely inspired
Word of God as well as to those church Fathers who handed them down; and it is crafted
in a way that exercises and “sustains” the soul in its ascent toward a bona fide divine
encounter. It is written with a desire to make the incommunicable communicable: to
bring the holiness—the uniqueness—of the Divine into the common; and by doing so, to
make the common “special.” In return, learning brings the communicable to the
incommunicable in a way that “extends” through all the multidimensionalities of visible
and invisible things to the outer realms of reason, imagination, devotion, and study,
propelling the soul of the novice toward beatitude—of union with God—creator with his
Creator. It brings theology full circle, returning God’s Word and oneself to Him full
rather than void and empty (Isaiah 55). Richard constructs the theology in De Trinitate
with a view to celebrating rather than challenging these traditions. Like the solemn walls
of the faithful monk’s cell, they provide a glorious freedom and silence within which to
hear the Word of God, to be transfigured by it, and to bring that “apocalypse” to the page
in a way that draws oneself and others into conformity with its brilliance.
Survey of Literature on Method and the Organization of this Work
The literature on Richard of St. Victor can be divided into four categories. Early
work on him focused on whether he was more a mystic than a scholastic.8 Subsequent
8

Authors emphasizing Richard’s mysticism: Jean Châtillon, Trois opuscules spirituels de Richard
de Saint-Victor: Textes inédits accompagnés d’études critiques et de notes (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes,
1986) [not read], Michael W. Blastic, “Condilectio: Personal Mysticism and Speculative Theology in the
Works of Richard of Saint Victor” (Ph.D. diss., Saint Louis University, 1992) [not seen], Steven Chase,
Angelic Wisdom: The Cherubim and the Grace of Contemplation in Richard of St. Victor, Studies in
Spirituality and Theology Series, 2 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Works
emphasizing Richard’s scholastic acumen with little attention to his spirituality noted by den Bok: Heinz
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work sees a blend of both in Richard with the emphasis on his sources and influences
determining which of the two is given greater weight. Steven Chase, for example, sees a
strong Dionysian influence at work in Richard’s Mystical Ark9; whereas Nico den Bok
sees more influence from Augustine and Anselm and downplays Dionysian influence.10
Aside from scholarship focused on Richard’s spirituality, his trinitarianism is receiving
greater attention, with some claiming it is the most important trinitarian theology between
Augustine and Aquinas.11 This high esteem for Richard is based on the view that he
provides a robust social trinitarianism. Nico den Bok deals with the question as to
whether the social trinitarian reading of Richard is warranted and concludes that it is
not.12 He argues that while leaning more in this direction, Richard offers a more “‘MonoWipfler, Die Trinitätsspekulation des Petrus von Poitiers und die Trinitätsspekulation des Richard von St.
Viktor: Ein Vergleich, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Theologie des Mittelalters, 41, 1 (Münster i.W.:
Aschendorff, 1965) [not read], Joseph Ebner, Die Erkenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor, Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 19, 4 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1917) [not read]; Works that
attempt to harmonize these two aspects of Richard: Gervais Dumeige, Richard de Saint-Victor et l’idée
chrétienne de l’amour, Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1952), Nico den Bok, Communicating the Most High: Person and Trinity in the Theology of
Richard of St.Victor (ca. 1173): A Systematic Study, Bibliotheca Victorina, 7 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols,
1996), Dale M. Coulter, Per visibilia ad invisibilia: Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor d. 1173,
Bibliotheca Victorina, 19 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2006).
9

Chase, Angelic Wisdom, 28. On Dionysian influence in Richard’s De Trinitate, see nn. 178 and 360
of this work.
10

Den Bok, 163 n. 53. Dumeige sees Richard using Dionysius for illustration rather than as
inspiration for his own thought. Coulter, 177. Cacciapuoti argues against the retrieval of Dionysian
apophasis in Richard. Pierluigi Cacciapuoti, “Deus existentia amoris”: Teologia della carità e teologia
della trinità negli scritti di Riccardo di San Vittore (†1173), Bibliotheca Victorina, 9 (Turnhout, Belgium:
Brepols, 1998), 106-7 [not read]. Den Bok concurs, noting if true, the “distinction between imago and
veritas collapses.” Den Bok, 134 n. 162. Boethius is also relevant as an alternative or complementary
source for these ideas. See nn. 322 and 360 of this work.
11

“Kasper and von Balthasar join the positive judgment passed on Richard by Albert Stohr. Michael
Schmaus, for one, had followed Stohr much earlier.” Den Bok, 91. Yves Congar shares this assessment,
seeing a move from essentialism to personalism. Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, Milestones in
Catholic Theology (New York: Herder & Herder, 1997), 87.
12

Den Bok’s concern is that contemporary interpreters misrepresent Richard’s thought by
anachronistically projecting their modern conceptions of person, freedom, relationality, individuality,
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Personal’ Trinitarianism.” That is, the relationship of God-to-man remains that of Personto-person and not that of God-to-society/mankind nor one divine person to one human
person.13 Other works situate Richard within his Victorine context. These focus on
specifics such as exploring the liturgical sequences used and adapted by the Victorines14
or detailing the hermeneutical practices of various Victorine writers.15
Richard composed in Latin, and not all of his work can be found in an English
translation.16 His Benjamin minor (under the title Twelve Patriarchs), his Benjamin
major (under the title Mystical Ark) and book III of his De Trinitate can be found in
society, etc. into the Trinity, subsequently appealing to this Trinity as a “Perfect-Society” in order to
prescribe those modern utopian ideals. See den Bok, 88-89, 189 n. 150, 190 n. 154, 314 n. 126, and esp.
477-87. I share den Bok’s concern, but for matters related to the textual history of Richard’s De Trinitate
(see Appendices A-B of this work) and Richard’s quid/quis distinction, I believe there is a nonanachronistic social trinitarianism in Richard that den Bok’s thesis precludes. See esp. nn. 323 and 457 of
this work.
13

Den Bok, 460.

14

Margot Fassler, Gothic Song: Victorine Sequences and Augustinian Reform in Twelfth-Century
Paris, Cambridge Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Music (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993). Her second edition is forthcoming.
15

Beryl Smalley, Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1964). Michael A. Signer, “From Theory to Practice: The De doctrina christiana and the
Exegesis of Andrew of St. Victor,” a chapter in Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina christiana of
Augustine in the Middle Ages, ed. Edward D. English, Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 84-98.
16

Works of Richard’s that have yet to be translated into English include Ad clamat ex seir,
Carbonum et cinerum, Causam quam nesciebam, De comparatione Christi ad florem et Mariae ad virgam,
De concordia temporum vegum conregnantium super Iudam et Israel, De differentia peccati mortalis et
venialis, De differentia sacraficii Abrahae a sacraficio beate Mariae virginis, De Emmanuele, De
eruditione hominis interioris, De exterminatione mali et promotione boni, De judicaria potestate in finali et
universali judicio, De meditandis plagis quae circa finem mundi evenient, De missione Spiritus sanctii, De
potestate ligandi et solvendi, De quaestionibus regulae sancti Augustini solutis, De sacrificio David
prophetae, De spiritu blasphemiae, De statu interioris hominis, De superexcellenti baptismo Christi, De
templo Salominis ad litteram, De tribis de personis appropriatis in Trinitate, De verbis apostoli,
Declarationes nonnularum difficultatum Scripturae, Elemosina patris erit in oblivione, Expositio
difficultatum suborientium in expositione Tabernaculi feoderis, In Apocalypsin Joannes, In Ezechielis
visionem, In illa die, Liber exceptionem, Misit Herodes rex manus, Nonnullae allegoriae tabernaculi
foederis, Quomodo Christus ponitur in signum populorum, Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est amor Patris et
Filii, Sermones centum, Super exiit edictum seu de tribus processionibus.
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Grover Zinn’s book published as part of the Classics of Western Spirituality series. Clare
Kirchberger provides English translations of some of Richard’s works, including various
of his sermons on the Psalms, selections from Mystical Ark and Twelve Patriarchs, as
well as Four Degrees of Violent Love.17 The only full English translation of Richard’s De
Trinitate is soon to be published by Brepols and translated by Chris Evans.18 Currently,
the work is only accessible in a French translation by Salet,19 a German translation by
von Balthasar,20 and in Danish by Rydström-Poulsen.21 The only critical Latin edition of
Richard’s work remains that of J. Ribaillier.22 Chris Evans graciously provided an
advance copy of his forthcoming English translation of De Trinitate, and in what follows,
we rely mostly on his translations. Where further analysis of the Latin is required, we use
Ribaillier’s critical edition.
The most recent works specifically to treat the topic of structure and method in
Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate have been Dale Coulter’s Per visibilia ad invisibilia,
and Nico den Bok’s Communicating the Most High. Coulter focuses more broadly on
Richard’s Mystical Ark and De Trinitate, arguing for a theological method of
17

Clare Kirchberger, trans., Selected Writings on Contemplation (London: Faber & Faber, 1957).

18

Chris Evans, trans., Richardus de Sancto Victore, De Trinitate (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols,
forthcoming).
19

Gaston Salet, La Trinité: texte latin, introduction, traduction et notes. Sources chrétiennes, 63
(Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1959). [Not read].
20

Richard von Sankt-Victor, Die Dreieinigkeit, trans. Hans Urs von Balthasar (Johannes Verlag,
2002). [Not seen].
21

Aage Rydström-Poulson, Richard af Saint-Victor: Om Treenigheden. Introduktion og oversættelse
(København, C.A. Reizels Forlag, 1986). [Not seen].
22

Jean Ribaillier, ed., De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Textes
philosphiques du moyen age, 6 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958).
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contemplative ascent from visible to invisible things.23 He sees the former work as a
prerequisite for undertaking a study of the latter. Nico den Bok focuses mainly on
Richard’s De Trinitate and argues for the pseudo-Athanasian creed—the Quicumque—as
the starting point for an inquiry based on finding “necessary reasons” for the truths it
inscribes.24 To that extent, den Bok sees Richard’s method following Anselm’s fides
quaerens intellectum where this is understood as taking those things already held and
believed by faith and seeking further and more “fitting” or “certain” reasons for believing
them to be true.
The thesis put forward in this work situates itself very near Coulter and den Bok.
We agree with den Bok that Richard takes the Quicumque as his main starting point for
his trinitarian reflections, and that Richard primarily seeks necessary reasons along the
lines of an Anselmian fides quaerens intellectum, but we argue further that Richard
deliberately incorporates these arguments as part of triadic structures with formative
aims.25 As a result, we see Richard’s amazing philosophical clarity and consistency
matched by an equally amazing organizational skill—a dimension to Richard’s treatise
that has yet to be fully appreciated. The thesis, likewise, falls in line with Coulter’s
23

Coulter, 19. Coulter argues for the harmony of the scholastic and mystical dimensions of Richard
by rooting it in an overarching framework—per visibilia ad invisibilia—that sees them as complementary
dimensions of a contemplative ascent to the face of God.
24

Commentaries on the Quicumque became common in the 12th century. For sources, see den Bok
156 n. 26.
25

This formative aim in Richard’s compositions has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., I. Van ‘T Spijker,
“Learning by Experience: Twelfth-Century Monastic Ideas,” a chapter in Centers of Learning: Learning
and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East, eds. Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A.
MacDonald (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), 197-206. What we wish to highlight in this work is
how this dimension manifests itself in Richard’s De Trinitate, a work that might be judged more by its
philosophical abstraction than for its formative aims. Furthermore we tailor our analysis to the specific way
Richard designs his work with triadic structures in order to use them for this purpose.
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analysis of seeing contemplation within De Trinitate as an ascent from visible to invisible
things. But where Coulter sees Richard harmonizing opposites, we argue that opposing
terms in De Trinitate are more often part of a triad. In De Trinitate, Richard usually
searches for a third, and this third creates triadic forms and structures that underly
Richard’s entire treatise. In addition, we add further context to Coulter’s Per visibilia ad
invisibilia by filling out the Augustinian heritage from which Richard draws all of the
major pieces for his De Trinitate. Per visibilia ad invisibilia is one among several
Augustinian margins within which Richard lives and composes his work.
Our thesis uncovers an added dimension to Richard’s treatise on the Trinity, and
attending to this dimension helps us appreciate, understand, and read Richard’s De
Trinitate in a proportionately deeper way. For as we discern the intricacies of Richard’s
compositions we become further enriched by them. As Richard himself says:
Certainly, the more fully, the more firmly something is learned, the
more richly the mind will be enlarged for holding larger and deeper
things. But nevertheless, it seems evident that whatever skill has
been obtained by instruction is strengthened, enlarged and perfected
by use and exercise. Again: What does it mean that in one and the
same effort in which we are instructed and are exercised we see
now more subtly, now more clearly, unless it means that
enlargement and sharp-sightedness of the mind increase according
to the mode of attention?26
We claim that Richard constructs his De Trinitate with trinitarian forms and
structures for the purpose of sustaining the hearts and shaping the minds of his readers
with the contemplation of the Trinity. Richard gives the content of his work a Trinitarian
form that has the power to transform his reader in ways it cannot if it is ignored.

26

Richard, Mystical Ark V.3; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 313.
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This work is divided into six chapters. Chapter 4 lays out the main thesis, showing
that Richard argues for the Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. But to situate
that thesis properly, we must provide some appropriate context and explain the major
theological influences Richard drew upon for composing his work (Chapter 1). Likewise,
it is helpful to understand life at the abbey where he composed the work and the
relationship the treatise has with some of his other literary compositions (Chapter 2). We
also must proceed with caution concerning the role of reason in theological
contemplation for Richard, lest we restrict ourselves to our modern and narrow view of
this term and misunderstand him. This corrective helps us see the highly favorable but
limited role reason plays in Richard’s views on theological contemplation (Chapter 3).
With that context in mind, we focus on our thesis: the trinitarian way Richard
structures his De Trinitate and how he uses these structures for formative purposes.
Chapter 4 focuses on the structural elements of the thesis, making the case that Richard
deliberately crafts his treatise with triadic forms. Chapter 5 deals with the formative
implications of these structures and determines how they edify the individual reader as
well as the Christian community.
Finally, we look at the chief objections that might be raised against our thesis and
provide adequate rejoinders to them (Chapter 6). We then conclude with a fitting
summary of our findings and some insight on what Richard’s De Trinitate teaches us
about “constructive theology” (Conclusion).

CHAPTER ONE
THE INFLUENCE OF AUGUSTINE AND ANSELM
See and ask for the ancient paths . . .
The sources and influences on Richard of St. Victor are as vast as any in the 12th
century, and so rather than get caught up in detailing all of them we confine ourselves to
those who are the most frequently cited by him in his treatise on the Trinity: Augustine
and Anselm.27
The Heritage of Augustine
We begin with Augustine—and appropriately so—for between the two, Richard
cites Augustine forty-three times more than Anselm.28 This is to be expected given that
Augustine’s works were the most frequently read at the abbey of St. Victor and that the
Victorines, like many other canons regular in the 12th century, looked to his writings
(and his Rule) for constructing their lives in accordance with the “common life.” The
canons regular and Richard’s life as one will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. For
now it is only important to point out that as a canon regular, living in Paris, Richard was

27

In narrowing our focus to Augustine and Anselm we do not deny the many other sources and
influences on Richard’s thought but only highlight the two primary theologians he draws upon in De
Trinitate. As is clear from the Victorine reading-cycle, Richard knows Gregory the Great and Origen. He
also builds on Boethius for his taxonomy of properties in II.25 and his definition of ‘person’ in bk. IV.
There are also traces of Pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor, Achard of St. Victor, and others. But
Anselm of Canterbury and Augustine—particularly their works on the Trinity—are the primary influences
on Richard as he composes De Trinitate.
28

Congar, 87.
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the most familiar with Augustine’s writings, memorized large sections of them, and
prized them above all. In Richard’s world, Augustine’s corpus would take second place
only to the Scriptures.29 Augustine, therefore provides the primary margins within which
Richard composes his De Trinitate.
For brevity we limit our treatment of Augustine to the work he devoted to the
Trinity. Richard cites it most in his own treatise because he too is writing on the Trinity.
This focus provides the opportunity for some direct contrasts between these two works.
But because our thesis deals with how Richard writes with a view to the formation of his
readers, we further confine our analysis to the formative dimensions of Augustine’s De
Trinitate with a view to how these are used by Richard. This proves just as fruitful as a
more comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s corpus because Augustine’s De Trinitate
is a mature work—written in his later years.30 As a result, it takes up many of the central

29

“We are fortunate in having for the Victorine community a list that identifies a substantial number
of works assigned for reading during meals. Found in chapter 48 of the Liber ordinis [sancti Victoris
Parisiensis] under the title ”De lectione mensae,” the list shows that at mealtime, which was one of the few
times outside of a chapter meeting or the daily round of liturgical celebrations when the canons gathered as
a group, they listened to the lector reading from a prescribed sequence of works, mostly patristic, that
tended to be homilies or biblical commentaries. Among the authors whose works are specifically
mentioned in this list is Augustine of Hippo, whose homilies and biblical commentaries comprise a
significant portion of the yearly cycle of readings. In this distinctive, communal reading and hearing,
Augustine was present for the canons in a way set apart from the regular liturgy and periods of instruction
or study, each of which also offered numerous opportunities to encounter Augustine’s writings.” Grover A.
Zinn, Jr. “The Influence of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana Upon the Writings of Hugh of St. Victor,” a
chapter in Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages, ed. Edward
D. English, Notre Dame Conferences in Medieval Studies (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1995), 48. And also, “ . . . one-fourth of the [Victorine] year was dedicated to Augustine, slightly less
to Origen, and about one-sixth to Gregory.” Ibid., 50. In the context of required Scripture reading, see Hugh
of Saint Victor, The Didascalicon of Hugh of Saint Victor: A Guide to the Arts, trans. Jerome Taylor (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 104.
30

Most date Augustine’s De Trinitate to the decade prior to his death in 430. The ideas were already
part of Augustine’s thought in ca. 399 when he likely began the work, but not completed until he was in his
late sixties. Allan D. Fitzgerald, Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), s.v. “De Trinitate.”
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themes and concepts from his other writings. Moreover, the theology of the Trinity is the
core of Christian orthodoxy itself. It is the source and end of all theology—the nexus in
which everything true and right and good coheres. Augustine’s De Trinitate thus forms a
developmental and theological apex from which we can see some of the main contours of
his thought and discern some key foundations upon which subsequent trinitarian
reflection would be constructed.
We begin where Augustine began his treatise on the Trinity: with the Scriptures. He
cites Scripture plentifully but one verse focuses our thoughts on De Trinitate’s formative
dimensions: 1 Corinthians 13:12.31 In this one verse, and the chapter that surrounds it, we
discern the major themes Richard picks up on in Augustine’s theology. The verse states,
“Now we see in a glass (speculum) darkly, but then we shall see face-to-face.”32 It was
probably part of a collection of theophanic texts (i.e., those that deal with a visitation
from God and/or the desire to encounter God in some more direct way).33
31

Augustine, De Trinitate, I.1, 8, 10, 13; II.17; III.4; V.1, 10; VI.10; VIII.4; IX.1, 3; X.3, 9; XII.14;
XIII.20; XIV.2, 17, 18, 19; XV.2, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 24. Note the higher frequency in XV where
Augustine consummates the journey to the “face-to-face.” All citations of Augustine are taken from Nicene
& Post-Nicene Series: On the Trinity, Enchiridion, Faith and Creed, Catechising, ed. Philip Schaff. Nicene
Fathers, 3 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 1980). On the importance of 1 Corinthians 13:12 to
Augustine’s thought see Frederick van Fleteren, “Per speculum et in aenigmate: The Use of 1 Corinthians
13:12 in the Writings of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 23 (1992): 69-102.
32

Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte tunc
autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.
33

See, e.g., how Augustine connects this ‘mirror’ (speculum) with the ‘watchtower’ (specula)
Moses is placed in before he is permitted to see God’s glory: Augustine De Trinitate II.16-18 (cf. Exodus
33:22). Given the basic Christian desire for direct encounter with God, and its priority within monasticism,
catenas of scriptures pertaining to encounters with the Divine were an early part of the inherited Christian
tradition. See esp. Bogdan G. Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate: An
Eastern Orthodox Perspective,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 52:1 (2008): 67-93. 1 Corinthians
13:12, however, seems to have become a gathering point for them, providing a central place for their
collective contemplation. In 2 Corinthians 3:18 Paul, alluding to Exodus 33:22, introduces a theology of
participation and illumination that contains key elements in Augustine’s thought: face, mirror, glory,
reformation in the image of God. Augustine pulls all of this together in his use of 1 Corinthians 13:12.
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We will treat the specific wording of this verse in detail later, showing a play on the
Latin wording for ‘mirror’ that connects with Richard and Anselm, but for now the
context of this verse demands our attention. 1 Corinthians 13 is primarily about the
priority of love above everything else. Without love, speech loses the ability to provide
true knowledge. As the apostle Paul says, to “ . . . speak in the tongues of men and of
angels, but have not love . . . ” is to be a “clanging gong or cymbal.” Further, love is the
greatest of those things that remain when all else fails: “And now these three remain:
faith, hope, and love. But the greatest of these is love.” And what kind of love is the
greatest of all? It is divine love; a love that is one-of-a-kind. Such love is “patient, kind,
and not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not
irritable or resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears
all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”34 It is the love God has
for his children; and the love He rightfully asks of them in return—a love that overflows
toward God and neighbor. This love plays a prominent role throughout Augustine’s
writings. Indeed, it is hard to find a single work where it does not turn up. And where it
does turns up in Augustine, it is often prioritized. De doctrina christiana, for example, a
work Richard heard read frequently at St. Victor,35 is conceived as a journey from fear to
love. In the same work love is the regula fidei that governs scriptural exegesis and
34

1 Corinthians 13:4-7. Paul’s description dovetails with the description God gives to Moses in
Exodus 34:6: “Then the LORD passed by in front of [Moses] and proclaimed, ‘YHWH, YHWH-EL,
compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in lovingkindness and truth . . . .” Paul picks up
on all of these allusions to the Hebrew ‘dRsRj’ for “lovingkindness” throughout the Torah, Prophets, and
Psalms: God’s faithfulness and lovingkindess endure forever, a divine love that “cries out” (~a!rVqˆ¥yÅw) for
human imitation and reciprocation.
35

“De doctrina christiana by Augustine and Moralia on Job by Gregory the Great were regular
mealtime reading at St. Victor.” Coulter, 227 n. 6. See also n. 29 above.
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homiletic preaching.36 Likewise, this love plays an important role in Augustine’s De
Trinitate and Johannine homilies,37 and its prominence may have led Richard to give it
focused treatment in his own argument for the Trinity of divine persons. As Augustine
writes in his main section devoted to love in his De Trinitate:
No other thing, then, is chiefly to be regarded in this inquiry, which
we make concerning the Trinity and concerning knowing God,
except what is true love, nay, rather what is love. For that is to be
called love which is true, otherwise it is desire; and so those who
desire are said improperly to love, just as they who love are said
improperly to desire. But this is true love, that cleaving to the truth
we may live righteously, and so may despise all mortal things in
comparison with the love of men, whereby we wish them to live
righteously.38
This love also becomes important in the later sections of Augustine’s De Trinitate where
it is incorporated with triads designed to elevate the mind toward further levels of
righteousness and rest in the contemplation of the Trinity.39
The second element in 1 Corinthians 13 is the move from what is partial and
imperfect to what is complete and perfect. As we see later, this distinction is the fulcrum

36

Augustine, De doctrina christiana III.

37

I think especially of Augustine’s tenth homily on the 1st Epistle of John: “I have seen the end of
all perfection.”
38

Augustine, De Trinitate VIII.7. Bk. VIII begins Augustine’s movement into love: love with
respect to he-that-loves, that-which-is-loved, and love. He refines the triad in the subsequent books. Two
points of connection with Richard’s De Trinitate are (a) Augustine’s precedent for using triads in his
articulations of the Trinity and (b) these triads are drawn out from the concept of Love.
39

Augustine’s love triads in De Trinitate: faith-hope-love (VIII.4); he-that-loves, that-which-isloved, and love (VIII.10); myself, that-which-I-love, and love (IX.2); memory-understanding-will/love
(X.1ff.); remember-understand-love (XV.28). As David Bell points out, Augustine articulates his goal in
Sermon 52.16-17: “Look in the creature, and see if it be possible to find something there ‘by which we
might demonstrate that some three things are shown forth separately, and [yet] operate inseparably.’”
Quoted in David N. Bell, The Image and Likeness: The Augustinian Spirituality of William of St. Thierry,
Cistercian Studies, 78 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1984), 34-35.
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upon which Richard’s entire treatise rides.40 Now we see the Divine only partially, dimly,
in a dark glass41; but then, we shall see fully, completely, face-to-face. For now,
knowledge of the Divine comes through glimpses, from prophecies, from tongues, but
then we shall behold—in a never-ending, and everlasting glimpse—the eternal face of
God. For now we think and reason as children, maturing in knowledge and faith: We still
see only partially. All of this is the scriptural background to the quest for true knowledge
rooted in faith and that underlies the theological method of Augustine, Anselm, and
Richard. This desire to take what is imperfect and partial toward its perfection and
wholeness motivates them to write on the Trinity as they do. Augustine writes:
But that is the right purpose which starts from faith. For a certain
faith is in some way the starting-point of knowledge; but a certain
knowledge will not be made perfect, except after this life, when we
shall see face to face. Let us therefore be thus minded, so as to
know that the disposition to seek the truth is more safe than that
which presumes things unknown to be known. Let us therefore so
seek as if we should find, and so find as if we were about to seek.42
Third, we see the ‘mirror’ of 1 Corinthians 13:12 as a “gathering point,” a ‘collatio’
used by Augustine to bring together allusions to similar wording and parallels with other
biblical texts. In doing so, he constructs the move from partial to perfect as a journey—an

40

The concept of ‘plenitudo’ (e.g., fullness, completion, perfection) plays the most significant role
in Richard’s argumentation for the Trinity of persons in bk. III and often forms the third element of his
triadic structures (e.g., Highest-Best-Fullest). As shown in chapter 3 of this work, it is the primary principle
Richard uses to decorate the margins of Augustine and Anselm on the Trinity. See esp. n. 79 and n. 171 of
this work.
41

“Given the nature of medieval mirrors the image is apt. They were made of polished metal and
gave at best a fuzzy and somewhat dim reflection. Subject to tarnishing, the accumulation of dirt and other
vicissitudes of use, they needed careful attention to be useful. So it is with the soul. Only by continual
attention to discipline can the mind become still, as it were, and begin to experience a new reality, divine
showings . . .” Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 20-21.
42

Augustine, De Trinitate IX.1.
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ascent—along three lines. First, it is an ascent from immaturity to maturity, from
formation to re-formation: “When I was a child, I reasoned like a child; when I grew up I
put childish things aside.” Here we note the pedagogical dimensions of Augustine’s
treatise on the Trinity where he starts with “first things”—Scriptures pertaining to the
Trinity and the proper way to understand and reconcile them.43 But he subsequently
moves on to “second things”—adult things—things that demand the identification and
use of that chief thing within man that sets him apart in the material created order: his
soul, his mind, his reason. It is to discover that one has been created in the image of
God44 and that the proper ordering and use of that image—in mind, understanding, and
will/love—properly prepares one’s soul for a direct encounter with God: the promise of
seeing Him face-to-face.45
Augustine, like the Victorines, gave great weight to the letter of Scripture,46 even to
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the point of emphasizing the significance of prepositions. One such preposition exploited
by Augustine was ‘ad’ in ad imaginem Dei (i.e., to the image of God).47 Man is not
simply created in the image of God; through sin, that image is marred and has to be
restored. Thus man, though created in the image of God, must still be restored to that
image. That ‘ad’ begins the ascent to God and requires both intellective and affective
control as one seeks to be restored in full accordance with that image. And in a play on
the Latin wording that becomes commonplace after Augustine, that ‘mirror’ (speculum)
also becomes the ‘watchtower’ (specula)—the place in the house of God (domus Dei)
one ascends, keeps a lookout, and awaits a visitation from the Lord.48
But Augustine also frequently glosses 1 Corinthians 13:12 with two important
scriptural allusions. These glosses further establish the contours of his theology and
become foundational to Richard’s as well. The first is Romans 1:20 and the second is
2 Corinthians 4:18. In Romans 1:20, it states that “the invisible qualities of God have
been made plain to men through those things which have been made so that men are
without excuse.” Thus through visible things one comes to discern the invisible qualities
of God. As Augustine writes:
But indeed all these visible and sensible things are, as we have
often said, exhibited through the creature made subject in order to
signify the invisible and intelligible God, not only the Father, but
also the Son and the Holy Spirit, “of whom are all things, and
‘transparent’ description of an object.” Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, 184.
47
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through whom are all things, and in whom are all things”; although
“the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His
eternal power and Godhead.”49
That Augustine understands this trajectory of visible to invisible with the mirror
(speculum) of 1 Corinthians 13:12 is demonstrated by the fact that he continues in II.16 to
speak of Moses’ desire to see God plainly; but it is not until God places Moses in the
‘watchtower’ (specula) that he will be able to see His glory; that is, his divine substance:
Assuredly he knew that he saw corporeally, and he sought the true
sight of God spiritually . . . the Lord afterward said to Moses,
“Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see my face,
and live.” And the Lord said, “Behold, there is a place by me, and
thou shall stand upon a rock: and it shall come to pass, while my
glory passeth by, that I will put thee into a watch-tower of the rock,
and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: and I will take
away my hand, and thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall
not be seen.”50
Thus the “ascent” from the imperfect to the perfect, from the partial to the complete
vision of God, also consists of moving from the visible to the invisible (per visibilia ad
invisibilia).51 One discerns by means of visible things what one ought to think about God,
because God, in providing them, makes this possible.
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And this leads us to the second gloss. What is visible also changes. Visible things
come to be and cease to be, but invisible things are eternal; and God is the most eternal of
all.52 2 Corinthians 4:18 states, “while we look at the things which are not seen; for the
things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” The
context of 1 Corinthians 13:12 makes clear that the contrast between what is partial and
what is complete is not just a question of what is lacking that might be fulfilled, but
also—and this is the point of emphasis in the passage—a question of what lasts when
everything else fails: “And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love” (emphasis
mine). What is eternal remains, lasts, and abides. What is temporal does not. So what is
eternal? In the final analysis, only God is eternal. But God is Truth and God is Love,53
and thus to seek God is to seek the Truth and Love in the way of truth and love. These are
the rails that mark the journey. They are what fix the lines of movement toward God. And
that movement, that passion, ends with its eternal destination. It is where the soul,
remaining in love, remains with Him and in Him as its fixed and eternal resting place. As
Augustine says in his Confessions: “Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are
restless till they find rest in Thee.”54
These themes do not offer a comprehensive survey of Augustine’s theology or his
own De Trinitate, but they do represent major contours of this thought. Many of them
coalesce around the ‘mirror’ of 1 Corinthians 13:12. But that mirror and these themes
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provide the margins of subsequent trinitarian articulation and reflection in the
Augustinian tradition. And as we will see, Richard also writes within them.
The Guidance of Anselm
The second most cited author in Richard’s De Trinitate is St. Anselm of
Canterbury.55 Anselm lived just a generation prior to Richard, but Anselm’s works were
well known to him. This is for two reasons. First, a good bit of Anselm’s compositions
and ecclesiastical involvement focused on debate about the Trinity, some of which was
fueled by one of his early works: De Grammatico. Second, two of Anselm’s greatest
works on the Trinity—his Monologion and Proslogion—became popular and were
widely published before Richard’s time.
Anselm became part of a new cycle of trinitarian polemics with one of his early
writings: De Grammatico—a treatise laying out some basic principles for predication.
Among the things Anselm considered in this treatise was the question of whether a white
substance is a white substance proper or a substance that is white. In the process Anselm
used the Trinity as an illustration. But this rather innocuous illustration was made a
controversy. Roscelin accused Anselm of leaning towards a tritheistic conception of the
Divine based on this distinction.56 This prompted Anselm’s response which he took up in
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his On the Incarnation. But Anselm’s trinitarian reflections continued, and his treatment
would reach its most sublime form in his Monologion and Proslogion. These two works,
along with an added dialogical exchange with Gaunilo who responds “On Behalf of the
Fool,” were some of the most copied and published of Anselm’s works. The Monologion
was written under the promptings of some of Anselm’s pupils; the Proslogion was
written later as Anselm’s thoughts further coalesced to form a single argument for the
existence of God. The writings became so popular, in fact, that Anselm sought the advice
of his mentor, Lanfranc. Lanfranc’s only corrective was that Anselm cite his authorities
rather than merely quote them. After these writings Anselm attended the Council of Bari
(1098)—a council that had as one of its chief objectives to reconcile East-West rifts with
respect to whether the Holy Spirit was sent from both the Father and the Son or from the
Son alone. Anselm was a major representative of the former view and defended it in an
attempt to persuade those who held to the latter. As a result of that debate, Anselm wrote
On the Procession of the Holy Spirit.57
Thus a generation prior to Richard of St. Victor there had been quite a bit of activity
clarifying and better articulating theological contemplation of the Trinity. Much of the
debate and contours of trinitarian thought at the time were given shape by Anselm’s
thought and writings.58 Given the popularity of Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion, it
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is not surprising that Richard would have known them and incorporated some of their
elements into his own work on the Trinity.
Anselm likewise fits within the Augustinian tradition but his connection with
Augustine becomes explicit in his Monologion; for despite Lanfranc’s admonition to cite
his sources, the only author Anselm explicitly mentions is Augustine.59 As we will see,
Richard works very closely with Anselm’s Monologion. We therefore have at least prima
facie grounds for seeing the new fullness Richard develops on the Trinity as the fruit of
an Augustinian-Anselmian trajectory. Moreover, our analysis bears this out, highlighting
that Richard develops formative as well as logical aspects of his predecessors’ thought.
We divide our treatment of Anselm along three lines. First, because our thesis pertains to
how Richard structures his own treatise on the Trinity with formative aims, we look at the
structure and formative aims of Anselm’s Monologion. Here we see that Anselm
structures his meditatio according to the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad popular in the
11th and 12th centuries.60 In addition, we note that the flow, in the last two sections of
his work, moves from right thinking to right doing—taking up the Augustinian maxim of
being perfect in “word and deed.”61 Second, we are interested in Anselm’s understanding
of ‘reason’ (ratio) and “necessary reasons” (rationes necessariae) as they pertain to
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theological contemplation. This sets up the proper historical context for Richard’s own
use of reason and its role in his writings. Thus the treatment of reason and necessity in
Anselm initiates some correctives to be developed in more detail in chapter 3 that
broaden our understanding of the term and its use in the 12th century. In addition, we also
find that Richard picks up on Anselm’s distinction of what is “above and beyond” reason
and the important, but limited, role reason has for Trinitarian contemplation. Third, and
finally, we look to those key Augustinian principles and ideas Anselm identifies and
builds upon that are so central to Richard’s own work on the Trinity. This prepares us to
see how the “heritage of Augustine” and the “guidance of Anselm” fuse together into a
new fullness Richard gives them in his own articulation of the Trinity.
Two main structural elements deserve highlighting in Anselm’s Monologion, and
both of them pertain to his intended triadic organization of the treatise. The first concerns
the basic structure that Anselm himself explicitly points to with his own words. In
Monologion 29, Anselm writes that chapters 1-28 pertain to “properties” of the supreme
nature, whereas what follows pertains to the supreme nature’s “verbalization.” As he says
in 29, “So far, following reason’s lead, I have been working through the properties of the
supreme nature. It is now, I think, the right moment to investigate, if I am able, the
supreme nature’s verbalization, through which all things were created.”62 Anselm first
considers God in God’s-self (i.e., God considered by Himself apart from creation).
Created things are spoken of in 1-28 only for the sake of human understanding and
speaking; but here God is considered primarily as what He is apart from the created
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order, as God in se. What follows in the second section, from 29-65, is a consideration of
the processions (i.e., what proceeds within God that is not the created order: God ad
intra). Finally, in the third section, 65-80, Anselm moves to the highest element in the
created order—Man, created in the image of God—and proceeds to spell out the
restoration of man according to that image. As he says:
It is now clear that one cannot get to see anything about the
supreme nature by means of what is proper to it. Rather, one must
work through something other than it. And hence, it is certain that
what one gets closest to knowledge of it through, is that which most
closely resembles it. And the more a creature resembles it, the more
excellent its nature must be. So such a thing has a double effect: its
close resemblance helps bring the inquiring mind closer to the
supreme truth, and the excellence of its created nature teaches the
mind what to think about its Creator. And the greater the
resemblance and excellence, the more it helps and teaches.63
The transition from the second to the third section of the Monologion is also a move
from “word” to “deed”—another Augustinian maxim. It is where man—in contemplation
of the trinitarian God—undertakes, with God’s help, the reformation of his soul en route
to God. Here theological meditation brings moral integrity to the rational soul as it
ultimately seeks what is above and beyond it: the face of the Divine. As Anselm says:
To strive to give, therefore, expression to this impressed image; to
strive to actualize, by an act of will, this, nature’s potential: such,
above all, is, in consequence, the debt that the rational creature
owes its Creator. A debt above and beyond the very fact that it
exists. To be able to be conscious of, understand and love the
supreme good is its most momentous ability (emphasis mine).64
And this transition in Anselm—like we see also in Richard—marks the end of the visible
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footprints and vestiges of the Divine within the created order that man’s graced mind and
reason are able to discern. The trail to the fact of God does not end here, but where one
steps next in the ascent is “above and beyond” reason. As Anselm says: “This seems to
me to be a sublime mystery, which stretches well beyond the horizon of human
understanding.”65 Here the sandals of reason are set aside and one treads cautiously in the
footsteps of Christ to reform the soul in accordance with His image.
But there is a second triadic pattern to notice in the Monologion—and this triad
most reveals that the objective of Anselm’s Monologion is a formative one. This is the
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that many writings on the Trinity (including Richard’s) in
the 11th and 12th centuries draw upon. What interests us about the triad in Anselm is the
unique—and reverse!—way he implements it in the Monologion. Among the three
elements of this triad, power is usually attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and
goodness to the Spirit.66 The primacy of the Father generates the Son in wisdom and the
Spirit in goodness. So one might expect a straightforward analysis of each element of this
triad starting first with Power, and then subsequently with Wisdom and Goodness, as
many writers on the Trinity do. But this is not what Anselm does. In fact, he does just the
opposite. Rather than start with Power and proceed to Wisdom and Goodness, he starts
with Goodness, then Wisdom, and ends with Power. These elements correspond, roughly,
with the three sections of the Monologion given above: 1-28 with Goodness, 29-65 with
Wisdom/Word, and Power in 80.
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What is the reason for this? The clue most helpful for making sense of this reverse
order of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad comes from the pen of Anselm himself.
Shortly after Anselm wrote the Monologion, he wrote his Proslogion where he explicitly
delineates his method in composing the former work. In the prologue to the Proslogion,
he writes that he crafted the Monologion “as an example of meditation on the meaning of
faith from the point of view of one seeking, through silent reasoning within himself”
(emphasis mine).67 Thus although metaphysically, ontologically—according to the order
of being—the order of the triad is Power —> Wisdom —> Goodness, reflecting the order
from God-to-man, Anselm picks the triad up with respect to the first point of contact man
has with God: an experience of his participation in the supreme Goodness that permeates
all good things. For man must first encounter and inhabit this Goodness in order to be
illuminated with its light and, by means of it, behold the inaccessible light of the glory of
God. One then verbalizes the verbalization of God, approximating with words in the
mind the perfect Wisdom and Word of God completely exemplified in the Christ. Jesus,
the divine Word of God is the most sublime manifestation of the supreme Wisdom of
God. As one longs for and seeks the face of God by means of that Wisdom—
approximating one’s own “silent reasoning” to that heavenly Reasoning, of one’s internal
and temporal word to that eternal Word—one comes closer to glimpsing the supreme
essence.
But this imitation and approximation of the Word—‘righting’ one’s own
verbalization (and hence, comprehension) of divine Wisdom—cannot stop at words
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alone. For chiefly in deed (ultimately, in power) one discovers God in Godself. One must
serve and worship the Lord (Dominus)—as Augustine’s maxim made clear—in word and
deed. It is to extend the ‘righting’ of words to the ‘righting’ of power.68 And this
integration of word and deed in the soul of the seeker forms the apex of the third section
of Anselm’s Monologion: the restoration of man in accordance with the image and
likeness of God. As that ‘re-flection’ properly imitates and approximates—through its
holy efforts and thoughts—the supreme Power-Wisdom-Goodness of God, the closer it
comes to seeing God face-to-face (i.e., as He truly is). Here one encounters the supreme
essence of God without mediation, above and beyond reasons and similitudes. The
rational and devout soul finally reaches, in its earnest longing, the summit of the Most
High God.
This leads Anselm to conclude with a chapter on the supreme and primal power of
God, by means of which come the generation of the Son, the procession of the Spirit, and
the creation of man in accordance with the image of God. Before the supreme power of
God, man finds himself—despite reaching the summit of God—still kneeling in worship
at His footstool. There is one God; there is no other. As Anselm says:
For the supreme essence alone is that through which anything good
is good, without which nothing is good, and out of, through and in
which all things exist. So then, since it, alone, is not just a good
Creator, but is also the superlatively powerful master and the
68
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superlatively wise controller of all things, it is superlatively clear
that this is the only thing that all other natures ought, with all their
might, to love and worship (emphasis mine).69
Some may object that this Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power reversing of the
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad is merely a coincidence; however, we have even further
support for it. At the very end of the Monologion, Anselm also reverses the Augustinian
triad of Faith-Hope-Love in the direction of Love —> Hope —> Faith.70 Taken together,
these two reversals combine with Anselm’s own explicit statement in the prologue of the
Proslogion to make a strong case that he has deliberately ordered these triads for
formative aims. He writes, starting with the encounter of the Triune God “from the point
of view of one seeking,” and thus the journey begins from love to hope to faith—and
from goodness to wisdom to power.71
This suffices to show some of the formative structure and aims in Anselm’s
Monologion—structures inspired by Augustine that are picked up and used by Richard of
St. Victor. Yet Augustine also sowed some seeds in the form of key principles. These
principles were further cultivated by Anselm and eventually harvested by Richard. What
were they? More specifically, which principles laid down by Augustine and built upon by
Anselm led to Richard’s main line of argument for the Trinity of persons in book III of
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his work? For brevity we limit our analysis to the key principles that led to the genesis of
Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons in book III. This focus both refines our
awareness of the contributions made to his thought by Augustine and Anselm and
increases our appreciation of Richard’s originality in providing a new fullness to them.
For as he points out at the opening of book III, this will be his “bold undertaking,”72
where he seeks necessary reasons for things he has read but has not seen proven.73
One of the starting points for Anselm’s articulation of the Trinity was a principle
found in Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity. Augustine writes that “God is/consists of
whatever it is better to be than not to be.”74 We can call it Augustine’s “Principle of
Perfection.” He means by it that of all of the many good things we come to know and
love, God lacks none of them. It is better to be just than unjust, therefore God is just. It is
better to be eternal than temporal, therefore God is eternal. It is better to be loving than
non-loving, therefore God is loving, etc. Anselm picks up this Augustinian “Principle of
Perfection” and gives it a more “optimal” form. For Anselm, God is not merely the better
of what is better or worse; but God is the best of all. Augustine would agree, but Anselm
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elaborates the idea further and allows it to play a more prominent role in his thought.
Indeed, with respect to Anselm’s Proslogion—a work he prized most of all for its
conciseness and rational perspicuity75—Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” is the
cornerstone on which the entire work is based. The chief difference in Augustine and
Anselm on this point is that Anselm took the principle to its highest level. For Anselm
God is not just perfect, but maximally so. God is the being-than-which-none-greater-canbe-thought.76 Thus God is not merely just as opposed to unjust, but the most just of all.
God is not merely loving as opposed to unloving, but the most loving of all, and so on. In
brief, Anselm takes Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” and turns it into the “Principle
of ‘Maximal’ Perfection.”77 Doing so gives him much of what he needs in his
Proslogion. For because God is maximally perfect—the being-than-which-none-greatercan-be-thought—He must also exist in actuality and not simply as an idea in the mind
alone. For if the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought exists in the mind alone,
one can still imagine a greater being; namely, one that exists in actuality and not as an
idea in the mind alone. Therefore, if God is the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-
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thought, he must exist in actuality and not in the mind alone. His maximal perfection
entails this.
Richard of St. Victor sees what Anselm has done with Augustine’s “Principle of
Perfection” by making it the “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection” and makes two further
moves that give him his argument for the Trinity of persons. First, like Anselm, he looks
to what is maximally perfect; but unlike Anselm, he narrows his focus to target the
greatest virtue of all: Love (caritas). So where Anselm focuses on greatest being, Richard
focuses (at least for book III of his work) on greatest virtue. If God is maximally perfect,
then highest among the goods of his supreme Goodness must be the virtue of love.78 And
if God is love, then . . . . This brings us to the second thing Richard does in fusing
Augustine and Anselm’s principles of perfection. Richard turns his attention to the
fullness of this perfection. Where Augustine turned to melius (better) and Anselm to
optimum (optimal), maximum (maximal), and summum (highest), Richard turns to
plenitudo caritatis (i.e., the fullness of perfect love).79 It is his desire to articulate the
Trinity more “fully” that motivates him. For if God is love, God is perfect love; and if
perfect love, this is both the highest love (summe caritatis) as well is the fullest and most
complete (plenitudo et perfectio).80 Yet perfect love, the fullest and most complete,
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cannot be a private love (privatus amor) contained by one person alone. Such love
requires a multiplicity, and ultimately, a Trinity of persons. Perfect love entails at the
least, a mutual love among equals; and at the most, a third who shares in the love of the
other two.81
Consequently, we can see that Richard’s work builds upon two of his theological
predecessors: Augustine and Anselm. We discovered that the major contours of Richard’s
theology come from Augustine and center around the love found in 1 Corinthians 13 and
its quest to see God face-to-face in verse 12. That quest is conceived as an ascent from
what is partial and imperfect to what is complete and perfect. The movement from man to
God, the movement to the image of God is a movement from childhood to adulthood,
from immaturity to maturity. And with the glosses of Romans 1:20 and 2 Corinthians
4:18, that ascent becomes a way of traversing from visible to invisible things, from what
is seen to what is unseen, from what is transitory to what is eternal, from what fades away
to what endures forever. Ultimately, it is an ascent from faith to love. Likewise, Anselm
builds on this Augustinian heritage and guides it further upward. In Anselm we find
Augustine’s “Principle of Perfection” becoming the “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection,”
where the God who is always the better of whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be
becomes the God-who-is-the-best-of-all. He is the being-than-which-none-greater-canbe-conceived. Secondly, we find Anselm constructing his Monologion with the PowerWisdom-Goodness triad and arranging it from the “point of view of one seeking” to

81

Richard, De Trinitate III.15. Further detail of Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons is
provided in chapter 4 of this work. Here we only highlight that the main principles upon which Richard’s
argument is based come from this fusion of thought he inherited from Augustine and Anselm.

39
better suit his formative aims. Like Anselm, we will see Richard using the PowerWisdom-Goodness triad as an essential structural guide in the crafting of his De Trinitate.
And like Augustine, we will see Richard continuing to perfect that “mirror” and
“watchtower” of 1 Corinthians 13 in order to raise the hearts and enlarge the minds of his
readers with “a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity.”

CHAPTER TWO
THE ROAD TO RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
…where the good way is…
Richard of St. Victor lived in the 12th century about a generation after Anselm of
Canterbury. His life is marked by the major historical shifts that were taking place at the
time. Among those shifts was a growing movement of monastic reform that was, in its
most basic sense, a desire for a purer form of the religious life. And if we are to properly
appreciate Richard’s attention to detail in De Trinitate we would do well to see how it fits
within some of these larger historical trajectories. Situating Richard within this context
provides two important insights. First, it relates the intricacy with which De Trinitate was
written to the moral refinement of the Victorines’ religious life and educational program.
Second, it helps us discern the formative relation De Trinitate bears to Richard’s other
literary works and thus the prerequisites of soul for properly undertaking its study.
The Canons Regular
The Victorines fit within the broader movement of the canons regular. Shortly after
the Lateran council of 1059 granted legitimacy to the order, the canons regular grew in
large numbers in the 11th century and reached their high point in the 12th.82 Early on
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they drew their customs from catenas of patristic and conciliar authorities in the Aachen
Institutes and adopted Benedictine observances for various aspects of their daily life.83
As a result, and as is well known, sharp distinctions are notoriously difficult to draw
between canons regular and the monastic orders.84 In the early part of the 12th century,
however, canons regular in France took the Rule of St. Augustine as their manifesto.85
Among its primary tenets was the renunciation of personal property. As the author of the
Libellus de diversis ordinibus et professionibus qui sunt in aecclesia,86 a canon regular
himself,87 writes about Augustine:
of papal history’, and it is true that, even if the number of regular-canon popes has been exaggerated, they
were influential in the curia. Their members can be found in almost every important area of the church’s
life: they were scholars (Hugh of St. Victor), radical reformers (Gerhoh of Reichersberg) or revolutionaries
(Arnold of Brescia), and canonists (Ivo of Chartres, Gratian). Their total impact has to be assessed as
greater than the Cistercians.”
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From the fact that he instituted near the city of Hippo a church of
brothers “according to a rule established at the time of the holy
apostles,” he is justly called the father of those who are near men;
from the fact that when he lived in the bishop’s house he lived
communally with his brothers, he is properly said to be the father of
those who live among the people with a bishop or under a bishop.
There are sermons of his on the clerical way of life, where it
appears that they who lived with him before he became a bishop,
and they who lived with him when he was a bishop, lived in a
similar manner, communally according to a rule.88
The “discovery” of the Rule of St. Augustine resulted in the conviction that it provided the
key to living the apostolic life as described in Acts 4:32-35. The canons regular studied it
in detail and looked to Augustine as one of their greatest sources of authority.89
But movements that gain momentum require not only the possibility for expansion
(as allowed by the Lateran council of 1059) but also the acuteness of certain conditions to
which that movement reacts. Historians recognize that the 12th century was a time of
population growth, expansion of towns, increased trade, and rapid growth in
sophistication both at court and in the schools.90 Against this backdrop it might be easier
way he ends his work with a focus on the canons regular—a structure found in monastic literature
demonstrating the humility of the monastic author in putting others before himself. Fassler, 192 n. 132.
Furthermore, he often employs the second person plural when he turns to a description of them. Ibid., 195.
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to see how this new order of priests arose: one that was monastic in its ascetic discipline
and commitment to personal poverty but quasi-monastic in its schedule, allowing more
time for study and service to the Church. This is an oversimplification and there are many
different motives for specific canons regular.91 But the main point is this: At a time when
their secular counterparts had grown comfortable with the new prosperity, the regular
canons renounced personal property to pursue the contemplative life lived in common
with friends of the sort Augustine was said to have prized above all.
Conditions such as these likely motivated William of Champeaux to give up
teaching at the cathedral school of Notre Dame and move to an abandoned hermitage
dedicated to St. Victor on the left bank of the Seine.92 We have two documents written
shortly after William left to found the abbey that say as much. One is a letter from
Hildebert of Laverdin commending William on his decision. The other is a letter from
one of William’s students who indicates just how rapidly William’s school attracted large
numbers of students. Because our focus is on the text of Richard’s De Trinitate we do not
have the space to look at Hildebert’s letter in too much detail. Here we highlight those
aspects of the milieu Hildebert commends William for reacting against. He speaks
commendably of William’s “putting aside ecclesiastical advancement,” preferring instead
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“the lowest place in the house of your God to living in the tents of the unrighteous.”93 He
tells of William’s giving up “the hawking of pedagogy (lectionem)” and hating “ambition
and its prerequisites.”94 He likewise makes reference to Diogenes, saying that he “feared
no man’s power because he hoped for no man’s reward” and that being “devoid of hope
as he was of fear, transformed his poverty into riches.”95 Positively, this is assessed by
Hildebert as a true and fuller philosophy. He states that “Hitherto you were but half a
philosopher since in the school of the wise you had only the slightest apprehension of the
perfection of moral beauty. Now indeed you have extracted from it, like sweet honey
from its comb, the formula of the good life” (emphasis mine).96
Here we see some of the themes espoused by the canons regular and the Rule of St.
Augustine that increasingly became their guide at the beginning of the 12th century.
Hildebert commends William for seeking the common life. Furthermore, that life is
commendable for what it rejects: ecclesiastical advancement, hawking pedagogy, vain
ambition, worldly riches. But Hildebert is careful not to leave it there; he further coaxes
William not to give up his teaching vocation, but to relocate it in this purer form of the
religious life. With full knowledge that William had recently been humiliated by Peter
Abelard, who was on a mission to claim William’s teaching post at the cathedral school
at Notre Dame, Hildebert sympathetically encourages William to renew his commitment
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to teaching at a time when William may have been the most downtrodden.97 He writes
further, “Take good care therefore not to deprive your brethren of the founts of living
water, but as Solomon says ‘pour out the springs and spread their waters abroad’ (Prov. v.
15).”98 And William seems to have heeded these exhortations. For in less than 20 years,
St. Victor had become renowned for its scholars who gave a full articulation to their
Augustinian ideals and brought them into dialogue with a vast range of patristic,
classical, and contemporary resources. Even less than a year after William leaves to
found the abbey, a German student of William’s writes to his patron back home:
I am now in Paris in the school of master William, who, though he
was archdeacon and one of the chief advisors of the king, gave up
all he possessed to retire last Easter to serve God in a poor little
church. There, like Master Manegold of blessed memory, he offers
his teaching to all comers free of charge, and he now directs a
school of secular and sacred learning larger than any I have ever
heard of or seen in my time anywhere in the world.99
In less than 50 years, Paris becomes the major center of monastic education—
unrivaled throughout all of Europe. Small grammar schools with, at best, one great
master attracting more than the average number of students (as Lanfranc had Anselm of
Canterbury), gave way to a bustling city with a panoply of students who could now easily
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move among a variety of great masters of rhetoric, grammar, and theology.100 The
springs that flowed from Laon eventually reach Paris, and pupils of Anselm of Laon, like
William, take root en masse there. St. Victor was uniquely positioned at what was soon to
become the future training grounds for the next generation of scholars and administrators.
This would have been enough to afford it great influence in the 12th century, but the
quality of that influence, enriched as it was by the common life, and graced as it was with
some of the greatest minds of the age—became a shining example of the Augustinian
ideal of teaching by word and deed. In what follows, we divide our treatment of the
Victorine canons regular into these respective categories before we place Richard’s De
Trinitate beside his other literary works.
The Religious Life of the Victorines
Three things are relevant to our treatment of Richard’s De Trinitate that connect
with religious life at the abbey of St. Victor: (a) language in the “From the Root of
Charity” sequence that connects with formative themes in Richard’s work, (b) the extra
care the Victorines gave to the composition and ordering of their liturgical rites, and (c)
how this rich, liturgical dimension of Victorine life overflowed in service to others. This
focus reminds us that Richard composed in this setting, daily reciting the trinitarian
formulas found in the Quicumque, and using various melodies and associations to link
together his thoughts on the Trinity. At various places in De Trinitate we discover
Richard making allusions to these communal experiences in his language and
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illustrations. For attentive Victorine, such language provided rich motifs that stirred their
souls with a holy longing for the face of God.
The “Ex radice caritatis” (“From the Root of Charity”) sequence was sung on the
feast of the translation of the relics of St. Victor and therefore had special significance for
the Victorines.101 As a result, we can look to it as something important for understanding
Victorine identity and their shared vision for the common life. It is given here in its
entirety to help us inhabit something of the liturgical ambience within which Richard
lived and composed De Trinitate. It reminds us that Richard’s treatise was inspired by—
and written with attention to—these communal experiences. But to fully understand this
dimension of Richard’s life requires imaginatively entering into it, of identifying (at least
provisionally) with the manner and spirit evinced by their celebrations. Here we walk the
halls and enter the chambers of the abbey at St. Victor. We steady our souls and stand
with Richard and his brethren as they honor their patron saint, and ascend with them from
the root of charity to the summit of joys.
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I
From the root of charity
from the state of piety
let this church sing;
let it sing with the heart,
let it sing with the mouth
and let the household of Victor
rejoice in Victor.
II
The part of that saint given to us
was brought by faithful men
from the city of Marseilles;
first we enjoyed his spiritual presence,
but now we enjoy
his bodily presence.
III
This is the summit of joys;
let us enlarge the innermost sanctuary
of our souls;
the relics of the martyr
are the subject of praise and gladness
for us.
IV
The organ of our heart,
the drum of our flesh
are diverse from one another;
let harmony temper
and unite to each other
with suitable consonance.
V
With our choirs singing together,
let the modulation be one
in our customs;
harsh is the clash
of dissimilar voices,
of diverse customs.
VI
From diverse things
the sound will be disordered
unless the finger of God
first adjust the strings
with sweet instruction;
unless the sweetness of the spirit
touch the heart of the marrow,
the noise of the sound and the exultation of the
flesh
tastes nothing deeply.

VII
This sweetness is not felt
in dividings of minds
nor is it ageeably found
in the land of the living;
may the unity of the faithful
taste this sweetness,
and foretasting, thirst
until it may seize it fully.
VIII
Let us foretaste with the mouth of the heart,
so that by internal savor,
we may be recalled
from the seductive love of the world;
this is the wholesome taste,
this is the unique taste,
through which forgetfulness of worldly care
advances by degrees.
IX
So that this world may grow bitter,
let the odor of Christ become very sweet;
may this sweetness ever grow
in the wine cellar of the heart;
where such a fragrance breathes forth,
spiritual fervor increases
and love of temporal life
grows cold.
X
Victor, triumphant soldier,
special martyr of Christ,
preserve us from the evils of the world,
that worldly love
not drown us in sins;
with one voice, with like mind,
with singular honor,
we are zealous to worship you
while we are tossed in this sea,
confer your assistance.
XI
May you not permit those for whom you are able
to plead
to be deceived in their hope:
make us to be presented to Christ
so that we may contemplate Him
with you in glory;
to your honor, Christ,
this choir has sung repeatedly
the praise of your fighter
in whose presence let nothing sad
102
disturb our joys. Amen.
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A few elements in this sequence are worth highlighting. First we notice the focus on
the “root of charity.” Charity is the fountainhead of all of the virtues, with a rich history
extending all the way back to antiquity. For Richard it is the virtue of virtues he uses to
find necessary reasons for the Trinity of persons in book III of his work. Second, we note
the “summit of joys” and “advancing by degrees.” Richard uses the summit of joy to
speak of the order and ardor of a love that can only be shared by those who are supreme
and love each other supremely. The summit also reminds us of the language of “ascent”
in Richard, where advancing in theological contemplation took place daily and by
degrees. But the highest joy is, as the sequence says, to be made “presented to Christ so
that we may contemplate Him with you in glory.”103 That contemplation, though it takes
place by degrees, reaches its highest form, as Richard demonstrates, in the contemplation
of the Trinity. Moreover, this divine gaze must take place by fortifying one’s soul as a
watchtower for contemplation. The military language of the “triumphant soldier” and
“special martyr” of Christ reminds us that one’s religious pilgrimage at this time was
viewed as a real battle—a matter of life and death.104 Like others of their day, the
Victorines saw themselves as special warriors—spiritual warriors—living the common
life as a way of fortifying a place on the left bank of the Seine with the true
contemplation of God. Finally, and most importantly, we see their vision for the common
life: forsaking property and the special refinements of secular life105; and with St. Victor,
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we see them seeking “one voice, like mind, and singular honor.”106
There were also three major processions during the church year that structured
Victorine life: (a) Feast of Purification, (b) Palm Sunday, and (c) Ascension.107 Fassler
summarizes Richard’s description of the first in his Super exiit edictum:
. . . this feast [of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin] was
distinguished by one of the three major processions of the Church
year, during which the participants carried recently blessed and
lighted candles throughout the church to the singing of the antiphon
“Lumen ad revelationem gentium.” The candles recall the words of
the aged Simeon, who, present at the temple when Mary arrived
with her child, recognized the baby as the Christ and called him a
“light to enlighten the nations.”
The feast commemorates the story recounted in Luke 2:22-38,
of the Blessed Virgin submitting to the rites of purification after
birth, and presenting her child in the temple.108
These three processions divided the Victorine year in accordance with these significant
moments in salvation history. They anticipated them. They looked forward to them. Their
day-to-day activities were undertaken and understood as part of them; and their readings
of Augustine, Origen, and Gregory the Great were sequenced on the basis of them.109
Their services were also very intricate and required great effort at sustained focus
and contemplation. And while such liturgical artistry was not unique to the Victorines,
Paris, grew rich on house rents and market tolls. The churches were inescapably involved in all the
complexities of feudal tenure and commercial finance . . .” Ibid., 394. By contrast, the Rule of St. Augustine
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the care with which they structured and ordered their theological compositions was a
mindfulness they suffused throughout every endeavor they undertook, as we can see in
the attention they gave even to conduct upon receiving guests. As it states in the Liber
ordinis sancti Victoris Parisiensis:
We enjoin that all these things [the welcoming ritual] should be
scrupulously carried out, because those who come from outside are
especially to be received with great kindness and humanity from
the first moment of reception . . . so that from their first impressions
of the outside they form an estimate of the things concealed
within.110
Such attention to detail was a direct extension of their commitment to purify all
aspects of their religious life. As Fassler writes:
The matins service at St. Victor was lavish and carefully
ordered, even more than might be expected of Augustinian canons
during this period . . . At the opening of the night office (or matins),
all the brethren were ordered in the middle of the choir, opposite
the step in front of the altar; all bowed low toward the altar. There
they said three prayers; after each of these they prostrated
themselves. Subsequently, they took their seats and there said the
fifteen Gradual Psalms, with a Kyrie and Pater noster after each.
After every group of five, they prostrated themselves again . . . .
During the office psalmody immediately following this opening
section, the brethren rose and sat in alternation as each new psalm
was sung. Hence half of the entire group got to rest physically half
of the time, although all continued to sing antiphonally throughout
the entire service.
Periods of respite may have been necessary: The Victorine
Office was known in the Middle Ages as being sung very slowly,
with long pauses at the middle and close of each psalm verse.111
This attentiveness in the reciting of their liturgies was further matched by a proportional
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mindfulness in composing them. As Fassler’s thesis makes clear, the Victorines adapted a
number of liturgical sequences with novel arrangements of their own. One of the most
significant is the “Laudes crucis,” a sequence about the cross the Victorines enriched by
extending its melody to other sequences. The melody functioned for the Victorines as a
mnemonic aid in calling to mind a rich harmony of parallels and contrasts with other
sequences they knew.112
These liturgies were a rich source for contemplation and inner renewal, a renewal
that would go with the Victorines as they served others in their community. Indeed,
service of others seems to have been a hallmark of Victorine spirituality in the 12th
century—an emphasis that distinguished them from both the older and new monastic
orders of their day. As Bynum writes:
The contrast of Victorine life with that of the older and newer
monastic orders may be precisely in the way the Augustinian
Rule—or rather the Victorine interpretation of it—brought an
emphasis to edification verbo et exemplo that was not found in the
Benedictine orders where “service” was seen positively in the role
it played in the individual monk’s solitary quest for God but
negatively in the practical requirements entailed by “love of
neighbor”.113
Like many of the new monastic orders, the Victorines shared a commitment to the
apostolic life. Where they tried to distinguish themselves was in how well they lived the
Rule of St. Augustine and served their community with purity, humility, and grace. In this
way they helped sanctify their thoughts and their deeds with the goal of calling others to
repentance and the full contemplation of God.
112

Fassler, 76-77.

113

Bynum, 137.

53
The Educational Program at St. Victor
We have seen something of the “deeds” of the Victorines in their liturgies and
service to others. We now turn to the source of their preaching and “words.” As the
author of the Libellus de diversis ordinibus says, monks should “. . . convert others to
their way of life through both example and preaching.”114
As we have seen, the formation of the educational program at St. Victor began with
its founder, William of Champeaux. In 1108, he eventually acquiesced to the growing
antagonism of his pupil, Abelard, on the nature of ‘universals’115 and abandoned his head
teaching position at the cathedral of Notre Dame.116 Though he had no desire to return to
his teaching or of founding a new order, he did so under pressure from his friend
Hildebert of Lavardin who had great regard for William’s teaching and saw him as
someone who offered a positive contrast to what was happening in the schools.117
William headed the education at the abbey from its inception in 1108 until 1113 when the
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charter of the abbey was granted and he was asked to become the Bishop of Châlons.118
Nevertheless, the spirit William left at the abbey—of pursuing education in relative quiet
and peace from the city, and of making prayer and contemplation priorities in one’s
theological education—remained a heritage the abbey would continue to enrich and
enjoy.
It was Hugh of St. Victor, though, who would broaden and deepen the educational
program at St. Victor and make it a center of learning that attracted some of the best
minds of the age.119 Two keys made this possibility a reality: increased financial support
and greater political stability. As confessor to King Louis VI, Abbot Gilduin was able to
secure both.120 This helped Hugh carry on the vision, begun by William, of broadening
the number of resources the abbey needed to expand knowledge of the liberal arts, as well
as enriching and deepening the methods by which they studied them. Hugh’s
Didascalicon gives an indication that the approaches taken at St. Victor were seen as an
alternative to those of the secular schools.121 Though the subject matter extended to both
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practical and theoretical arts, the main disciplines the Victorines were to master consisted
of three that would extend throughout them all: Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric.
Grammar is “knowledge of how to speak without error”; Dialectic is “clear-sighted
argument which separates true from false”; and Rhetoric is the “discipline of persuading
to every suitable thing.”122
Also noteworthy is the focus on the moral dimension of learning.123 The purpose of
expanding one’s knowledge did not have as its governing concern to fill oneself up with
new information; rather, every source from which knowledge could be obtained was put
in the service of the spiritual purity of the individual. The purity of the subject matter
being studied mattered little in comparison to the inner purity of the soul undertaking the
study. As Augustine said, “. . . a picture’s value lies not in the image itself but in the
cognitive and ethical use someone makes of it, the quality of what we think and think
about, using the picture as our instrument.”124 Thus at St. Victor, even non-theological
works were studied in such a way as to refine one’s own knowledge of the truth and
sharpen one’s own moral and spiritual proclivities: e.g., How might the errors in this
work refine my own knowledge of the truth? How might the vanity and perversions of
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this work sharpen my own resolve to live a holy life before God and develop my soul in
accordance with virtue? This “inner purity” was in the service of the richer goal of
developing a soul that was, as Richard says, “to a full and perfect purity.”125 And thus
under the guidance of Gilduin and Hugh, the abbey enjoyed a period of broadening their
library with new resources and filling it with new compositions of their own. Thus the
“widening” of their educational program was also matched by a proportional effort at
“deepening” the focus of their pedagogy around divine contemplation and inner purity.
This period of broadening and deepening the educational program at St. Victor
comes as a result of the consistent leadership of Hugh and Gilduin as well as the royal
favors the abbey had due to Gilduin’s political connections. But when Richard arrives at
St. Victor, this period of blessing comes to an end. Richard comes to the abbey about
seven years after the death of Hugh. His knowledge of Hugh would come through a
careful study of his writings and continuing Hugh’s educational reforms with the help of
Hugh’s pupils. The Bishop of Paris, Stephen of Senlin, who was one of the Victorines’
staunchest allies in supporting their efforts at reform, also dies one year after Hugh. And
the founding abbot, Gilduin, dies five years after Richard arrives in 1155. Thus Richard
arrives at a point when both the external political favor the abbey had enjoyed and the
internal constancy of vision conceived of by Hugh and Gilduin were “up for grabs.”
Achard takes up the abbacy for the next six years before leaving in 1161 to become the
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Bishop of Avranches. Richard becomes prior of the abbey the next year, at the same time
the community elects Ernisius to be abbot in 1162; an appointment that soon proves to be
a source of great irritation for Richard. Where Richard would look to the inherited
spiritual and financial prosperity of his predecessors with a view toward furthering their
efforts at continual reform, Ernisius would squander these hard-won luxuries with what
Richard took to be a spirit of laxity and worldliness the order had been founded to
counter. Despite successfully involving the Pope in admonishing Ernisius, Richard
endures a decade of Ernisius’s complacent leadership at the abbey until Ernisius is finally
deposed in 1172 and Guarin is elected to serve as abbot. Richard, sadly, dies less than a
year later.
So on both sides of Richard’s arrival at St. Victor around 1150 lie the death of the
head of the educational program and the founding abbot. However little we know of
Richard it is clear that he came to the abbey at a time when the treasures of its founders
were the most pristine. It would need the guidance of those who could salvage and be
good stewards of this heritage, and in ways that would further enrich the kind of reform
espoused by the abbey’s founders. Richard’s writings indicate he came to have an
increasing role in the educational program at the abbey.126 The question is to what extent
Richard saw the immediate heritage of Hugh as the margins within which he would cast
the future of the Victorine agenda, or whether he would seek, with good intentions, to
improve upon the legacy of his predecessor. The answer to that question involves a very
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careful, comparative analysis of Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs-Mystical Ark with Hugh’s
Moral and Mystical Ark treatises.127 And while we don’t have the space to undertake this
here, we do want to highlight what this comparison reveals about an important distinction
shared by Richard and Hugh and how this helps us understand the “formative
chronology” of Richard’s main body of written works.
The Road to Richard’s De Trinitate
With a sense for the rich life of the Victorines in their liturgies, their service to
others, and their vision for the educational program at the abbey, we now turn our
attention to Richard’s main literary works in an attempt to see something of the formative
framework his De Trinitate shares with his other treatises.
Richard wrote a number of other works besides De Trinitate. His works consist of
his Liber exceptionum, a work that expands on Hugh’s Didascalicon. It similarly lays out
the main lines of study in the liberal arts with a focus on how to study the Scriptures.
Subsequently Richard also wrote two books of Allegories based on selections taken from
the Old and New Testaments. Throughout Richard’s time at St. Victor he also gave
numerous sermons, and some of his works likely evolved out of them.128 There is some
evidence that De Trinitate itself may have begun as a collection of sermons or
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discussions Richard later developed into the form that we now find the treatise today.129
His works of tropology and rich symbolism consist of his Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical
Ark, and De exterminatione mali et promotione boni. The first is a tropological
interpretation of the twelve patriarchs where each one symbolizes a virtue to imitate. The
second uses the Ark of the Covenant as a way of tempering the soul in its ascent to the
full contemplation of God. It is where Richard provides his religious epistemology in rich
detail, laying out theological contemplation in six stages. In De statu interioris hominis
Richard expounds the text of Isaiah 1:5-6 with the triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness.
The treatise delineates the three wounds of the soul along with their divine remedies. In
De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate Richard likewise expounds on the same triad
where each pertains to a particular person of the Trinity and the work of salvation. Ad me
clamat ex seir is the human side of this triad where humans come to see that their pride,
ignorance, and malice need to be reformed in accordance with divine power, wisdom, and
goodness. De exterminatione mali et promotione boni consists of a movement from the
land of servitude in Egypt to the promised land with an emphasis on the transition that
takes place at the Jordan river. And De quator gradibus violentae caritatis describes four
grades of love, from a selfish love to a divine love for others in imitation of Jesus Christ.
Do we have any indication of the chronology of Richard’s works? Most Richardian
scholars agree that Richard’s literary works span a very short period of composition,
probably no more than a decade or so. As a result, Richard’s theology exhibits a
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consistency across his works, making the evolution of his thought more difficult to
discern. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus on the order of his three main works:
Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical Ark, and De Trinitate. Feiss, for example, sees a progressive
optimism in each one for the role of reason in the pursuit of eternal truths.130And Coulter,
den Bok, Zinn, and others see the chronology of these works in that order.
While we cannot be certain with respect to Richard’s chronology,131 it is possible to
see these three works with respect to their intended ‘formative order’; and we point to
some specific internal evidence from these works that suggest this is the order Richard
expected them to be read. This is important because it indicates that De Trinitate is best
understood as a culmination of theological insight and training Richard lays out in his
other works; a culmination that reveals an “ancient road”—a well-worn pathway to the
“heavenly Jerusalem”—where those trained in discernment enter its temple and commune
with God face-to-face.
Three things are needed to establish the formative chronology of Richard’s main
works. First is to recognize a moral-mystical duality in the writings of Hugh and Richard.
Second is to see that this duality is also a sequence from moral to mystical. And third, is
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to establish that Richard viewed the contemplation involved in De Trinitate as a
culmination of this sequence.
Discovering a Moral-Mystical Duality
We begin with the case for the moral-mystical duality. We look first to Richard’s
Twelve Patriarchs which consists of a tropological reading of the sons of Jacob (i.e.,
“Israel”) by Rachel and Leah. Three clues in Twelve Patriarchs alert us to this moralmystical duality. First, Richard makes a distinction between the “grace of discretion” and
the “grace of contemplation.” As he writes:
By this Joseph the soul is continually instructed and at times is
led to full knowledge of itself, just as by his uterine brother
Benjamin it is at times lifted up to the contemplation of God. For
just as we understand grace of discretion by Joseph, so we
understand grace of contemplation by Benjamin. Both are born
from this same mother because knowledge of God and of self are
learned from reason. Benjamin is born long after Joseph because
the soul that has not been practiced over a long time and educated
fully in knowledge of self is not raised up to knowledge of God. In
vain he raises the eye of the heart to see God when he is not yet
prepared to see himself. Let a person first learn to know his own
invisible things before he presumes that he is able to grasp at
invisible divine things. You must know the invisible things of your
own spirit before you can be capable of knowing the invisible
things of God. If you are not able to know yourself, how do you
have the boldness to grasp at those things which are above you?
(italics mine)132
Any careful analysis of Twelve Patriarchs confirms that the main concern Richard
has in that work is to impress upon the young Victorine the foundational virtue of
“discretion.”133 This is accomplished by walking in the ways of the virtues each of the
132
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sons of Jacob alludes to. Learning discretion consists of learning to recognize and curb
the affections that drag the body down in its immoral desires; discretion means keeping
one’s attention pure in its relationship to carnal desires. Second, the manuscript tradition
of Richard’s Mystical Ark also went by another name: “On the Grace of
Contemplation.”134 When we look to this second treatise, we notice it is concerned with
an entirely different domain: a mystical one focused on the contemplation of God by
means of a creative, tropological crafting of the Ark of the Covenant. And whereas
Twelve Patriarchs was concerned with attention in its relationship to bodily affections,
the goal being “discretion,” Mystical Ark is concerned with attention in its relationship to
mental distractions, contending with that mental vice of ‘curiositas’. The goal of the
latter work is the mystical contemplation of God. So we see both works have a shared
concern for refining and purifying the soul on its way to God: the former with
purification of the moral dimension—of creating pure discretion on one’s own invisible
things (e.g., bodily affections); and the latter with purification of the mystical
dimension—of creating pure focus on the invisible things of God.
The relationship between “ecstasy” in Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark reveals a
similar distinction: the difference between “knowledge of self” and “knowledge of God.”
In Twelve Patriarchs Richard writes:
Lest the labor of the journey and the difficulties of the ascent
terrify you and draw you back, hear and give attention to what the
Works, 128. For a helpful survey of these aspects as well as a comparison of discretio in Richard and
Bernard of Clairvaux, see Mark A. McIntosh, Discernment and Truth: The Spirituality and Theology of
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result of the arrival is. On the peak of this mountain Jesus is
transfigured; on it Moses is seen with Elijah and each is recognized
without a sign; on it the voice of the Father to the Son is heard.
Which of these is not marvelous? Which of these is not desirable?
Do you wish to see Christ transfigured? Ascend this mountain;
learn to know yourself. Do you wish to see Moses and Elijah and
recognize them without any sign? Do you wish to understand the
law and the prophets without a teacher, without an interpreter?
Ascend this mountain; learn to know yourself. Do you wish to hear
the mystery of the Father’s secrets? Ascend this mountain; learn to
know yourself. For he descended from heaven when he said: gnw!ti
seauto\n; that is, “Know yourself.” Do you see how much the
ascent of this mountain is effective, how useful full knowledge of
self is? (italics mine)135
This moral-mystical duality was a cornerstone of the Victorine educational program from
its inception, for we find the same in Richard’s predecessor Hugh of St. Victor. He too
devotes a separate treatise to each of these domains: his Moral Ark of Noah and his
Mystical Ark of Noah. Hugh took up the first in a response to questions among the
brethren “that they might be shown the cause of these unstable movements in man’s
heart, and . . . particularly begged to be taught if such a serious evil as this could be
countered by any skill or by the practice of some discipline.”136 The focus of the treatise
is on external distractions and bringing order and integration to one’s soul before entering
the ark. As Hugh writes:
We have now . . . shown sufficiently clearly the origin of the
infinite distraction of our thoughts from which we suffer—that is,
from the world and from the lust of it, from the works of creation.
Again we have shown by what means our thoughts can be
reintegrated—that is, by the works of restoration. And because . . .
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there can be no order where there is no limit, it remains for us now,
having left the work of creation behind us, to seek out the order of
our thoughts where they are bounded—that is, in the works of
restoration. For this is the matter that we previously proposed for
our investigation—namely, what the order of our thoughts should
be, if they are to enable us to build in ourselves the spiritual house
of wisdom (emphasis mine).137
Hugh also concludes his Moral Ark of Noah with an indication of the formative
distinction it bears with his Mystical Ark of Noah:
And now, then, as we promised, we must put before you the pattern
of our ark. Thus you may learn from an external form, which we
have visibly depicted, what you ought to do interiorly, and when
you have impressed the form of this pattern on your heart, you may
rejoice that the house of God has been built within you (emphasis
mine).138
This indicates that the Victorines viewed the task of ridding oneself of vices and
inculcating virtues as one task, and the task of rising up to mystical contemplation as
another—each one deserving of its own treatise. One deals with eliminating external
distractions from contemplation (e.g., carnal desires, passions); the other with eliminating
internal ones (e.g., mental fornication, curiositas, wandering attention, etc.).139
To summarize, Richard makes a distinction between the “grace of discretion” and
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the “grace of contemplation.” He devotes two of his literary works to each of these
respectively. The latter of these works, Mystical Ark, also went by the name of “On the
Grace of Contemplation” in the manuscript tradition. And while Twelve Patriarchs did
not go by the title of “On the Grace of Discretion” in the manuscript tradition, it is
consistent with the content of the work and the relationship it bears to Richard’s Mystical
Ark. Finally, we noted that Richard’s predecessor, Hugh, also retains this duality by
devoting a separate treatise to each of these domains. Next we discover that this moralmystical distinction was seen as a moral-to-mystical sequence with very ancient roots in
the Christian mystical tradition.
Seeing the Moral-to-Mystical Sequence
It is clear, then, that there was a moral-mystical distinction in the educational
program at St. Victor. We now ask whether there was an order to them. Our first hint that
there is an order between the two is the distinction between knowledge of self and
knowledge of God mentioned above. One has to know oneself first—know oneself in a
way that rids the soul of vices and inculcates virtues—in order to make the journey
toward the knowledge of God. We remember that the Victorines were diligent students of
Augustine. And when we look to Augustine, we also find that this moral-mystical duality
expresses the equilibrium he sought to maintain between the active and the contemplative
life.140 Speaking of Augustine’s understanding of the active and contemplative
dimensions in the reformation of the soul, Ladner writes:
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add here is that this distinction was part of their Augustinian heritage; and specifically that it relates to an
Augustinian architectural mnemonic both Richard and Hugh use as a framework for their compositions.
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. . . because two virtues are set before the human soul, one active,
the other contemplative, the first the road, the second the goal, and
because though the first one toils so that the heart is purified for the
vision of God and in the second he is at rest and sees God:
[therefore] the first is contained in the precepts for the practice of
the temporal life, the second in the doctrine of sempiternal life
beyond. And therefore the first [kind of virtues] works, the second
rests, because the former consists in the purgation of sins, the
second in the light of the purified. And therefore in this mortal life
the first exists in the working out of good habits (in opere bonae
conversationis), the second rather in faith and, in a very few, in
some partial vision of the unchangeable truth as “through a glass in
a dark manner” (1 Corinthians 13:12).141
That Richard saw this moral-mystical distinction as a sequence from moral to
mystical, and that it was connected with the active and contemplative life, is clear from
his Super exiit edictum where he speaks of the transition from the Hebrew to the
Galilean: “the active life produces a Hebrew, but the contemplative life a Galilean.”142
When one surveys the literature before and after Richard, one finds a rich heritage and
practice of dividing attention between the two tasks of integrating wayward desires and
then preparing the soul for contemplation. Subsequent to Richard we find it in
Bonaventure, for example. Bonaventure’s Lignum vitae focuses on the moral dimension
using the “Tree of Life” as its guiding metaphor, and his Itinerarium deals with the
mystical dimension, picking up on and summarizing themes developed in Richard’s
Mystical Ark. Prior to Richard one finds the same two-step sequence in Gregory,143 and
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Ladner, 334. Augustine lays out a pathway here “like a road for our return home.” Augustine, De
Trinitate XII.10. Hugh and Richard, like many others before them, follow this two-fold path toward God:
to seek the purgation of sins (i.e., ridding oneself of dangerous attachments to bodily affections) and the
light of the purified (i.e., the mystical contemplation of God).
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Quoted in Coulter, 29.

“Gregory sees conversion as a two-stage process of reform that requires a dual sacrifice to God
. . . . For Gregory, reform focuses around compunction, the emotions first of fear and sorrow, and then of
joy and love that inspire this two-part sacrifice. As the soul progresses toward perfection, it moves from a
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going all the way back to the Desert Fathers (e.g., Evagrius Ponticus, Diodachus, and
John Cassian).144
So the tradition and sequence of moving from moral-to-mystical contemplation is
an ancient one the Victorines inherited as a foundation for their spiritual reforms. But
what we wish to highlight in Richard’s case is how, at least in the Augustinian tradition,
this sequence developed into a “spiritual topography” with distinct “places” (loci) that
map the chronology of Richard’s main works. Beyond the immediate horizon of
Richard’s De Trinitate lies a pathway with clear divisions and places that help us “locate”
his other works. Understanding where those places are, and the formative relationship
they bear to one another, helps us understand the spiritual journey Richard expects his
reader to travel before stepping up to the “entrance” (introitus) of his De Trinitate.145 To
that end, there seems to be a distinct set of mental places Augustine develops in his
theological program; and it is likely this very schema the Victorines picked up on as a
guide for ordering their own theological compositions. As Marry Carruthers writes:
For a living human being here (“in hac terra”), who is seeking
God in the context of a pilgrim-church, the “way” lies from outside,
wandering in error, through “the place of the Tabernacle,” to the
ascent up to “the home of God.” There are thus three distinct
locations in Augustine’s structure, three mnemonic loci: outside,
lower, outward, carnal compunction of fear to a higher, inward, spiritual compunction of love.” Carole
Straw, Gregory the Great: Perfection in Imperfection, Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 14
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1991), 214.
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For Evagrius, see Evagrius’s Praktike in Evagrius Ponticus. Praktikos, Chapters on Prayer,
trans. John Eudes Bamberger, Cistercian Studies, 4 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1980).
For Diodachus, see Diadochus of Photiki, On Spiritual Knowledge and Discrimination, Vol. 1, The
Philokalia, trans. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and Faber, 1983). For
Cassian, see John Cassian, The Conferences, trans. Boniface Ramsey, Ancient Christian Writers (New
York: Paulist Press, 1997).
145

Richard, De Trinitate I.3.

68
Tabernacle, and domus Dei (a common phrase in the Psalms, but
one that in this context particularly resonates, recollectively, with
Ezekiel 43:10).
Entering the place of the Tabernacle, Augustine invites us to
look around and walk about with him: the verbs used here
repeatedly are various forms of ambulare and admirari and
specere and ire, walk, gaze upon, look, go. And in the Tabernacle
he sees grouped figures of just men, showing their various
attributes (here the verb is ostendere), the various virtues disposed
in loci of the building. And then, having made his inspection of the
whole place, he walks across (“transibo,” “I will walk over”) from
it to the next place, ascending to the domus Dei. At this point,
Augustine shifts without explanation from first to third-person, and
joins his own vision with the experience of the Psalmist, as they
move with one soul through the “place of the Tabernacle.”146
Anyone as familiar with the Scriptures as Augustine, Hugh, and Richard also knows
of the identification of the physical temple of God with the human body. This is true with
respect to Jesus speaking of the Jerusalem temple being torn down and rebuilt in three
days: “the temple he was referring to was the temple of his body” (John 2:21). It is also
true with respect to the Pauline teaching in 1 Corinthians 6 when Paul admonishes the
Corinthians about their bodies: “Do you not know that your body is the temple of the
Holy Spirit who is in you?”147 One can easily see, therefore, how those who walked in
these exegetical traditions could take the notion of geographically walking up to the
temple in Jerusalem to also think of it allegorically with respect to the body and soul. As
one enters the “temple of God” the soul becomes purified and ascends to the Holy of
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Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 253. Cf. Augustine, Exposition of Psalms 41. Richard’s works
seem to fit this Augustinian schema that begins with traveling to the temple of the Lord, then thinking of
that temple as the temple of one’s body (as in 1 Corinthians 6), and then ascending through the inner
chambers of the Temple, and by means of the image of God in the soul of man, of finally seeing God faceto-face. “Richard of St. Victor’s meditation on the Tabernacle, The Mystical Ark, is summarized by its
author in terms of a three-fold scheme of “places” very like the one Augustine uses here. My thanks to
Grover Zinn for pointing this out to me.” Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 355, n. 81.
147

1 Corinthians 6:19. See Augustine, De Trinitate I.6; VII.3.
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Holies in which one comes to see God face-to-face. Thus, not surprisingly, when we look
at the final line of Hugh’s Moral Ark we see him interpreting the house of the Lord in
precisely this way where he speaks of the “house of God formed in you.”148
Richard also confirms this identification of the soul with the temple of God in his
sermon on Psalm 28:
For if by the temple of God we understand the heart of men, we
shall soon find who are those who give thanks to God in this
temple. For the thoughts of the mind and the affections of the heart
are the inhabitants of this temple . . . . She is wholly gathered
together within herself and is raised above herself and fully
absorbed by the full tide of spiritual happiness . . . and then it is
fulfilled, which is said: “And in his temple all shall speak of his
glory.”149
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Fassler, 218. In fact, Hugh plays with the etymologogy of ‘ecclesia’ in a way that shows the
movement between his two Ark treatises, from the restless world to the inner chambers of the Church:
“And in this fashion [the first man] was spread (diffusus) through the four parts of the world and was
dispersed (dissipatus). When he is gathered and called together (colligitur et revocatur), first from the four
parts of the world he approaches (accedit) the Ark (ad arcam), which is the Church (ad Ecclesiam), and
ascending upward from there he gathers himself into a whole (in unum colligit) little by little, until he
reaches the highest point (ad summum perveniat) (emphasis mine).” De arche Noe mystica VIII.21, quoted
in Jessica Weiss, trans., “Hugh of St. Victor, A Little Book About Constructing Noah’s Ark,” a chapter in
Jan M. Ziolkowski and Mary Carruthers, eds., The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and
Pictures (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 61. See also Achard of St.
Victor’s “Sermon for the Dedication of a Church” where he utilizes similar themes, taxonomies, and
ordering devices as Hugh and Richard and has three houses of stone, wood, and gold converge into the one
house that is the perfected human soul. Hugh Feiss, Achard of Saint Victor: Works, 201-253. Charts
comparing Victorine authors use of the temple-soul symbol can be found in Steven Chase, Contemplation
and Compassion: The Victorine Tradition, Traditions of Christian Spirituality (Maryknoll, New York:
Orbis Books, 2003), 73-81.
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Kirchberger, 239. See also Hugh of St. Victor, De institutione novitiorum 12, where the themes
of “drawing one’s wits together within oneself” and then “climbing above oneself” offer the same moralmystical sequence. See also strophe III of the “Ex radice caritatis” sequence in chapter 2 of this work: “This
is the summit of joys: let us enlarge the innermost sanctuary of our souls . . .” Gregory the Great also
follows this sequence, and speaks of falling “below oneself” as a way of describing the state of the soul
when it loses its footing on the road to divine contemplation. Straw, 80. This is also intricately related to
the two kinds of “going out” Richard describes in Mystical Ark 5.8, Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works,
320-321. The history of the two directions of knowledge goes back to Plato, but was given clear
articulation by Augustine (esp. in his De Trinitate), and “renewed with vigor by Hugh of St. Victor.” See
Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian
Studies, 15 (Washington D.C.: Consortium Press, 1972), 173.
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When we look further to the ordering schema of Augustine’s De doctrina
christiana, it follows the same architectural pattern of pilgrimage and ascent. Carruthers
refers to this as the ‘ductus’ of a work; that is, the way or the path that leads a reader to
the main goal, to its skopos. She writes,
. . . it is in Augustine’s writings that rhetorical ductus and the
meditational “way” most closely connect . . . [It] is central to his
notion of “conversion” as a procedure of changing orientation and
way-finding, as though within a topography of locations among
which there is a variety of routes . . . . [This] notion of ductus also
informs how Augustine writes about meditation in his work De
doctrina christiana (“On Teaching Christianity”), modeling it as a
“turning” (of direction) in fear, and then climbing through
emotional stages on a mental ladder from fear to joy to
tranquility.150
She then goes on to cite Augustine’s description of each meditational stage of the
journey:
Above all the work [of reading Scripture] requires that we be turned
by fear of God toward knowing His will . . . this fear may both
inspire in us thought about our mortality and our inevitable future
death, and, as our flesh begins to crawl [lit. our flesh looking as
though it had broken out in prickles], may affix all the wrigglings
of our pride to the wood of the cross. . . . [The second step is piety,
the third knowledge, the fourth strength, the fifth mercy, and then]
he ascends to the sixth step, where he cleanses that eye by which
God may be seen, as much as He can be by those who die to the
world insofar as they can. . . . And now however much more certain
and not only more tolerable but more joyful the sight of a [divine]
light may begin to appear, nonetheless still darkly and in a mirror it
is said to be seen, for it is approached more by faith than by sight
when in this world we make our pilgrimage, although we have our
conversation in heaven.
The seventh step of this ladder is wisdom, and “from fear to
wisdom the way extends through these steps.”151
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If we look at the first five steps on the one hand and the sixth and seventh on the
other, they parallel Richard and Hugh’s moral-to-mystical pattern. It is the sixth step by
which the eye of the soul is cleansed and enabled to see God and the seventh step that
becomes a ladder extending to the goal—the skopos—to the full wisdom of God. That
sixth step is where the body is conceived as the “temple of the Holy Spirit,” where, with
intellective and affective control, one consecrates that temple and reforms the image of
God imprinted there. It is that untarnishing of the ‘mirror’ of the soul understood as
God’s temple, where the religious moves from outside to inside and then begins that
ascent to the full wisdom of God within the “house of God.”152 Speaking of man’s
spiritual journey, and drawing on Augustine, Gregory the Great wrote that “God alone
was his proper place (locus), in whom man found his true self and homeland (patria).”153
Strikingly, when we look at Richard’s Mystical Ark, it is the cherubim who rest above the
ark of the covenant who symbolize the “full wisdom of the triune God.” If Twelve
Patriarchs travels with the sons of Israel to bring one to the house of God conceived as
the righteous soul, Mystical Ark is where one enters its most holy of places and ascends
to full knowledge, where one seeks the Divine face-to-face. Hugh and Richard’s Mystical
Ark treatises, therefore, may be fuller articulations of the sixth and seventh stages found
in Augustine’s De doctrina christiana.
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Notice in Twelve Patriarchs that when Richard reaches the final ascent of the mountain (esp.
lxvii-lxxxii), he transitions to the change in the “garments” of Christ, alluding to consecration and the
“priestly vestments” required of those in the “inner courts” of the Temple. These, too, mark the transition
from earthly things to celestial things: “earthly truth in the valley, heavenly truth on the mountain.” Ibid.,
138.
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So we see that the moral-mystical dualism Hugh and Richard use in their own
literary works has its root in the father of their educational ideals: St. Augustine himself.
And we see that Augustine has developed an “architectural mnemonic” for taking a
mental journey through the places of the “biblical world” in order to bring them up to the
holy hill of the Lord. Then, through the “sanctuary” of their own soul, they seek that still
and silent place within by which they might see God face-to-face. This Augustinian
schema of Outside-Tabernacle-House of God, as a pathway one can mentally walk
through as one seeks the face of God, was therefore very familiar to the Victorines and
likely served as the “spiritual topography” Hugh and Richard used to guide the
composition of their works and structure the educational program at St. Victor.154
The “Formative” Order of Richard’s Main Works
With this moral-to-mystical road to Jerusalem in mind, we can look to the main
literary works of Richard and see, as Nico den Bok appropriately says, “. . . what human
beings, according to Richard, need in order to be able to travel, build, and climb.”155 This
travel-build-climb schema is exactly the relationship of Richard’s three major literary
works: Twelve Patriarchs, Mystical Ark, and De Trinitate. Twelve Patriarchs consists of
traveling with the sons of Israel to the mount of transfiguration. This mount is likely the
“mystical location” for Augustine, Hugh, and Richard where it was equated with mount
Sion, or the heavenly Jerusalem. As Augustine says in his exposition of Psalm 74:
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Zinn also notes this Augustinian precedent for beginning the spiritual journey in fear and ending
in love and its relation to the pattern of Hugh and Richard’s works. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 15; cf.
Richard, Mystical Ark II.17, ibid. 202; Twelve Patriarchs lx, ibid. 117.
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Yet even Mount Sion can be otherwise understood. “That one
which Thou hast dwelled in the same.” In the place where the
People was aforetime, where the Temple was set up, where the
Sacrifices were celebrated, where at that time were all those
necessary things giving promise of Christ.156
Richard brings the meditations of his readers in Twelve Patriarchs up to the house
of the Lord associated with the place where Jesus transfigured before his apostles.157
Twelve Patriarchs consists of traveling, of walking in the ways of the Lord. Mystical Ark
consists of building, of mentally constructing the intricacies of the Ark of the Covenant,
of tempering one’s soul, and rising to the pure understanding of God. The former work, a
purgation of external distractions (e.g., affections, carnal desires); the latter, a purgation
of internal ones (e.g., mental fornication, curiositas). The former follows the earthly
teachings of Christ “according to the fleshly manner”158 until He is transfigured in glory;
the latter follows the celestial teachings of Christ “as the fullness of Wisdom” until one
beholds the Triune God in the fullness of His glory. For only the final two stages of
contemplation in Richard’s Mystical Ark provide trinitarian reflections of the Divine.
Thus Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark combine to bring moral integrity to the soul
and fix its mystical gaze as preparation for the highest of meditations. Here we reach the
“crown” of Richard’s contemplative work: his De Trinitate.
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Richard makes very few explicit connections to his other written works in De
Trinitate. The genre of De Trinitate is noticeably different and is primarily attributable to
the fact that necessary reasons and proofs form a more explicit part of its textual
fabric.159 Nevertheless, Richard clearly intended Trinitarian reflection to come at the end
of a spiritual journey of purification. And this purification consisted of learning the
straight and narrow way of the Lord: of dispensing with vices and inculcating virtues.
Daily, and by degrees, one would ascend the holy hill of the Lord, up to the place of the
high priest before the Ark of the Covenant. One would rise with the purest of desires and
ardor of love, from the visible things to the invisible things of God, and finally to the
triune God Himself. Formatively, therefore, one does not attempt to undertake Trinitarian
contemplation without meeting these moral and mystical prerequisites of soul. As
Richard says in his Twelve Patriarchs:
Let him ascend this mountain if he wishes to receive those things, if
he wishes to know those things which are above human sense. Let
him ascend above himself through himself; to knowledge of God,
through knowledge of himself. Let a person first learn in the image
of God, let him learn in his similitude what he ought to think about
God. The ascent of the mountain, as has been said, pertains to
knowledge of self. the things that happen upon the mountain lead on
to the knowledge of God. . . . On this mountain the Lord taught and
Moses learned about the construction of the tabernacle. What is
understood by the tabernacle of the covenant except the state of
perfection? Therefore he who ascends the mountain, who gives
heed diligently, who seeks for a very long time, who discovers at
last what sort he is—it remains that he learn from divine showing
what sort he ought to be, what sort of edifice of the mind he ought
to prepare for God, and by what obediences he ought to appease
159

I attribute this to two things: (a) that Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark are full compositions.
They were likely either prepared as a series of sermons or as final drafts to be read from start to finish. De
Trinitate, on the other hand, emerges out of dialogical exchange and, as will be shown later, consists of a
method of inserting new material; (b) that in De Trinitate Richard seeks “necessary reasons” for the Trinity
whereas in Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark, he presupposes them as part of their contemplative ascents.
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God. Therefore, when do you think a mind that still is spread out
through various desires, that is dragged this way and that by various
thoughts, will be worthy to receive this grace? If it is unable to
gather itself into a unity, if it does not know how to enter into itself,
when will it be able to ascend by contemplation to those things that
are above itself? (italics mine)160
This pattern of Richard’s works has also been discerned by other Richardian
scholars. As Nico den Bok suggests:
There is a sequence in Richard’s œvre which resembles a pervasive
scriptural (in fact, Old Testament) framework . . .
. . . these latter works themselves show a special convergence
and cumulation, like a pyramid the top of which is, enlarged,
another pyramid that, enlarged in turn, appears to be a third
pyramid. De exterminatione describes man in three-staged
transformation of his entire affective and cognitive life, whereas
[Twelve Patriarchs] concentrates on the positive outgrowth of this
twofold life; [the] final stage is contemplation (represented by
Benjamin, or the ark of the covenant). The [Mystical Ark] is in fact
a close-up of this final stage, for which the earlier stages are
necessary preliminary steps. In contemplation man resumes the
three-staged pattern just described in mente; its third stage, in turn,
is contemplating the trinitarian God. In De Trinitate this
contemplation is envisaged.161
What we see, then, in Richard’s three main works is a formative pattern; a pattern that
follows the sequence from moral to mystical contemplation, and that pays attention to the
spiritual topography laid down by Augustine (Fig. 2.1).
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Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxxiii; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 141-142. When Richard
speaks of gathering the wanderings of the mind together into a fixed and holy resolution for moral purity,
he refers to the need for both affective and intellective control (e.g., controlling desires and thoughts as well
as intentions and wills).
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Fig. 2.1 Relation of Augustine’s Three Mnemonic Loci to the Formative
Chronology of Richard’s Main Works
It is important for us to keep this in mind as we turn to a detailed analysis of Richard’s
De Trinitate. For it is not a meditation one takes lightly. When we see the relationship
Richard’s De Trinitate bears to these other written works it is clear that he expected a
great deal of previous soul-work to be done before embarking on its study.162 Here
Richard’s apprentice, “Now distanced from the world . . . ‘collects’ the attention scattered
on worldly delights and withdraws to the inner world of his conscience, the ‘citadel’ and
‘courtroom’ of his mind.”163 With a disciplined and collected soul,164 crafted in
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accordance with the “brilliance” of the Ark of the Covenant, he now stands ready for the
most sublime contemplation of God.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF REASON IN THEOLOGICAL CONTEMPLATION
There I will meet with you…
Richard’s fides quaerens intellectum a plenitudine ad plenitudinem
We have already alluded to some of the elements Richard gains from Augustine and
Anselm. Both Augustine and Anselm are seeking the face of God, and Richard joins them
in that ascent with a few contributions of his own. Richard opens his De Trinitate with
1 Corinthians 13 and this inherited understanding of how one must take oneself and one’s
readers from a state of imperfection to perfection. One must put childish things behind,
un-tarnish the mirror of the soul, and embody the kind of love that prepares the soul for
an encounter with the Divine. Here we add that Richard also shares the religious
epistemology of his theological predecessors: the fides quaerens intellectum (i.e., faith
seeking understanding).
The basis for this is found in the one scripture reference all three of them draw
upon: “Unless you believe, you will not understand” (Isaiah 7:9). Consistently, all three
of these authors start with the things already believed by faith and seek further reasons
for believing them. Thus the view is not that one seeks reasons in order to believe, but
rather one already believes the things of faith and seeks further reasons for believing
them. As Chenu notes with special reference to the 12th century:
Revelation provided more than an external corrective to mistakes in
philosophical speculation; it inspired men of faith to produce a
78
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frame of reference which served them in their rational constructions
no less than in their art or culture. Neither the essential disparity
between philosophy and religion nor the transcendence theology
assigned to faith limited the possibilities of a Christian exercise of
reason, without faith in any way supplanting reason or perverting
the workings of the rational process.165
This “faith seeking understanding” is not, therefore, some sort of Pascalian wager
for the unbeliever; it is, rather, the meditative process of the believer who seeks a full
understanding of what he already believes. In short, the movement is not from unbelief to
belief, but from belief to vision. The goal is to ground that original knowledge with even
greater perspicuity. For some of the things of faith are difficult to believe in the absence
of good reasons. Faith is enough to believe them on the basis of reliable tradition and
authority, but faith still seeks the “evidence of things unseen” (Hebrews 11:1).166 This is
what Augustine, Anselm, and Richard of St. Victor are after: further evidence for the
things of faith.167 As Augustine writes, “If, then, when sought, He can be found, why is it
said, ‘Seek ye His face evermore?’ Is He perhaps to be sought even when found? For
things incomprehensible must so be investigated . . . .”168 This is even more the case for
the most inscrutable of mysteries: the Holy Trinity.
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of Thought, 116.
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But Richard plans to decorate the margins of his theological predecessors, and he
indicates at the outset of his treatise the principle by which he will offer a fuller
articulation of the Trinity than either of them. He states in his prologue that faith is both
the “beginning” (initium) and the “foundation” (fundamentum) of the good.169 But he
goes further, stating that one moves from faith to knowledge to perfection. He writes:
But just as the beginning of all the good is in faith, so the
consummation and perfection of all the good is in knowledge. And
so, let us press on toward perfection, and, to the extent we are able
to advance toward perfection, let us make haste from faith toward
knowledge; let us be diligent insofar as we are able, so that we may
understand what we believe (emphasis mine).170
This notion of pressing on toward ‘perfection’ is so central to Richard’s project that
it can rightly be said to be the golden thread that runs through the treatise from beginning
to end.171 Whether Richard makes an argument for the Trinity of persons or describes the
prerequisites of soul for divine contemplation, he enriches his thought with plenitude
(plenitudo) and perfection (perfectio).172 And this is a common theme in the Christian
169
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therefore, is not incidental, but an early indication of the tool and the method he uses to develop earlier
theological tradition. A rough search of terms yields the following statistics: fullness / plenitudo (165x),
highest / summa (20x), integrity / integritas (11x).
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spiritual tradition; indeed, every theologian from the apostle Paul onward seeks the end of
faith in perfection. But Richard not only shares this quest for fullness, he actually
incorporates it as a premise in his most important arguments. This perfection becomes an
essential principle for drawing out “new fullness” from inherited theological tradition. Its
mention by him in his introduction, therefore, is not incidental, but an early indication of
the tool and the method by which he will develop his trinitarian theology. So where
Richard “fits” within the heritage of his theological predecessors is within the
Augustinian-Anselmian tradition of the fides quaerens intellectum. But as we will see, his
most original work comes when he applies the concept of fullness to true Divinity.
Earlier we showed how Augustine and Anselm establish necessary reasons for God
as the Most High God; but Richard goes further. He finds necessary reasons to show how
this Most High God must also be the Fullest and Most Complete (i.e., a Trinity). In book
V Richard provides the clearest articulation of his main goal when he speaks of “a fully
formed contemplation of the truth” (omniformem veritatis contemplationem). He then
qualifies this in the next sentence as “complete plenitude” (omnem plenitudinem).173
Without this complete plenitude, without this fully formed contemplation of the truth,
Richard says, one does not have true Divinity (non habet . . . veram divinitatem). Richard
therefore glosses the parameters of the theological quest, turning fides quaerens
intellectum into fides quaerens intellectum a plenitudine ad plenitudinem (“faith seeking
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Richard also alludes to various aspects of his project with words such as ‘soli’, ‘omni’,
‘plenitudo’. For example, he addresses the imperfection of Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ by first noting
that it does not apply to persons alone (soli) and subsequently that it does not apply to all (omni) persons
(noticed by den Bok, 226 n. 115). This ebb and flow pervades the work: from one to all, from singularity to
multiformity, from defect to perfection, from lack to fullness. But ‘plenitude’ becomes his preferred way of
perfecting existing tradition with new fullness, as he does with Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ in book
IV. See esp. n. 322 of this work.
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understanding from fullness to fullness.”) Richard shares the desires of his theological
predecessors for a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity, but he goes beyond them
in how he argues for it.174 For as we will see, he not only pursues the Trinity to the full,
he also uses ‘fullness’ itself to lay out its reasons.
For all of Richard’s works, learning begins with reading (legere) in order to seek the
full and free contemplation (contemplatio) of those things. The summit is the
contemplation of God, but the ascent, as we have seen, requires following a certain
pathway to get there. In Twelve Patriarchs it begins by walking with Jacob’s sons and
wives in an attempt to purge one’s soul of vices and ready oneself for seeing the glory of
God on the Mount of Transfiguration. It continues with the Mystical Ark by approaching
and building the Ark of the Covenant and tempering one’s soul for an ecstatic flight in
the contemplation of God. In both treatises the journey begins with reading from the
Scriptures, being familiar with its narratives, and learning how to rise to contemplation
with allegorical and tropological insights. Richard’s De Trinitate likewise begins with
reading aimed at contemplation. But the starting point and the tools for the journey differ
from his other treatises.
The starting point for Richard’s De Trinitate is the Quicumque: the PseudoAthanasian creed the Victorines were in the habit of reciting daily. Richard is interested
in how the propositions embodied in this creed might be proved. As den Bok notes:
In De Trinitate I Richard starts his quest by saying that reading
(«legere») the assertions of the Quicumque he does not recall
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This is also in keeping with Richard’s triadic epistemology where imagination (imaginatio),
reason (ratio), and understanding (intelligentia) correspond respectively to things (i) visible and created,
(ii) invisible and created, and (iii) invisible and uncreated. Den Bok, 120.
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reading how they are demonstrated («probare»). There are many
authoritative texts confirming them, yet not as many arguments
proving them, nor experiential evidence confirming them.
Believing them to be true he intends to give reasons for their
truth.175
Thus in De Trinitate, there is an important probare between lectio and contemplatio. As
Ribaillier points out, one of the things Richard seeks in De Trinitate is the rational
demonstration of dogmatic formulas one already has good grounds for believing176; and
the primary tool for this endeavor is ‘reasoning’ (ratiocinando).177 Thus if we are to
properly understand this work we must be clear about the role of reason in Richard’s
project and how it fits with the mystical ascent to Trinitarian contemplation.
Approaching Richard with an understanding of ‘reason’ as that faculty by which
one derives deductive proofs for the existence of God is a more constricted conception
than was current in the 12th century: the semantic range of ‘ratio’ was much broader. Its
most basic sense was to devote the mind to the basic principles of things. The continuum
of meaning for ‘ratio’ moves from simply attending to some physical object through the
senses to offering necessary reasons for faith in God. Nevertheless, this has not kept
contemporary readers of Richard from judging his work with the more modern
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Den Bok, 195. As den Bok notes in his own translations of Richard, ‘demonstration’ here has the
broader sense of a ‘showing’ and not the strict sense of a formal, logical demonstration. In what follows,
we use ‘demonstration’ with this broader meaning.
176

“Il veut, en effet, fournir une démonstration rationelle du bien fondé des formules dogmatiques.”
Ribaillier, 19. Further evidence for this is seen in Richard’s discussion of other traditional formulas, as in
VI.15ff.
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In this respect, Richard’s De Trinitate is like Anselm’s exemplum meditandi. It is more a
meditation even though contemplation is its main goal. As Richard writes, “Contemplation is a penetrating
and free gaze of a soul extended everywhere in perceiving things; but meditation is a zealous attention of
the mind, earnestly pursuing an investigation concerning something.” Mystical Ark I.4; Zinn, RSV’s Three
Main Works, 157.
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conception.178 Consequently, the attraction or antipathy one has when reason is observed
offering ‘proofs’ for the truths of God often matches the attraction or antipathy one has
for Richard’s project in De Trinitate. On one side are those who are suspicious of any
attempt to ‘prove’ the mystery of the Trinity lest the mystery dissipate and theological
contemplation and wonder give way to a sapless set of theological inferences and
conclusions. On the other side are those who are suspicious of philosophical incoherence,
inconsistency, or ambiguity in what they take as a bona fide ‘proof’ for the Trinity with
‘reason’ in the full, modern sense of that term. But with a modern preconception of
reason, Richard’s theology simultaneously becomes a success and failure for both sides.
For if Richard succeeds in proving the Trinity by means of reason in this sense he fails to
preserve the mystery of trinitarian faith. Faith no longer seeks because it has already
found. There is no mystery left to discover. On the other hand, if Richard succeeds in
preserving the mystery of the Trinity, he does so only by failing to prove the Trinity with
modern standards.
Our analysis has to be faithful to Richard’s understanding of reason (ratio), which is
broader than the modern and more narrow sense, but also show that he is clearly
comfortable offering necessary reasons for belief in the Trinity.179 These are not the only
178

This modern divide between the clarifying quest of rationalism and the mystery-preserving
desires of anti-intellectualism partly explains the rational vs. mystical emphases Richard receives in Chase
and Nico den Bok. While Chase’s Dionysian thesis may be consistent with Richard’s theology, Richard’s
understanding of ‘ratio’ is more in the tradition of Augustine and Anselm. And while den Bok’s ‘Monopersonal’ trinitarianism keeps Richard within Augustine’s hesitant “Quid tres?” (Augustine, De Trinitate,
V.9, cf. XII.6-7), as I make clear in the appendices, the textual development of De Trinitate suggests a
greater optimism on the social trinitarian dimensions of Richard’s thought. See den Bok, 377.
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As Ribaillier notes, despite differences with Abelard, Richard shares a confidence in finding
necessary reasons “. . . non seulement à la connaissance de Dieu, mais à celle du Dieu trinitaire.” Ribaillier,
20.
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reasons, but they are the primary reasons he seeks in De Trinitate.180 We probably will
not satisfy both sides, as coming up with what is clearly the “middle-way” makes those
on both sides unhappy with the distance from their respective views. But these are
contemporary views. Richard, by contrast, stands at the cross-roads of a nascent
scholasticism and an incredibly rich monastic tradition. It thus comes as little surprise to
see in Richard both the mystic and the scholar, showcasing in one person how the best of
both need not require the separation of the school from the cloister.181
Richard’s Objective: ‘Necessary Reasons’ (rationes necessariae)
Richard looks for not just any kind of reasons for the contemplation of the Trinity,
but necessary reasons. Thus if we are to properly understand him we must know what he
means by its two main concepts: ‘reason’ and ‘necessity’. What we discover is Richard’s
“high” confidence in reason, comparable to many of the scholastics of his day and
beyond. This may surprise some who wish to see him as more a mystic than a rationalist;
but as we will see, Richard not only has the highest regard for reason in proving the
fullness of true Divinity, he clearly prefers it with respect to the certitude it brings to
beliefs held by faith.182 At regular transitions of argument and illustration in his treatise,
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Nico den Bok provides the fullest and most persuasive case for this. See esp. 184-194.
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Indeed, as we have seen in chapter 2, the founding of St. Victor and the distinctive focus of its
educational program may have been motivated by the desire to keep this division from happening. See esp.
nn. 117 and 123 of this work. Leclercq originated a distinction but not the separation between monastic and
scholastic theology in the 12th century. Here we merely locate Richard within that context when these two
were integrated aspects of the religious life. See Leclercq, Love of Learning, 191-235. See also Bernard
McGinn, “Love, Knowledge, and Mystical Union in Western Christianity, Twelfth to Sixteenth Centuries,”
Church History 56 (1987), 7-24.
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Richard’s confidence in reason does not preclude other sources for religious belief and
presupposes the authority and verity of Catholic teaching and Scripture. Necessary reasons for religious
belief do not circumvent but undergird these other sources of belief and devotion to God.
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those that provide “necessary reasons” provide deeper reasons for religious belief.
Nevertheless, we will also see that despite Richard’s high regard for reason, it is only part
of the contemplative journey; it is reason, but not reason alone that provides the
justifications he seeks. And this reminds us that unlike others who would eventually
pursue proofs for their own sake, Richard embarks on a journey—and takes his readers
on a journey—that goes well beyond this. He, like his theological predecessors and peers,
seeks the face of God. And that journey, while it may require the use of reason,
eventually sets foot on holy ground where those sandals must be taken off: where one
stands in the presence of God and longs for the encounter of face-to-face. It is because
this journey goes “above and beyond” the plateau of reason that reason has its limits for
Richard. But it is still a critical part of the movement from visible to invisible things as he
makes clear in his Mystical Ark. Indeed, among all modes of attention and investigation,
ratiocinando permeates almost every stage of the ascent. And even where reason is
surpassed in the higher stages of Divine contemplation, it is still consulted subsequent to
receiving truths revealed by divine grace.
Second, we must be clear on what Richard means by ‘necessity’. Two kinds of
necessity pervade Richard’s De Trinitate. One we term “logical necessity” and the other
“fitting necessity.” The first kind has to do with forms of logical entailment or
conclusions derived by deductive reasoning. These deductive arguments take many
forms, but the one Richard employs the most frequently in De Trinitate is the reductio ad
absurdum—a favorite among philosophers and rhetoricians.183 Here we point out the
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Philosophers, because it provides the highest justification for a belief; rhetoricians because once
its truth is demonstrated, one’s opponent either has to accept its truth or admit to believing a contradiction.

87
logic that underlies this style of argument to distinguish it from Richard’s arguments
from “fitting necessity.”184 Consider two mutually exclusive propositions, P and not-P.
Because P and not-P are contradictory (i.e., the truth of one entails the falsity of the
other), without a doubt only one of the two can be true. As a result, we can take the
opposite of the proposition we wish to prove, assume its truth, and see if—together with
other known facts—it results in an absurdity or contradiction. If so then the proposition
cannot be true because, when supposed true, it leads to a contradiction. But if that
proposition cannot be true, then the other must be true; for only one of P or not-P can be
true. In other words, if we suppose P to be true and then demonstrate that P combined
with other known facts leads to an absurdity or contradiction, then P has to be false. And
if P is false then not-P must be true. And this is not just true, but necessarily true. It has
to be true; and one can be certain that it is true. Truths like this are necessarily true and
their reasons are “necessary reasons.” This reductio ad absurdum forms the vast majority
of Richard’s method of argument throughout his work and affords him with many
“necessary reasons” for believing God is one substance and three persons.185
In addition to the logical necessity described above, there is also a kind of “fitting
necessity” that Richard employs. It has to do with optimal consistency (i.e., how well
things “fit” together). This can apply equally to truths that are to be believed as well as

184

Here we situate the “logical necessity” of the reductio ad absurdum within the context of
Richard’s other two methods of theological inquiry (e.g., fitting necessity, similitudes). For a specific
example of the reductio ad absurdum, see p. 122 of this work.
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The reductio ad absurdum is Richard’s preferred form of argument for securing “necessary
reasons” in his De Trinitate. When Richard uses non-reductio-ad-absurdum arguments, he regards the
conclusions as persuasive and probable, but not strictly necessary.
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the relations that obtain between substances or beings.186 With respect to beliefs, fitting
necessity has to do with the harmony, consistency, and coherence of these beliefs. It is
one thing to hold beliefs that are true, but it is a bonus when these beliefs have an added
consistency and harmony with one another. It is what makes our set of beliefs not only
true but also beautiful to hold and behold. With respect to substances or beings, Richard
argues for example, that where Divinity consists in a plurality of persons in a unity of
substance, and humanity consists in a plurality of substance (e.g., corporeal-incorporeal)
in a unity of persons, there is an ontological gap between these two. And in order for
there to be optimal consistency—not merely in thought, but also in actuality—there must
exist an intermediate kind of being between the above two. So there is that angelic
property that resembles Divinity in that it never possesses a plurality of substance in a
unity of persons (e.g., angels, unlike humans, have only incorporeal substance) and it
never possesses a plurality of persons in a unity of substance (e.g., angels, like humans
but unlike Divinity, have as many substances as persons). Hence the angelic property
forms the missing piece that finishes the picture, as it were, and is necessary if that
picture is to be perfectly ordered and beautiful. The logic involves three kinds of
substance, A, B, C. If one has grounds for believing only A and C from other known facts
but lacks evidence for B, one can argue on the basis of the optimal consistency that
would be lacking between A and C if there were not some third B that exists as an
intermediary between them. Thus in addition to “logical necessity” there is also this
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These parallel Coulter’s categories for Richard, ‘metaphysical criterion’ and ‘aesthetic criterion’.
Coulter, 219. While distinct, they should be seen as part of one principle of “fitting necessity,” a principle
that Richard applies to each of these domains; one with respect to “things” the other to the “knowledge of
things.”
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“fitting necessity” Richard uses to argue for the truth of his conclusions. He regards both
as “rationes necessariae.”187
We therefore have these two kinds of necessity in Richard’s treatise. Richard has a
higher regard for “logical necessity” but he uses both as needed to seek the reasons for
belief. He is not exclusively committed to one or the other but uses both in a symbiotic
fashion throughout his work to persuade his readers.188
The best place to see the difference between Richard’s two kinds of necessity and
the relationship between them is in book V where he delineates the divine processions. In
book IV, Richard begins with Boethius’s definition of ‘person’ (i.e., “an individual
substance of a rational nature”) which is both ascertainable and sufficiently applicable to
all persons. But Richard wants to go further; he wants to refine the definition and make it
more perfect and complete. As he writes, “In order for a definition to be perfect
(perfecta), it is necessary for it to cover the entire reality (rei esse comprehendat) and
only the reality of the object being defined.”189 The definition must extend to the entire
realm of the things to which it refers, and it must be an interchangeable proposition (i.e.,
the word ‘person’ must be able to be applied to different things to which its definition
appropriately pertains). The solution Richard comes up with is that every person has a
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“So only these reasons that are derived from aseity, immutability, and simplicity are called
‘necessary reasons.’” Den Bok, 192; see also 190 n.154 of that work, where den Bok notes that Richard
seems to equate indubitability with ‘necessary’ at some points in his treatise where modern scholars—with
stricter definitions—see a distinction between the two.
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It is this focus on persuasion that forms the intention of Richard’s treatise; it is as much a work
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“rational being from an incommunicable property.”190 But because Divinity lacks
differentiation due to its aseity, the question remains how there can be any plurality of
persons in one Divinity. In other words, how is it possible to apply the definition of
‘person’ to three things if there is only one thing? Since ‘person’ requires an
incommunicable property, there must be something that distinguishes the divine persons
despite the fact that each one of them is identical to the divine substance. The solution is
that each divine person has a different “causal” origin. One is from himself, one is from
another, and a third is from the other two.
Next, in book V, Richard inquires about the properties of each divine person and
provides a particular characteristic of each one.191 But what is his method? He says we
already know that the three persons in the Trinity are differentiated by certain properties
(i.e., differences with respect to their original cause), but that those properties applicable
to them individually have not yet been “discovered through reasoning (ratiocinando).”192
He states further that the goal is to support via an “attestation of demonstrative certitude
(demonstrativae certitudinis) what we hold by faith.”193 Here we see him in the pursuit of
fides quaerens intellectum, and his method is to find more certain reasons.
His first move is to employ an argument based on “fitting necessity.” He has
already shown that there is plurality within Divinity in book III; but now Richard asks
which of two kinds of plurality is the more beautiful and hence applies to true Divinity. Is
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it “a plurality that is differentiated by a most ordered variety of properties and unified in a
most appropriate manner of proportions through a marvelous reason?”194 Or is it “a
plurality connected by no concord of differences or concordant difference between
persons and adorned by no order of otherness?”195 The answer, because it is the more
beautiful, is the first. Therefore “. . . it is necessary to believe that the most pleasant
fraternity of persons cannot be lacking in the supreme happiness nor can the most ordered
variety of properties be lacking in the supreme beauty.”196
But the above argument based on “fitting necessity” is not enough for Richard. He
writes subsequently, “But, lest this argument, which we have offered, appears to some to
be probable rather than necessary, let us investigate our assertion further through deeper
reason” (emphasis mine).197 Richard then moves to an argument based on “logical
necessity.”198
Borrowing an important argument from I-II, Richard next shows that what was said
with respect to divine substance can also be said with respect to divine person. In the
same way that there can only be one substance that exists from itself and not from any
other, so there can only be one (divine) person who exists from himself and not from any
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other; otherwise, there would be an infinity of divine persons in one Divinity. With
respect to substance, we can speak of a beginning of time such that there cannot be an
infinite regress of substances. There must, finally, be a first cause; a first substance from
which all temporal things come to be. But in Divinity (i.e., God in se) there is no
beginning of time; God is eternal. There is no first being or second being with respect to
time. However there is a first person and second person with respect to origin, where
“first” and “second” are understood not temporally but ‘naturally’, or with respect to
causal-dependence. So a similar argument can be made with respect to origin of being in
book V as was made with respect to temporal order of being in I-II. To put it another
way, the same argument that worked for speaking of God ad extra to show that there
must be a first substance can now be applied to God ad intra to show that there must be a
first divine person. If there is no “divine person” who exists from himself, then there
would be an infinite series of divine persons. There would be no first, originating person.
And hence there must be a first, originating divine person. There must be someone who
exists from himself, who does not draw source from another, and who does not exist from
anyone other than himself. Richard subsequently provides the evidence that the property
of this divine person is incommunicable and concludes the section by saying, “Behold we
have now considered with indisputable arguments that mode of existing spoken at the
beginning of the work with probable reasons” (emphasis mine).199
All of this reveals that Richard is working with two different kinds of necessity.
One is a “fitting necessity” having to do with the optimal consistency, harmony, and
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“Ecce illum existendi modum jam indubitata demonstratione collegimus, de quo in hujus operis
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beauty of a set of truths: What is true and what one is more justified in believing is
whichever of two beliefs is the more fitting and optimal. The other is a “logical
necessity” having to do with truths delivered by means of a process of logical reasoning,
and usually the fruit of a reductio ad absurdum argument. What we see above is that
Richard uses both. But what we also see is that he has a higher regard for “logical
necessity.” He sees it offering a level of certitude the other lacks. But notice that Richard
doesn’t dispense with more probabilistic forms of argument once he’s discovered a
deeper and more logical reason for a particular belief. Rather he offers the “logical
necessity” for those who are not persuaded by the first kind of necessity. So while
Richard himself sees both forms of argument offering “necessary reasons” in the sense
that they cannot be doubted, he is aware of the important difference between the two
types of necessity he puts forward. They both may be “indubitable” and for that reason
necessary to believe; but “fitting necessity” argues for what is more probable (i.e., the
more optimal and fitting is more likely true) whereas “logical necessity” argues for what
cannot be otherwise. It is not only true, but must be true. The important point is that they
both provide adequate justifications for belief even if the level of certitude differs
between the two.
In addition to these forms of argument, we mention a third Richard uses
prominently throughout his work: his use of the principle of similitude. As Coulter’s
thesis makes clear, Richard’s method is one of moving in an ascent from the visible to the
invisible. We noted earlier that this per visibilia ad invisibilia is a thoroughly Augustinian
margin which subsequent Trinitarian authors, including Richard, write within. But there
are two things to further point out here. First, any time Richard mentions discerning
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invisible from visible things, he does so by means of the principle of similitude. By this
he means that he can take something visible and compare it with something invisible in
such a way as to highlight their similarities and differences. Greater insight can be
obtained by attending to these similarities and dissimilarities. Second, in De Trinitate this
is almost always connected with the notion of man being created in the image of God.200
Since man is the visible image of God, one can attend to this image in order to see what is
true about the invisible reality to which that image corresponds. As den Bok notes:
The realm of meaning is as wide as reality can be. God and
man, the Trinity and his image, have «rationes» which can be
discovered by a careful study of properties departing from various
similitudes offered to us by Scripture and creation. Human beings
are called to read this twofold book and try to understand its text.
God has expressed himself first; He descends in writing calling us
to read. A human person images the trinitarian God precisely in his
transcendent openness of mind to all that can be known and loved.
Indicating God by so many human characteristics Scripture invites
us to investigate what He can possibly have in common with
man.201
This “commonality” between man and God becomes clearer as the apprentice discerns
the image in which he was made and by means of which he can rise to knowing God as
He is. As Gregory writes, “‘Experiencing in themselves that the invisible is better than
the visible,’ they can rise toward God through contemplation of the visible world.”202 As
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a result, as “. . . the universe unfolds, man’s identity becomes more distinct and
comprehensible.”203 The divine image in man suddenly becomes the ‘mirror’ of
1 Corinthians 13:12 by which one peers into these invisible realities and their
similitudes.204 Further, there is the creative play between the ‘speculum’ and the
‘specula’ in the Latin such that the “mirror” (speculum) is also understood as the
“watchtower” (speclua) where one enlarges one’s mind and “stands up” in order to peer
further into these human-divine comparisons. Together, these are the three main methods
Richard uses to argue for the truth of his claims in De Trinitate. But as we see in the next
section, it is this last method that shows the limits of reason: where the soul transitions
from the knowledge of Being to the knowledge of being-in-Being.
Ascending “Above & Beyond” Reason
Like his theological predecessors, and many of his contemporaries, Richard
conceives the process of learning as a journey from imperfection to perfection, from faith
to full understanding. But when it comes to the contemplation of the Trinity it presents
the learner with some unique challenges. This is because the Trinity exceeds one’s
rational capacities; it is “above and beyond” reason, as he says.205 And thus it is
important for us to understand not only the types of reasons Richard seeks in his quest to
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provide his readers with a full understanding of the Trinity but also to point out where
reason fits in the ascent to that full and perfect contemplation. As den Bok notes:
Because of the method of «fides quaerens intellectum» the
(Pseudo-) Athanasian formulations are caught in a very remarkable
tension. On the one hand, if the enterprise is not to fail, they are the
threshold, and only that: We should not rest at them, but enter and
proceed. On the other hand they are, so to speak, written on the
altar, we cannot leave them behind, they will always be before and
above us: They will be confirmed by reason, if the enterprise is not
to fail. So the Quicumque and its setting in tradition and liturgical
life is the «context of discovery» for God’s trinitarian character,
whereas De Trinitate offers a «context of justification».
If the enterprise succeeds, we will indeed have gained some
understanding of what is expressed by the creed—an understanding
which, when fully unfolded, is eternal life. De Trinitate consciously
aims at contemplation in its optimal form, which is not only very
useful, but also pure enjoyment, communicating everlasting delight
and a taste of endless sweetness.206
Richard’s understanding of the positive, but limited role of reason in theological
contemplation is virtually identical to that of Anselm, the main contours of which were
shared by many others in the 12th century. Anselm, too, saw the path to full theological
contemplation as an ascent; indeed, as we have seen, he was widely influential in further
contributing to its upward momentum. Moreover, Anselm wrote his Monologion and
Proslogion with formative aims. Both bring a person to the summit of that being-thanwhich-none-greater-can-be-thought through silent reasoning alone. But here we pause to
notice a critical point in Anselm’s treatises where the God-seeker stands upon the final
precipice of rationality, still seeking the face of his ineffable Creator.207 For how is one to
206
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Den Bok, 156-157.

In addition to the metaphysical dimension of Creator-created/creature that fixes the contours of
the Trinitarian and Christological debates, there is its formative dimension. This formative focus is at the
center of Anselm’s project as he instructs his reader in how to properly think and speak of himself, his
Creator, and the similitudes and dissimilitudes that obtain between them.
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see the face of God when the difference between creature and Creator, the common and
the holy, remains so great? Though one may come to know about God, how is one ever
to come to know and love Him like a lover her Beloved—inseparable, united, and one?
Anselm describes this gap as what is “above and beyond” in his Monologion and Richard
uses the same idea but gives it a fuller articulation in his Mystical Ark when he describes
the factors involved in ecstatic contemplation.208 Anselm writes in Monologion 65:
But what about our earlier conclusion? Namely, that the supreme
essence is above and beyond all other natures . . . . What then?
Have I, in some way, brought something to light about something
incomprehensible, although, in another way, gained no direct
insight into it? (italics mine)209
For Anselm, as well as Richard, the solution for bridging the divide between the
little essence and the supreme essence is the process introduced by Augustine of seeking
the truth of Divinity by means of the ‘mirror’, by means of the creature who has been
created in the image of God. Anselm continues:
What we do, when we cannot, or will not, utter something properly,
is to signify it by means of something else—an [aenigma] for
example. And often we do not see something properly (i.e., as it is),
but we see it by means of some likeness or image—when, for
example, we make out someone’s face in a mirror. Thus we say and
do not say, see and do not see, one and the same thing. For it is
through something else that we say it, and we see it. . . .
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In Mystical Ark IV Richard charts the course for the fifth and sixth stages of trinitarian
contemplation; in bk. V he kindles the “white hot longing” (aestuantis animi ardor) that will catapult his
readers into the presence of the triune God. There he lays out the three modes for ecstatic contemplation:
enlarging of the mind, raising up of the mind, alienation of the mind.
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Davies, Anselm: Major Works, 71. The closest Augustine comes to “above and beyond” in his
De Trinitate is IX.4: “. . . if knowledge is less than that thing which is known, and which can be fully
known, then knowledge is not perfect . . . . But when the mind knows itself, its own knowledge does not
rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself is known.” Note the allusion to 1 Corinthians 13:12. See
also IX.6 “above the eye of the mind.” He also writes in VII.4, “. . . the super-eminence of the Godhead
surpasses the power of customary speech. For God is more truly thought than He is altered, and exists more
truly than He is thought.”
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This line of reasoning, therefore, allows our conclusions about
the supreme nature to be true and the supreme nature itself to
remain ineffable. We understand them to be indicating the supreme
nature by means of something else, rather than expressing it by
means of what is proper to its essence.210
This ineffable stopping point requires new methods of inquiry, methods that move
above and beyond reason alone. As we mentioned earlier, this place in Anselm’s
Monologion is where he finishes his treatment of the “Word” and “Wisdom.” The
‘righting’ of words must now extend to the ‘righting’ of power. And that reformation
requires pursuing, within one’s soul, a conformity of word and deed. From 65 to the end
of the work, Anselm treats the reformation of the soul in the image of God. For coming to
know God as He is requires not merely “fitting reasons” but a “fitting soul.”
In Richard’s works, this ineffable stopping point is described as the place at which
reason “fails” (defecerat)—literally “faints away.” In both Twelve Patriarchs and
Mystical Ark, he refers to this point as the death of Rachel before giving birth to
Benjamin (i.e., contemplation):
And so when Benjamin is born, Rachel dies, because the mind,
having been carried away to contemplation, experiences how great
the failure of human reason is. Did not Rachel die and did not the
sense of all human reason fail in the Apostle when he said:
“Whether in the body or outside the body, I do not know; God
knows” (2 Cor. 12:2)? Therefore, let no person suppose that he is
able to penetrate to the splendor of that divine light by
argumentation; let no person believe that he is able to comprehend
it by human reasoning. For if it were possible to approach that
divine light by some argument or other then it would not be
inaccessible.211
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This ineffable stopping point that requires new methods of inquiry; methods that move above
and beyond reason alone, can also be found in Anselm’s Proslogion, 14-16; Davies and Evans, 95-96.
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Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxiv; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 131. Benjamin itaque
nascente, Rachel moritur, quia mens ad contemplationem rapta, quantus sit humanae rationis defectus
experitur. Nonne Rachel mortua tunc erat, et omnis humanae rationis sensus in Apostolo defecerat, cum
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And later, “Moreover, we can conclude suitably enough from the death of his mother
what we ought to understand by Benjamin that kind of contemplation which is above
reason.”212
This failure of reason is not to be thought of in the sense of ineffectualness but
merely to show that reasoning—as a method of theological inquiry—is only effectual for
some modes of knowing and not others. I can learn quite a bit about my wife, for
example. Theoretically I could have full knowledge of her biological makeup, her genetic
constitution. I could study her dispositions, learn her temperament, observe her behavior.
I could multiply in the acuity of my knowledge of her in all of these ways. But these
modes of inquiry are not what provide the most appropriate and fullest knowledge of her.
That requires a different mode of seeking, a mode more conducive to enjoying and loving
her; and likewise, to her enjoying and loving me. In the same way, Richard and Anselm
know that while knowledge of God may come through reason, the kind of knowledge
they seek is “above and beyond” it. It is the knowledge of love.213 For Anselm, the ascent
to God must transition from reason to a reformation of the soul in righteousness. It
requires washing one’s hands and cleansing one’s heart so that one might ascend the holy
hill of the Lord. For Richard, when reason fails it gives birth to a new form of
dicebat: Sive in corpore, sive extra corpus, nescio, Deus scit (II Cor XII). Nemo ergo se existimet ad illius
divini luminis claritatem, argumentando posse penetrare; nemo se credat humana illud ratiocinatione
posse comprehendere. Si enim aliqua argumentatione adiri potuisset lumen illud divinum, utique
inaccessibile non fuisset. PL 196.53A.
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Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxiv; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 132. Quod autem per
Benjamin illud contemplationis genus, quod supra rationem est, intelligere debeamus, ex matris ejus morte
convenienter satis conjicere possumus. PL 196.53CD
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Indeed, there is much to be made of how love becomes the rich taproot from which one is
“drawn out of oneself” until one reaches the “rising” and “alienation of mind” involved in the highest levels
of theological contemplation. Love is the source of all language of ‘excess’ in Richard.
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contemplation: an ecstasy and alienation of mind that makes the ardent soul ready for
divine visitation.
We will describe Richard’s understanding of ecstatic contemplation in chapter 5.
For now, we only need to show where reason fits in Richard’s broader religious
epistemology; and specifically how it relates to the contemplation of the Trinity. Richard
explains this the most clearly in his Mystical Ark with the separation of the “crown” of
the cherubim on the Ark of the Covenant from the base it rests upon. That physical
separation of the crown from the base is what Richard regards as the separation between
what is below reason and what is with, above, and beyond it. He writes:
However, in every part and everywhere, the propitiatory is placed
over wood, and on that account with sufficient suitability there is
represented in it the kind of contemplation that, when going beyond
all imagination (quod omnem imaginationem excedens), is engaged
in reason according to reason (ratione secundum rationem). And as
the propitiatory (inasmuch as it is the cover of the ark) nowhere
descends below wood, nor is permitted to be attached to wood, so
when this contemplation surpasses all imagination (omnem
imaginationem supergrediens) and does not agree to let itself be
mixed with anything, it is mindful of invisible things only and
directs attention to invisible things only.214
This is the pivotal point in Richard’s religious epistemology that shifts one’s “attention”
(attentio) or “imagination” (imaginatio) in the first two forms of contemplation to
reasoning (ratiocinando).215 Richard describes this shift in his Mystical Ark (Fig. 3.1).
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Richard, Mystical Ark I.11; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 171-172.

Spijker rightly emphasizes both the ‘narrowing’ character as well as the ‘dynamic ebb and flow’
involved in Richard’s use of ‘ratio’: “What is important to notice is the necessity of increasing
concentration. The senses offer images to the reason (ratio) where they become the object of all kind of
cogitations. These wander around purposelessly. When the mind comes upon one of these free-floating
thoughts and wants to know more about it, it has to concentrate, and cogitation turns into meditation. Even
more concentrated is the contemplation. But from this point of concentration things can be seen in all kinds
of ways: the process can now be reversed, an expanded vision is possible.” Spijker, 202.

101
Mode of
Attention

Movement

Goal

Object

Ark

Narrowing of
Attention
considering
things
consultare seemingly
consult,
contrary to
weigh,
reason from
ponder
irradiation of
divine light
Key Verb

learning
(cognoscere)
ad Trinitate
those things
quae de
left
6
(exsulto atque
seemingly personarum
cherub
tribudio)
contrary to
Trinitate
human
reason
perceiving
quae de
piercing
supra, sed non
things that
Divinitatis
cernere insight of the
praeter
ad Divinitate
transcend
right
5
natura
separate, lift, understanding
rationem
(ascendo)
limits of
cherub
(simplici
distinguish from a divine
human
essentia)
showing
reason
-------------------------------------------------- upper limit of ratio -------------------------------------------------full self-knowledge = beginning (initium) and foundation (fundamentum) for divine contemplation
supra
rationem, et
videtur esse
praeter
rationem

4

in ratione et
secundum
rationem

per invisibilia
nostra ad
coelestium
animorum et
supremum
bonorum
(adsergo)

gathering
intelligible
fruit from
experience
solis
propitiand
intelligibilibus atory
reasoning as
foundation
for higher
speculations

reasoning,
colligere comprehension
gather
applied esp. to
together in
invisible things
mind
of ourselves

---------------------------------------------- upper limit of imaginatio ---------------------------------------------per speculum ad speciem
rising to
by intention
speculation
and
in ratione
per visibilia ad of invisible
intendere solis
investigation
3
secundum
invisibilia
things via
crown intend, aim
invisibilibus
but drawn from
imaginationem
(sublevo)
similitudes
at
image of
with visible
visible things
things
rationem
discerning
in
ordinem
reasoning
invisibilia ab
rational
versare imaginatione
dispositionem
accommodated
2
visibilium
principle of
gilding
ruminate,
secundum
causam
to visible
(insisto)
any one
meditate
rationem
modum
things
visible thing
utilitatem
rejoicing in
in
free movement
ad visibilia
the manifold
mirari imaginatione
rerum
of the mind
1
corporalia
beauty of
wood
look at,
solam
visibilium
carried by
(obstobstupesco)
God’s
marvel
imaginationem
wonder
creation

Fig. 3.1 Richard’s Six Modes of Contemplation216
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Classifying the powers of the soul was common to the 12th century. As McGinn suggests,
Boethius’s four-fold schema of sensus, imaginatio, ratio, and intelligentia was organized into a five-fold
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For greater clarity we arrange Richard’s taxonomy from bottom-to-top to give a
sense for the ascent as well as to better highlight the separation of the fifth and sixth
modes that culminate in Trinitarian contemplation. The first kind of contemplation
consists of constructing the ark by garnering materials; that is, by a free attending to
visible things. It is the effortless gaze of the mind as it enjoys the abundance and variety
of things God has made. The second adds understanding to this attending of visible things
by seeking their rational principle (rationem). The key verb Richard uses to describe this
mode is ‘versare’ which literally means “to turn over and over in the mind, to ruminate.”
It is symbolized by the gilding of the wood with gold. The third consists of the crown of
the ark and represents the rising with one’s attention from visible to invisible things. It
“rests” on the four sides of the Ark because it represents the first moment at which
contemplation takes its root in reason (in ratione). The two prior forms of contemplation
are “below reason”; reason must “accommodate” itself to what is below itself in its
interaction with the corporeal sense (sensu corporeo). The third mode consists of
“drawing out” (trahere) similitudes from visible things in order to rise toward the greater
contemplation of invisible things alone. The fourth involves using “reason according to
reason,” where one seeks the similitudes of invisible things only. The key verb Richard
uses here is ‘colligere’ which means “to gather, recollect in mind.” The goal is to gather
the intelligible fruit gleaned from experience and reasoning and integrate them into a
foundation from which one might “stand up” to a full, human understanding of all
pattern of ascent beginning with Hugh of St. Victor and Thierry of Chartres. Other classifications were
made by William of St. Thierry, Isaac of Stella, William of Conches, Godefroy of St. Victor, Aelred of
Rievaulx, and Clarenbald of Arras among others. An overview of the semantic range of these terms in the
12th century is given in McGinn, The Golden Chain, 153-177. On modifications of the Boethian schema,
ibid., 208-221.
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things.217 It is symbolized by the propitiatory. The fifth, symbolized by the cherub on the
right, consists of those things that are above but not beyond reason. These are those
things that are consistent and agree with reason, such as the simplicity and unity of the
Divine substance. The sixth, symbolized by the cherub on the left, consists of those
things that are both above and beyond reason, where things seem contrary to reason, as
when reason seeks the mystery of the Trinity.218
The first four stages eventually culminate into one contemplation, involving both
human effort and divine grace in the ascent from visible to invisible things. But the fifth
and sixth contemplations are “separate” (i.e., “holy”) and depend upon divine grace.219
The cherubim are in an angelic form. It is only as one tempers one’s soul according to
their angelic similitude and holiness—a wholly invisible form that exceeds human
fullness and holiness—that one may enjoy the fruits of trinitarian speculation. As he says:
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Now it becomes clearer why the educational program at St. Victor was so focused on expanding
and deepening its knowledge of the liberal arts. Richard’s taxonomy indicates that the wider and deeper
one’s knowledge, the greater the foundation (fundamentum) from which one can rise up to the
contemplation of divine things. Furthermore, the fourth mode of contemplation, as he says, involves
“common understanding” (communem intelligentiam) as well as “full self-knowledge” (ipsa intelligentia
nostra videtur intelligere seipsam per semetipsum), where ethics is included here as a prerequisite to divine
contemplation. All individual and communal human understanding and righteousness culminate in the
fourth mode of contemplation. The “propitiatory,” then, marks the possibility for full understanding—the
“foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men” (1 Corinthians
1:25). Faithfulness and grace determine whether it becomes the place of rejection or beatitude; for the
fullness of theology—that highest of sciences—is “raised up” from there.
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Richard, Mystical Ark I.6; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 163. Richard would therefore see
theological inquiry sola ratio as stuck at levels four or five with one or two more levels of contemplation to
go. Moreover, these final levels require a transition from the active mode of knowing to a more
contemplative one (i.e., in the way that a beloved’s letter “faints away” as a lover encounters the object of
her love face-to-face.) Reason, fueled by love, reaches the higher levels of contemplation, but only a
seething love for God can carry one “above and beyond” reason to rest with Him face-to-face; and even
then, not without the assistance of divine grace and illumination.
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Richard’s choice of verb is fitting here. He uses ‘cernere’ with its sense of perceiving by means
of “lifting, separating, and distinguishing.” Ibid.
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Certainly it ought to be noted that those four previously
mentioned contemplations are, in a certain manner, joined together
into one (in unum conjuncta). However, these two last ones are
separate and are set apart (separatim sunt et seorsum posita). And
indeed in those first four kinds of contemplations we grow daily
from our own activity (industria), yet with divine assistance (cum
divino adjutorio). But in these two final ones everything depends
on grace (ex gratia). They are wholly far removed (omnino
longinqua) and exceedingly remote (valde remota) from all human
activity, except to the degree that each person receives the clothing
of angelic similitude from heaven and by divine providence puts it
on himself . . . for the reason that without the addition of this
highest grace (supremae gratiae) no one would be able to attain to
fullness of knowledge (quis ad plenitudinem scientiae pertingere
non possit).220
Thus contemplation begins with the wonder and manifold variety of visible things God
has made, but only takes its root in reason (in ratione) at the third stage. There the form
of investigation still accommodates itself to the mode of those things that are below
reason, but rises to the contemplation of invisible things by means of the “principle of
similitude.” Once fixed in memory, however, the work of “reasoning according to
reasoning” truly begins. In the fourth mode of contemplation, reason works to unite its
entire “inventory” of intelligible things—including, and most especially, by bringing
moral integrity to one’s soul—in order to provide a foundation from which to stand up
and peer into the Divine mysteries (i.e., the things of faith). Reason then applies itself to
those things that come down from above and beyond itself in the fifth and sixth modes of
contemplation. In the former, divine revelation is shown to agree with reason, such as
Richard demonstrates in books I-II of his De Trinitate. In the latter, reason seems
contrary to the things of faith. But as Richard shows in book III, necessary reasons for the
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Mystical Ark I.12; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 172.
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Trinity of persons are not lacking; and where they can be found, there is hope for the
zealous who wish to make that final ascent. These necessary reasons become the anchor
points Richard places in the rock leading to trinitarian contemplation, ensuring that his
readers have both the means and the assurance they need to reach the summit of the Holy
Trinity. They are footholds that provide hope for successfully making the journey.
Reason therefore plays a very important part in Richard’s understanding of
theological contemplation. Like a choice tool, it is used in the construction of just about
every aspect of the “mystical ark,” but it faces its greatest challenges in that face-to-face
encounter with the Divine. We therefore ask, with an unknown disciple of the 12th
century, “Who then will conduct us to the city of the great king in order that what we
now read in these pages and see only as in a glass, darkly, we may then look upon the
face of God present before us, and so rejoice?”221 In De Trinitate we find the craftsman
hard at work to provide the fullness of this contemplation for his readers, and challenging
them to forge a unanimity of mind and heart by means of its “trinitarian” structures and
forms.
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Quoted in Leclercq, Love of Learning, 65.

CHAPTER FOUR
ARTICULATING THE TRINITY “TRINITARIANLY”
…and walk in it.
We have shown that Richard sees a symbiotic relationship between necessary
reasons offered for truths about God and the fitting necessity—the optimal consistency
and the beauty—in which those reasons cohere. Both provide greater certainty and proof
for the things already held firmly by faith. But faith’s chief object is God Himself.
Richard’s main object of study in De Trinitate is God Himself. And when we look at the
connection between God and the kinds of reasons Richard seeks to establish firmer
convictions about God’s Trinitarian nature, we find that the terminus of those reasons is
God who is their ultimate ground. It is because of who God is and what God is like that
the very reasons themselves are eternal, necessary, and beautiful. Thus the most eternal
of all beings—the Eternal One—ought to have proportionally necessary and eternal truths
that can be known about Him. Likewise God is the most beautiful of all beings. Thus, in
addition to finding necessary reasons, Richard expects the constellation of these reasons
to reflect the harmony and maximal beauty of true Divinity. Such congruity provides the
confidence that one’s beliefs reflect a true knowledge of God. Thus the more necessary
and more congruent the reasons, the greater trust one has in believing them. Faith thus
increases as the dogmas already believed on the testimony of authority come to be
believed additionally on the basis of reason and beauty. For Richard, these necessary and
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fitting reasons complement rather than replace those things believed by faith.222 As Nico
den Bok writes:
So, although God is not visible nor created, properties of visible
and invisible created things can be compared, by reason, with
properties of the invisible and uncreated God.
This comparison is made possible because God creates material
and spiritual beings: They are construed by divine wisdom, hence
rationally consistent. Moreover, since this God is the best possible
«rational substance» they will have good reasons, optimal
consistency and beautiful structuring. Yet comparison would still
be impossible if the realm of reasons were restricted to creation.
For Richard this cannot be the case, however, since . . . God’s own
being in fact has the best possible reasons, consistency, and
beauty.223
As a result of this correspondence between God and the reasons one seeks to obtain
in the contemplation of Him, discovering these reasons leads to an awareness of already
existing within their order and structure. And one’s journey, one’s ascent to God, consists
of following that order back to God in whom that ultimate rational beauty and harmony
consists. Nico den Bok accurately describes this correspondence in Richard and the effect
it has on the construction of his texts:
Richard has a special talent for discovering parallels between the
structure of the «letter» and that of the «things» that can be read
from it figuratively. The increased analytical accuracy by which
knowledge of the realities of man and God is extended and
intensified by way of differentiation and integration of the aspects
disclosed matches an increased sense of synthesis. Both spiritual
sensitivity and empirical sensibility are refined into a capacity of
vision capable of seeing a «content» in its specific form; both of
them are enabled and mediated by a more vigorous rational
penetration into the complexity of things. So Richard intensifies the
hermeneutic circle between vision and analysis. As such he shows a
222
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commitment to the objective, for it is the concrete shape of texts, or
facts or things expressed in it, as given, which leads both sense
perception and reflection; the spirit «goes out» to them via the
senses and reason (italics mine).224
It is thus not surprising that those who diligently seek the Divine find their
contemplations and compositions coming to reflect that rational order and structure. But
Richard’s talent extends above and beyond the relationship between the “letter” and
“things”; he also structures his treatises in accordance with the form of their subject
matter. Thus Richard applies his analytical skill to “arranging” the aspects of revelation
for his readers so that the organizational dimensions of his texts match—as much as
possible—the subject being contemplated. In De Trinitate, Richard arranges necessary
reasons and their optimal consistency in a very special way—a “trinitarian” way.
Previously Richardian scholars have claimed an originality for Richard’s content in De
Trinitate. In what follows, we demonstrate that this originality and creativity extends to
how Richard arranges and forms that content.
We now come to the main thesis of this work: the way Richard argues for the
Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. In this chapter we lay out the triadic
forms and structures by which Richard constructs his treatise. The next chapter shows
how Richard uses these structures for the spiritual formation of his readers.
Inventional, Ordering Devices
A written composition can be arranged and organized in many ways, but what is
especially true of Richard is his tendency to conform the structural pattern of his treatises
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in accordance with their main object of study.225 One can see organizational patterns in
Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs consisting of his arrangement around the two wives and the
twelve sons of Jacob. Similarly, in Richard’s Mystical Ark, the four sides of the Ark of
the Covenant contribute to regular patterns of four as Richard composes that work.226 It
is a skill Richard employs throughout his entire corpus. Such organizational patterns are
what Carruthers—in her studies on memory-work in the Middle Ages—calls “inventional
devices.” These structures aid both the writer and reader in retaining the content for
contemplation and assist the grueling meditational activity involved in reading texts in
the Middle Ages. Carruthers provides an example of how this works with the AngloSaxon poem Beowulf. In this poem, King Hrothgar looks upon a sword-hilt depicting the
scenes of the Flood and then constructs a speech ordered around the flow of scenes he
perceives. He praises Beowulf for saving the Danes from the dangers of Grendel and his
mother and then reflects more generally upon life and death. Bringing attention to the
role the sword plays in the structuring of the poem, Carruthers writes, “It is clear in the
poem that looking at the sword enables Hrothgar’s meditation, that the decorated artifact
acts as not only the ‘inspiration’ (as we would probably now say) but as the inventional,
ordering instrument with which he composes.”227 The sword itself becomes a way of
225

“In the content and form of almost every work he is in fact doing this: forming the mind of his
readers by repetition and variation of basic structures. Cf. Van ‘T Spijker, Learning by experience,
especially 201ff. In this way reading Richard’s works as they enfold themselves is a spiritual exercise
itself.” Den Bok, 102 n. 31. See also idem., chapter 8.
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For an example, see n. 430 of this work.

On the notion of ‘inventional’: “Inventio has the meanings of both of these English words
[“creative” and “inventory”] . . . . Having “inventory” is a requirement for ‘invention.’ Not only does this
statement assume that one cannot create (‘invent’) without a memory-store (‘inventory’) to invent from and
with, but it also assumes that one’s memory-store is effectively ‘inventoried,’ that its matters are in readily
recovered ‘locations.’” Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 205. Further, the word derives from ‘in’ (i.e., into)
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collecting and ordering one’s thoughts. It helps gather all of the content to one place,
aiding remembrance and recollection. And it gathers content within a particular form
(i.e., the sword). The inventional device of the sword helps the reader recall both the
content and that content’s structure.
Similarly, Richard chooses “inventional instruments” from the Scriptures that gather
the content of his compositions together around a familiar biblical object or narrative.
The device aids further recollection and builds a platform for later contemplation.
Richard’s goal is to get his reader’s eyes off the book and onto its subject matter so that
he can enjoy free flights of contemplation upon the more sublime forms to which it
pertains. It is this “freedom” in contemplation that keeps the soul in a ready state for
direct encounters with God. As Carruthers writes:
So a reader’s memory, not confined by worries about “the author’s
intended meaning,” is freed to roam its memorial symphony,
“gathering up” harmonies and antitheses in the compositional
activity which Hugh of St. Victor described as “meditation,” the
highest kind of study, that “takes the soul away from the noise of
earthly business” (such as grammatical commentary) and “renders
his life pleasant indeed” who makes a practice of it. Interpretation
can then become a form of prayer, a journey through memory like
that Augustine took with his mother Monica, by means of which, at
moments, the soul seems to recollect beyond its self, to find out
God’s own sweetness.228
This is precisely what Richard does with his Mystical Ark, where the Ark of the Covenant
serves as the inventional, ordering instrument for the contemplation of God. Everything,
right down to the gold and the wood with which it is constructed, becomes a way of
and ‘venire’ (i.e., “to come”) and has the sense of “going into” and “getting to the heart of a matter.” This is
exactly how Richard describes his method in De Trinitate I.4, of “drawing out” truths into the open “from
the secret sanctuary of wisdom.”
228

Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 147-148.
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calling to mind meditations and contemplative resolutions by which one constructs one’s
soul into the form of this Ark. All elements of the Ark coalesce in six stages of
contemplation on Divinity Richard gives in amazing detail. As den Bok writes:
The basic principle of Richard’s theological method can be
expressed without any technical term: «It gives us pleasure to turn
our attention eagerly to this description, both to affirm the rule of
our teaching from the similitude that is set forth, and to forge the
form and the manner of our work in accord with the formula of
description.» Scripture provides a specific form or shape, like that
of Jacob’s family or the ark of the covenant described in Bibletexts, or even the form of a Bible-text itself. Richard intends to
study this form as accurately as possible in order to detect its
complex similitude with things human and divine, factual and
moral, as believed by the Church. Richard also intends to mold his
own rendering of this description including his disclosure of the
similitudes hidden in it by the same form; so his works too
somehow reflect this form. Finally, the human soul should also be
molded in accordance with the structures distilled from this form or
«littera»; Richard is convinced that its form offers a model which
can bring one’s inner world «into shape.»229
We give attention to this inner shaping in the next chapter. But to fully show how
Richard’s De Trinitate brings one’s inner world into shape, we have to first make the case
that Richard is deliberately constructing his work with the very triadic forms and
structures by which he intends to edify his readers.
In most of his treatises, Richard takes the inventional, ordering device from
Scripture. In the case of De Trinitate, the content has a scriptural basis, but its form
transcends the text. There is no equivalent “picture” per se of the Trinity in the Scriptures
by which Richard can devise a similar contemplation as he does in his Mystical Ark. So
Richard chooses the dogma itself (“one substance, three persons”), derived from the
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teachings of Scripture, the church Fathers, and the Creeds, to order his contemplation on
the Trinity. Thus the quality of formation that takes place in Richard’s readers is
proportional to how well they identify and retain the intricacies of these trinitarian
structures in his treatise. How well we are formed by them will consist, first, by how well
we discern them; and second, by how diligently we explore the various aspects Richard
wants to “draw out” from them. We now make the case for Richard’s intentional,
trinitarian structuring of his treatise.
Breadth: Beginning with the End in Mind
Richard explicitly states that he structures his De Trinitate in a triadic way at the
very end of the work. Here he reminds his readers of the most important elements in his
treatise. They are so important that he asks his readers to memorize them. He writes:
In the end of our work, we want to repeat and commit to memory
the following: as we have shown with sufficient evidence in the
previous discussions, it was easily proven from the consideration of
omnipotence that there is and can only be one God; it was easily
proven from the fullness of goodness that God is triune in person;
and it was clearly concluded from the fullness of wisdom how the
unity of substance fits with the plurality of persons.230
Earlier we showed how Anselm constructed his Monologion in accordance with the
triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness and arranged the triad in a particular way as to devise
the meditation from the point of view of one seeking. Richard knows this triad231 and,
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Richard, De Trinitate VI.25.

Poirel meticulously traces the complex history of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad from the
patristic era to the 12th century when its trinitarian appropriation became common and controversial.
Briefly, he suggests its appropriation in the 12th century begins with Hugh and Abelard. The latter’s
language equates the three properties with the divine persons; this view is condemned in 1140. Poirel
suggests Richard is the first to use the term ‘appropriatio’ (see De Trinitate VI.10; De spiritu blasphemiae
PL 196.1192BC) and confidently moves beyond Hugh’s De sacramentis to assign positive reasons for the
appropriation (see De Trinitate VI.15 where Richard inserts material from his De tribus appropriatis), but
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like Anselm, he uses it to organize the main tenets of his treatise.232 But whereas Anselm
organizes his work in the order of Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power, Richard orders his
as Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom. Later, we explore the significance of this different
ordering of the triad between Richard and Anselm; but for now it is only important to
note the familiarity Richard has with this triad and the fact that both he and Anselm use it
as the main organizational structure for their compositions on the Trinity.233
Further evidence for this intentional structuring comes as we connect this final
summary Richard provides for his treatise with the outline he gives for his entire work in
book III. This broader outline serves as a useful map to keep in mind as we explore the
intricacies of Richard’s triadic structures and triads throughout his work. At the opening
of book III, Richard writes that he previously (referring to I-II) demonstrated the unity
and property of the divine substance. In book I Richard argued that Divinity is supremely
simple. In book II he argued that there is only one Divinity.234 The rest of the work, he
says, consists of three further steps: Step one (book III) answers the question, “Is there

avoiding the imprudence of Abelard’s language. The appropriation of the triad is furthered by the second
generation of masters of Peter Lombard’s sentences at the end of the century. See Poirel, 383-399.
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Further evidence of the importance of this triad for Richard can be seen its use as an underlying
framework in his Liber exceptionem; a treatise that parallels Hugh’s Didascalicon in delineating the
methods and subjects of study at St. Victor. This indicates the foundationalness of this triad to the Victorine
educational program and its connections to their teachings on the Trinity. For Richard’s individual use of
the triad in De Trinitate, see VI.3, VI.15, VI.25. See also Godefroy’s connection of this triad with the
Trinity on p. 187 of this work.
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power of God (i.e., God as He is). Richard orders De Trinitate as a beautiful portrait where the first two
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true plurality in true and simple divinity and if the number of persons comes to three as
we believe?”; step two (book IV) answers the question, “How is unity of substance
consistent with the plurality of persons?”; and step three (book V) consists of
investigating “. . . whether . . . there is among the three [divine persons] one person alone
who is from himself, and whether each of the other two persons proceeds from the other,
and if there are other questions to be investigated concerning the same considerations?”
In book VI, Richard treats the diverse modes of procession of the Son and Spirit, the
mode proper to each, and what can be learned from the “names” according to the
property of each [divine] person.235
The relationship between this “table of contents” in book III and the PowerWisdom-Goodness triad at the end of Richard’s work is the following. Books I-II
establish, from a consideration of omnipotence, that there is only one God. Book III
shows that God is triune in person from a consideration of supreme goodness. And Books
IV-VI fittingly crown the work with a demonstration of the harmony between the unity of
substance and the plurality of persons from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom.
This is the broad sweep, the overall picture, the bird’s-eye-view, if you will, of Richard’s
De Trinitate (Fig. 4.1).
Power
I

Goodness
II

III

Wisdom
IV

V

VI

Fig. 4.1 Bird’s-Eye-View of Richard’s De Trinitate
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Nico den Bok, following Ribaillier, argues that this section of bk. III provides the outline of the
entire work; he also identifies the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad as the “rough structure” of the treatise,
with books IV-VI filling out the Wisdom part of that triad. Den Bok, 371-372, see esp. n 177. I agree with
den Bok but also believe the textual history of De Trinitate is more complicated and that this section of bk.
III may be one of the latest stages of its development. For more on this, see Appendix A. On the
relationship of this section of bk. III to the authenticity of bk. VI, see nn. 441 and 456 of this work.
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This breadth, however, also has a corresponding depth to it that reveals the maturing
intricacy of Richard’s thought as he crafted the work. And upon closer inspection, when
we consider this breadth and depth together, we find some important clues to the textual
history of De Trinitate, clues that reveal De Trinitate as a work of art “in relief.” It is that
depth to which we now direct our attention.
Depth: Richard’s Trinitarian Structures in Book III
Now that we are familiar with the broad triadic structure of Power-GoodnessWisdom Richard used to organize the main lines of argument in his treatise, we zoom in
on book III where he makes his case for the Trinity of persons. Here we discover that not
only does Richard conceive of a triadic structure for his entire work, but that he
deliberately incorporates triads and triadic structures within every one of his books. Book
III, however, showcases his most intricate formulations. It is where he uses one triadic
structure to form three sections of argument for the plurality and Trinity of persons in
Divinity. Then, within each of these three sections, he uses that same triad in order to
show how fitting it is to have three considerations supporting one and the same truth.
The pattern is consistent with Richard’s stated method in book I of “drawing out”
profound and hidden reasons into the open from the sanctuary of wisdom. In books I-II
Richard deals with Power; in book III, with Goodness; and in books IV-VI, with
Wisdom. In book III, Richard “draws out” the Goodness from the Power-GoodnessWisdom triad that structures the entire work. Richard focuses in order to magnify. Book
III focuses on Goodness and then magnifies it with an increasingly lucid set of arguments
for the Trinity of persons. We now look at how Richard does this in book III.
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Richard uses numerous triads in book III, but the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad
plays the largest structural role. The triad is introduced in III.2-5, and it structures the
material from III.2-20. The following diagram (Fig. 4.2) provides a perspective of the
intricacy with which Richard draws these considerations out into the open from the
fullness of Goodness and it will be helpful to have in mind as we provide a microscopic
analysis of this material in book III.

Fig. 4.2 Richard’s Use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory Triad in Book III
The Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad structures three sections of book III. The
conclusion of each section provides an “anchor point” that marks the end of one pitch and
the starting-point for the next.236 Section one, in III.2-5, establishes the plurality of
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The language is taken from rock-climbing terminology. In the same way that a lead climber puts
in anchor points for those who are making the ascent below him, so Richard provides organizational clues
that indicate where each new contemplation begins.
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persons; that is, that there must be more than merely one person in true Divinity. Section
two, in III.7/11-13, establishes that this plurality must be a Trinity of persons. Section
three, in III.14-20, establishes the truth of both the plurality and Divinity in a single
argument from supreme benevolence. The material that comes between these sections
(e.g., III.6, 8-10 and III.21-25), as will be shown later, consists of earlier stages in
Richard’s composition of his work. They are the residual pieces of previous work that
shifted as he expanded on his earlier writing.237 The detailed case for this is given in
Appendix A, but for now, it is not too difficult to see how Richard’s method of focus and
magnification from the fullness of goodness in book III might consist of a literary
development as well as a meditative one. Indeed, the unparalleled intricacy of its content
and form compared to what we find in the rest of De Trinitate bears this out.
These three sections of material, as well as the further triadic illustrations Richard
uses within all three, demonstrate how he extends his arguments into a “trinitarian” form.
This form consists of three elements: three arguments, one truth, and an indication that
Richard sees the relation of these three arguments and that one truth reflecting trinitarian
significance (i.e., that this three-and-one is an allusion to the three-in-one of the
Trinity).238 We start first with an example of how Richard takes what was a clear, biblical
237

Compare, for instance, the content after the conclusion of III.20 with that found at the end of
chapters 6, 7, 8, all of 9 and 10. They all coalesce around co-eternity, immutability, equality, unity/
plurality, similitudes of divinity/humanity, greater/lesser. Aside from the beginning of III.21, the final
chapters of the book (III.21-25) never rehearse the content of charity found in the preceding chapters! In
addition, the language is more simple, connects with the language in the Quicumque (e.g., one omnipotent,
one immeasurable, one God; see III.8), and reminds of the Power-Wisdom-Nature/Being triad Richard
develops in detail in I-II (also in VI.20). Richard’s Goodness-Happiness-Glory material was probably
“expanded” by him as his meditations developed. Futhermore, III.2-20 has the most intricate triadic forms
and structures of the treatise; and this may indicate that the Goodness-Happiness-Glory material is the
fullest and most mature development of Richard’s thought on the Trinity. For more, see Appendix A.
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Like Ribaillier, Richardian scholars have noted the repetition of arguments in bk. III, but instead
of seeing their trinitarian structure and significance, they focus on the pedagogical value of reinforcing
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dyad and turns it into three to make it fit this trinitarian structure. Later we see how
Richard uses the three to undergird one truth and explains their trinitarian significance.
Richard’s intentionality in crafting this material trinitarianly is seen in his scriptural
allusion to the need in both the Old and New Testaments for two witnesses to establish
the truth of something.239 Instead he uses not just two arguments for the plurality of
persons, but three. The third, he says, stands by to “applaud” (acclamare) the testimonies
of the other two.240 Richard is not content with only one or two arguments, and so he
searches for a third. The third witness is the third element in the Goodness-HappinessGlory triad. And this threefold witness becomes the structural basis for the three sections
of this material in book III as well as the content found within each section. We thus have
a ‘macro’-use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in dividing this material into three
sections, and we have a ‘micro’-use of the same triad in giving three arguments for one
truth within each of those sections. Richard emphasizes each element of the triad, as
indicated by the bold words in the following diagram (Fig. 4.3). Let’s look at this more
closely.

earlier conclusions with new arguments. Ribaillier, 15; Den Bok, 102 n. 31, Kirchberger, 28. Den Bok
recognizes Richard’s “tripartite schemes” more generally but does not indicate any specific trinitarian
significance for De Trinitate. Den Bok, 104 n. 37. Similarly, Salet, nicely summarized in n. 23 of Chris
Evan’s translation.
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5:19; Hebrews 10:28.
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Richard, De Trinitate III.5. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 378. Because Zinn’s translation of
book III of Richard’s De Trinitate is more widely available we resort to his translations for book III in this
section.
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Arguments

III.2-5

III.7/11-13

III.14-20

#1

Goodness

Goodness

Goodness

#2

Happiness

Happiness

Happiness

#3

Glory

Glory

Glory

for Trinity of Persons

for Plurality & Trinity

One Truth for Plurality of Persons

Fig. 4.3 Richard’s ‘Macro’ & ‘Micro’-Uses of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory Triad
‘Micro’-Use #1: Greatest Love at the Summit of Perfect Goodness (summa)
In III.2-5 Richard calls forward three witnesses to testify for the truth of the
plurality of persons in Divinity: (a) the fullness of goodness, (b) the fullness of happiness,
and (c) the fullness of glory. III.2 provides Richard’s statement of what he intends to
prove. He writes that the “fullness of goodness (plenitudo bonitatis) shows clearly from
the nature of charity that in true divinity a plurality of persons cannot be lacking.”241 As
we mentioned earlier, where Anselm turned the “Principle of Perfection” in Augustine
(i.e., “God is whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be”) to the “Principle of ‘Maximal’
Perfection” (i.e., “God is the best of whatever-it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be”), Richard
turns his attention to the “plenitude” of this “maximal perfection” (i.e., God is the fullness
of the best that it is better to be than not to be). Thus we see Richard regularly arguing
first for what is highest among goods in accordance with Anselm’s principle of maximal
perfection, and subsequently for the fullness of that highest good at the summit of
perfection.242 Richard writes, “. . . in order that charity be supreme and supremely perfect
241
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Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 375.

As Coulter notes, “. . . the terms summus and plenitudo identify the framework within which
Richard formulates all attributes of a maximally perfect being.” Coulter, 210-211. But there is also a middle
integritas that serves as the middle term between them (also noticed by den Bok, 307 n. 98), as will be
made clear in what follows.
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(summa et summe perfecta), it is necessary that it be so great that nothing greater can
exist and that it be of such a kind that nothing better can exist.”243 Richard places charity
at the summit of God’s perfections. Then he shifts to point out its fullness. He writes,
“But where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking.
For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity.”244 And so, from
the fullness of supreme goodness, Richard derives the supreme and perfect love from
which a plurality of persons cannot be lacking. The “fullness of goodness” who testifies
about supreme charity becomes the first of three witnesses in support of the conclusion
that true Divinity must consist of a plurality of persons. Fullness of goodness entails
fullness of charity; and fullness of charity—by which one person loves another person
supremely—requires a plurality of persons.245
The second witness called to testify to the plurality of persons is the “fullness of
happiness” (plenitudo felicitatis). In III.3, Richard appeals to a distinction between
ontological and subjective value. In III.2 Richard argues that supreme charity has
superior, objective ontological worth; that is, on the scale of things great to be or have,
supreme and perfect charity is highest among them (summe caritatis). In III.3, however,
the focus changes. Rather than arguing for charity as the highest of objective goods,
Richard now argues that charity is the best of subjective goods; that is, charity is not only
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The same idea was already in Gregory the Great: “There cannot be love if there are not at least
two persons: if love («dilectio») is self-love and does not tend to another person, it is not love («caritas»).”
Quoted in den Bok, 287.
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better (melius) than other things but also the most pleasing and delightful (jocundius).246
As he says,
Let each person examine his consciousness; without doubt and
without contradiction he will discover that just as nothing is better
(melius) than charity, so nothing is more pleasing (jocundius) than
charity. Nature and many experiences teach us this.247
Here again we see the language of Anselm, but Richard moves that logic toward the
experiential quality of the perfection this being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist must
have and enjoy. He writes further, “Therefore, just as that-than-which-nothing-better
cannot be lacking in the fullness of true goodness, so also that-than-which-nothing-ismore-pleasing cannot be lacking in the fullness of supreme happiness.”248 In order for
there to be such fullness of supreme happiness (i.e., what is most pleasing), love must be
“mutual.” There must be both “one who can show charity” and “one to whom charity can
be shown.”249 Therefore the second witness of supreme happiness also testifies that true
Divinity must consist in a plurality of persons.
The third witness called upon to establish the plurality of persons is the “fullness of
glory” (plenitudo gloriae). Richard develops this in III.4 where he employs one of the
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The terminology of ‘ontological’ and ‘subjective’ is not found in Richard, but the distinction is
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clearest examples of his reductio ad absurdum style of argument.250 He begins with the
two key propositions needed to make his point:
(p) There exists a plurality of persons in true Divinity
(~ p) There exists only one person in true Divinity
Richard then assumes the truth of the opposite proposition he wishes to prove and
combines it with other known facts in order to elicit the absurdity: “If we say that in true
Divinity there exists only one person, just as there is only one substance, then without
doubt according to this He will not have anyone with whom He could share that infinite
abundance of His fulness.”251 This could be true in one of two ways: (a) either by a
defect of power (i.e., God lacks the ability such that even if He wished to have one to
share His glory with, He could not have one to share with Him), or (b) by a defect of
benevolence (i.e., even if God had the ability and could have one to share His glory with,
He would not wish to share it). Given the known and previously established truth that
God is undoubtedly omnipotent, the first possibility is ruled out, which leaves the latter.
But if the latter were true—that God had the power to share but wished not to—this
would lead to the absurdity that the God, whom we know must be that-which-is-greaterthan-anything-that-exists and lacking in no perfection, would be far less than perfect; for
He would suffer from this severe defect of miserliness, which is uncharacteristic of true
majesty and glory. A God who is powerful enough to share the infinite abundance of His
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The following is a specific instance of the reductio ad absurdum form of argument Richard uses
to argue for the plurality of Divinity in bk. III. On the significance of the reductio ad absurdum form of
argument to Richard’s treatise as a whole as well as its relationship to other forms of argument he employs,
see chapter 3 of this work, esp. nn. 183-185.
251

Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 377.

123
fullness, but unwilling to, would not be the being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist and
who lacks no perfection. And given this absurdity, which derives from the supposed truth
of (~ p), Richard establishes—beyond the shadow of a doubt—that (p) must be true:
Necessarily “there exists a plurality of persons in true Divinity.” All of this is spelled out
by Richard in terms of love:
. . . nothing is sweeter than charity; nothing more pleasing than
charity. The life of reason (rationalis vita) experiences nothing
sweeter than the delights of charity (caritatis deliciis); enjoys no
pleasure more pleasing than this. He would lack these delights in
eternity if He remains all alone (solo solitaria) on the throne of
majesty because He lacks fellowship (consortio carens in
majestatis).252
In summary, then, the plurality of persons is established by the testimony of three
witnesses: the fullness of goodness, the fullness of happiness, and the fullness of glory.
The “Fullness of Goodness” establishes the plurality of persons by arguing from the
objective, ontological superiority of charity among goods; the “Fullness of Happiness”
establishes the plurality of persons by arguing from the subjective, experiential
superiority of charity among pleasing things; and the “Fullness of Glory” establishes the
plurality of persons by arguing that sharing is required of true majesty. Thus all three
independently testify and mutually solidify the conclusion that true Divinity must consist
of a plurality of persons. Richard integrates it all beautifully in III.5:
Behold, concerning the plurality of persons, we have presented our
teaching with such transparent reasoning that whoever wishes to
oppose such a clear confirmation would seem to suffer from the
disease of folly . . .
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[Witness #1:] For who, except someone suffering from the disease
of madness, would say that there is lacking in the supreme
goodness (summe bonitati) that than which nothing is more perfect
(nihil perfectius), and nothing better (melius)?
[Witness #2:] Who, I ask, except someone weak in mind, would
deny there is the supreme happiness (summe felicitati) that than
which nothing is more joyful (nihil jocundius) and nothing sweeter
(nihil est dulcius)?
[Witness #3:] Who, I say, except someone devoid of reason, would
think that there could be lacking in the fullness of glory
(plenitudine glorie) that than which nothing is more glorious (nihil
gloriosius) and nothing more magnificent (nihil magnificentius)?
[All Three Witnesses:] Certainly nothing is better (nil melius),
nothing is more joyful (nil certe jocundius), nothing is more
magnificent (omnino nil magnificentius) than true (vera), sincere
(sincera) and supreme charity (summa caritate), which he knows
does not exist without a plurality of persons (personarum
pluralitate).253
In his first use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad Richard notably takes a
biblical principle found throughout the Scriptures of the need for two witnesses to
establish the veracity of a judicial claim and adds a third witness to “applaud” the
testimonies of the other two. Richard takes a two with a biblical precedent and turns it
into three. He does not need three arguments to make his claim. He could very well have
argued for the truth of the plurality of persons with just one or two elements of the triad
(e.g., either Goodness or Happiness). If he wanted to align his use with the biblical
precedent, he would only need two arguments. But because he is intentional in
253

Ibid., 378. The “true, sincere, and supreme” may also be a very small reverse chiastic structure
(e.g., true-magnificence, sincere-joy, supreme-love). Richard’s summary also reveals that the ‘flow’ or
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us the structural and semantic framework of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad Richard uses to structure
the material in III.2-20. This “Nihil . . . nihil” is also frequent in strophe VIII.2 of the “Lux iocunda, lux
insignis” sequence the Victorines recited at Pentecost where there are other verbal parallels with this
material in book III. For the sequence, see Fassler, 276.
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articulating the Trinity “trinitarianly,” and Scriptures do not preclude the addition of a
third witness,254 he turns the two into three to fit a trinitarian form.255
‘Micro’-Use #2: Most Integral Love in The Purest Happiness (integritas)
Interestingly enough, Richard not only uses this Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in
the opening section and other sections of book III, but he also adopts it as a governing
triad that triadically structures III.2-20. Thus Richard uses a ‘macro’ GoodnessHappiness-Glory triad to divide book III into three sections in addition to a ‘micro’
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad to structure all three! We have already seen the opening
argument Richard makes for the plurality of persons from supreme charity on the basis of
this triad in III.2-5. In the second section, III.7/11-13, Richard argues for the “Trinity” of
persons (i.e., that there must be at least three divine persons in Divinity) from the
“fullness” of charity. In a way that parallels Richard’s use of the fullness of happiness to
speak of the “pleasing quality” of love, Richard turns in III.7/11-13 to the mutual quality
and E-quality of this supreme love to argue for the Trinity of persons. In III.7 Richard
establishes that supreme love can only obtain among supreme equals; III.11-13 then
builds on III.7 by describing the order and ardor of loving supremely. Thus in III.7
Richard writes, “Surely it ought to be noted that as true charity demands a plurality of
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See n. 239 of this work.

By contrast, in Twelve Patriarchs lxxxi, Richard states the same principle but only asks for two
witnesses: “I do not accept Christ without a witness nor can any probable showing be confirmed without
the witness of Moses and Elijah, without the authority of Scripture. Therefore let Christ summon two
witnesses to Himself in His transfiguration if He wishes that the light of His splendor, which is so great and
so unusual, not be suspect to me.” Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 139.
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persons, so supreme charity demands equality of persons” (italics mine).256 This shows
both a connection with III.2-5 as well as a decisive shift to a new section on the
“equality” and “integrity” of supreme love. Richard continues, “And so in true Divinity,
as the particular nature (proprietas) of charity requires a plurality of persons, so the
integrity of the same charity requires supreme equality of persons in true plurality”
(italics mine).257 This shift from III.2-5 to III.7/11-13 is further indicated by a transition
from “supreme love” to a new section on “loving supremely” as this relates to both the
equality of the divine persons (III.7) and the quality (i.e., order and ardor) of their mutual
love (III.11-13). Furthermore, Richard recalls the “witnesses” he interrogated in III.2-5.
He writes in III.11, “And so, concerning the assertion of Trinity, let us question the same
witnesses we brought forth above to testify for plurality” (emphasis mine).258
So Richard uses the same Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad from III.2-5 for this new
section in III.7/11-13, but with a twist. That twist consists of baptizing the triad in its
second element—the fullness of happiness with respect to its pleasing quality. In III.2-5,
Richard argued, “ . . . in order for charity to be supreme and supremely perfect (summa et
summe perfecta), it is necessary that it be so great that nothing greater can exist, and that
it be so excellent that no better love can exist.”259 The move there was from “no greater
love” (majus) to “no better love” (melius). In III.11-13, Richard moves from “no greater
love” (maximum) to the most excellent love (praecipuum): “For just as in supreme
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charity what is greatest cannot be lacking, so what is clearly excellent cannot be lacking
either.”260 The goodness of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in III.2-5, where the
emphasis was upon the highest degree of love, has now become the excellence of joy
experienced by those who love each other supremely. Richard writes, “Certainly in
mutual and very fervent love nothing is rarer or more magnificent than to wish that
another be loved equally by the one whom you love supremely and by whom you are
supremely loved” (emphasis mine).261 Therefore on the basis of this most excellent love,
there must be a third, a partaker of the love of the other two (condilectum).
Next, Richard considers the defect of “grief” that would exist if each lacked a
partaker of their mutual love—either on the basis of lack of power or lack of will—and
argues that the “ . . . fullness of happiness excludes every defect of charity, whose
perfection (consummatio) demands a Trinity of persons, . . . ” (italics mine).262 He thus
combines supreme happiness with supreme goodness of his previous argument to give a
“mutual attestation” of the truth that there must be a Trinity of persons in divinity. But he
still has the third part of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad to use. And he secures this
by moving from the “grief” that would obtain from a defect of power or will in desiring a
partaker, to a consideration of the “shame” that would obtain for those who would lack
such a partaker in their love. As Richard says, “But just as in supreme happiness there
cannot be a cause for grieving, so in the fullness of supreme glory there cannot be a
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matter of embarrassment.” Such a defect would hide “ . . . the splendor of so much glory”
(italics mine).263
Richard confirms his use of the same Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in this
second section when he summarizes it all in III.13:
Behold how the fullness of divine goodness and the fullness of
happiness and glory come together in one witness to truth. They
clearly demonstrate what ought to be thought concerning the
fullness of divine charity in that plurality of persons. Together, they
condemn suspicion of any defect in that supreme charity; in accord
they proclaim the fullness of all perfection. In order for charity to
be true, it demands a plurality of persons; in order for charity to be
perfected, it requires a Trinity of persons.264
Whereas the first section was an argument from “supreme charity,” this second is an
argument about the “fullness of divine charity” from which Richard derives the Trinity of
persons. We also see that in the same way Richard summarized the argument of his first
section, he also summarizes this one—taking all three considerations into account to hold
forth a single truth.
We have already shown that Richard uses triads and triadic structures for the
broader horizon of his work. We have also demonstrated that he uses triads within
specific sections of his treatise. Now we point out that he employs triads that reflect the
dogma of Trinitarian orthodoxy: “one substance, three persons” before moving on to
Richard’s third, and final, ‘micro’-use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in
III.14-20.
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At the conclusions of III.2-5 and III.7/11-13 Richard summarizes each section so as
to make each element of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad undergird one attestation of
truth. In III.2-5, Richard uses Goodness-Happiness-Glory, with an emphasis on the first
element (Goodness: i.e., the highest of goods), to argue for the single truth that there is a
plurality of persons in Divinity. In III.7/11-13, Richard uses the same triad with an
emphasis on the second element (Happiness: i.e., equal joy), to argue “in one witness to
truth” what must be understood about the fullness of divine love in the plurality of
persons.265 The truth is that out of a mutual and ardent love they require a partaker of
their love; thus a “trinity” is consummated.266 Therefore each ‘micro’-use of the
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in these two sections of book III, consists of three
arguments for a single truth. The first use establishes that there must be a plurality of
persons in Divinity; the second that there must be at least a Trinity.267 In the next section,
III.14-20, we see Richard deriving the truth of both the plurality and Trinity of persons
from a single argument, and with an emphasis on the third element (i.e., Glory).
Therefore, in the same way that the Trinity consists of “one substance, three persons,”
Richard uses one truth to argue for it in three ways, and conversely to argue from three
considerations for that one truth. He thus turns a dyad into a triad to fit a trinitarian form.
He then relates the three elements of that triad to one truth. And in the process, he “draws
out” a form to this material that reflects the significance of the trinitarian dogma: three in
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one. He provides a trinity of arguments for the Trinity of divine persons. He argues for
the Trinity “trinitarianly.”
‘Micro’-Use #3: Fullest Love Out of the Most Abundant Glory (plenitudo)
In the third section, III.14-20, Richard takes up the third element in the GoodnessHappiness-Glory triad to gather everything he has previously considered into one, single
argument. As he says, “But so that this may be more apparent, let us gather into a unity
what we have said more diffusely.”268 He considers whether it might be possible to
obtain from some element of a single divine person alone both the plurality and Trinity of
persons the earlier two sections already secured.269 How will Richard obtain this? He
considers the “abundance” of Divinity’s glory. He writes, “And for the magnificence of
His honor, He rejoices over sharing the riches as much as He glories over enjoying the
abundance of delights and sweetness” (italics mine).270 Richard takes the goodness that
consists in a divine person “possessing” a bounty of riches and the happiness involved in
“enjoying” such abundance and subsumes them to the glory that is “the magnificence of
His honor.” Thus Richard emphasizes the third term of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory
triad by looking at the “supreme benevolence” that can only be enjoyed and bestowed by
one who has supreme glory.271
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Richard derives the plurality and Trinity of persons based on a consideration of
supreme benevolence (benevolentia) in the following way. First, he argues for the
“fellowship of a fraternity” (consortio societatis) by pointing out that the supreme
magnitude of one divine person would entail an “abundance of delights (deliciarum) and
sweetness (dulcedinis)”—an abundance that could neither be “had” nor “enjoyed”
without the acquisition of “intimate love (intimae dilectionis).”272 There must, therefore
be, at minimum, a plurality of persons in Divinity. But if there is only one partner (unam
sociam) then “He alone [would possess]273 the sweetness of such delights who has a
partner and a loved one (sociam et condilectum) in the love that has been shown to
Him.”274 Therefore, in order for there to be a “communion of love” (communio amoris)
there must be at least a Trinity of persons.275
Next Richard moves to a consideration of the second term of the triad (i.e.,
Happiness) in his argument from benevolence. Richard’s emphasis is on the generous
nature276 of this supreme benevolence and what it entails for true Divinity. Thus III.14
focuses on the abundance that true Divinity must possess (e.g., goods, bounty,
abundance) in order to show such magnificent generosity. While one may have a
benevolent and generous disposition, one cannot be supremely generous without
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possessing a bounty of goods to distribute and share. Thus Richard first emphasizes the
‘Goodness’ component in the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad by attending to the
abundant riches true Divinity must possess. But one cannot be supremely benevolent
without also sharing these goods with others. Supreme benevolence also entails supreme
generosity; that is, this abundance of goods must also be abundantly shared. And the
quality and E-quality of this sharing, as emphasized in III.7/11-13, must consist of mutual
order and ardor. As Richard says:
However, where equal benevolence exists in either person it is
necessary that each with equal desire and for a similar reason
should seek out a sharer of his excellent joy. For when two persons
who mutually embrace each other with supreme longing and take
supreme delight in each other’s love, then the supreme joy of the
first is in the intimate love of the second, and conversely the
excellent joy of the second is in the love of the first (emphasis
mine).277
From the goodness found in the bounty and abundance of riches in one divine
person, Richard was able to derive the conclusion that there must be a “communion of
love” (communio amoris) that requires a third mutually loved (III.14). Here, in the second
part of his argument (III.15), from the happiness found in the equal sharing of that
abundance, Richard derives the conclusion that there must be a “communion of excellent
joy” (praecipui gaudii communione) that requires a third mutually loved
(condilectum).278 Richard then discusses why the supreme happiness requires both a
plurality and Trinity of persons by pointing out that pleasures of wisdom and power could
be possessed by one divine person alone; and hence an argument from the pleasures of
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either wisdom or power cannot deliver an argument from reason for the plurality or
Trinity of persons. But the pleasures of charity, unlike the pleasures of wisdom and
power that come only from one’s own heart, are drawn from the “heart of another.”279 So
supreme happiness requires at least two mutually loved. And as these two “ . . . draw the
mellifluous delights of love (melliflua dilectionis oblectamenta)” from the hearts of each
other, “ . . . a great accumulation of joy and pleasure builds up for anyone who gives and
receives love in fellowship with another.” Thus “ . . . the supreme level of that generosity
(benignitatis) would have no place in Divinity if a third person were lacking in that
plurality of persons.”280 And so “ . . . the consummation of true and supreme goodness
cannot subsist without completion of the Trinity.”281
This concludes Richard’s use of the second term of the triad from a consideration of
benevolence. But, if he is consistent, we should find him searching for a way to “draw
out” the last element of the triad with respect to Glory. He does this by considering the
“virtue” of the property of the mutual love for a third person. When one person bestows
love upon another, this is dilectio not condilectio (i.e., the mutual love for a third). But,
“Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons
harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into one
affection by the flame of love for the third.”282 As Richard further notes, this is not
“shared love” but “supreme shared love. (summa condilectione).” He then asks a few
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questions, showing that he connects the “virtue” of condilectionis with the great “dignity”
obtained in those who perfectly exemplify it.283 He asks:
If there is so much worth (dignitas) for each person in these two
virtues [i.e., (a) supreme and totally perfect benevolence and (b)
intimate and supreme harmony] on account of the virtue itself, what
virtue, what worth, I ask, will there be where each is fashioned on
account of the other, where one is greatly praised (magnificatur) on
account of the other, where one is brought to consummation on
account of the other? (emphasis mine)284
And he concludes that “Just as a virtue of so much worth (tantae dignitatis) and
supereminent excellence (supereminentis excellentiae) cannot be lacking in the supreme
and altogether perfect good, so it is not able to subsist without a Trinity of persons”
(emphasis mine).285
Does Richard summarize III.14-20 in such a way that it reflects one truth held up by
these three considerations as he does in III.2-5 and III.7/11-13? In III.20 he writes,
“Consider now how union with a third person establishes concordant affection
everywhere and brings about consocial love through all and in all.” Simply take any one
of the divine persons and we will “ . . . see the other two love the third concordantly.”
We recall from III.14 the abundance “had” by Divinity that requires a plurality and a
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third mutually loved. This is the Goodness of benevolence: the bounty, the “communion
of love” (communio amoris) that requires both a companion and lover (sociam et
condilectum). When we take a look at a second divine person we find that the “ . . .
remaining pair unite with equal desire in love for him.” We remember from III.15 how
this abundance is “shared” in all of its fullness. This is the Happiness of benevolence: the
“communion of excellent joy.” And finally, when we look at a third divine person we see
the “ . . . affection of the others flows in equal harmony to the third.” We call to mind the
“virtue” and “dignity” of such an abundance where each person is magnified and
consummated through fellowship with the others in III.19. This is the Glory of
abundance, of benevolence, of generosity. Richard brings it all to a fitting summary:
Behold how from shared fellowship (consodalitate) with a third
person in that Trinity it is argued that concordant charity
(concordialis) and consocial love (consocialis) are never found
anywhere in an isolated individual.286
Thus, from a detailed and microscopic analysis of III.2-20, we see Richard being
very intentional in constructing his treatise with triads and triadic structures. In book III
he has taken the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad and used it as the basis for structuring
the material in III.2-20. It draws this material out into three sections corresponding to
each element in that triad. And within each of those three sections, Richard employs the
triad to make three considerations illuminate a single truth. III.2-5 takes the GoodnessHappiness-Glory triad to argue for the plurality of Divinity from a consideration of
“supreme charity” and with an emphasis on Goodness (i.e., supreme charity is the
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greatest of all virtues; there is nothing greater, nothing better). III.7/11-13 takes the same
triad to argue for the Trinity of persons from a consideration of the “fullness of supreme
charity” and with an emphasis on Happiness (i.e., the quality and E-quality of the perfect
charity requires a third mutually loved). And III.14-20 takes the triad from a
consideration of benevolence and with an emphasis upon Glory (i.e., the virtue and
dignity of having, sharing, and manifesting the unsurpassable excellence of “supreme
mutual love” (summa condilectione)).
Individually and together, Richard’s use of the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in
book III makes a strong case for the thesis that Richard argues for the Trinity
“trinitarianly”—that he constructs his arguments in ways that reflect the trinitarian
dogma. We see this in how he employs this triad throughout book III as well as in how he
summarizes each section with three considerations attesting to one truth: God is one
substance and three persons. Richard’s arguments not only provide necessary reasons for
the greater certainty of this truth; the very form his arguments take seem to manifest it!
Perspective: Additional Trinitarian Structures and Triads
When we turn our attention to the other books of De Trinitate we also find Richard
using triads and triadic structures. In the prologue to the work Richard lists no fewer than
eight of them. None of these triads form a structure within the Prologue, but the fact that
Richard opens his work with so many right at the outset is good reason to suspect that he
will give special attention to triads in the rest of his work (Fig. 4.4).
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Fig. 4.4 Triads in the Prologue of Richard’s De Trinitate
In book I Richard adds further triads287 but only one serves to structure the content
of his work there: namely, the triad of Highest-Best-Fullest. This is the ‘macro’ triad of
book I. The ‘micro’ triad is Being-Power-Wisdom. Book I is significantly briefer than the
other books and seems to retain earlier material. The opening chapters in I.1-5 detail
more of Richard’s method in beginning with the articles of faith in the Quicumque and
searching for necessary reasons. As he says, “I have read but not seen proven . . . ,” “I
hear daily . . . ,” “I find . . . ,” “Authorities abound but I don’t recall proofs.”288 I.7-10
establish three modes of being and which of those modes will be the focus of the entire
treatise. Three modes of being obtain among everything that is or can be: (a) being from
eternity and from itself, (b) being neither from eternity nor from itself, and (c) being from
eternity and not from itself. He then gives arguments for the existence of each of these
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modes of being, establishing that all three exist.289 But the unique focus of De Trinitate is
on those two modes of being that are from eternity. Books I-II give special attention to
the first mode of being from eternity and from itself; III-VI continue to treat the first
mode of being, but with special attention to that other mode of being from eternity and
not from itself. In short, I-II treat Divinity in se; III-VI, Divinity ad intra.
Richard organizes book I with the Highest-Best-Fullest triad in three sections.
I.11-12 take the being from eternity and from itself and argue that it must be the
“highest” being of all. As such, it must be rational because rational is greater than
irrational nature, and therefore it must be the highest rational nature of all.290 It is that
“power of being” (essendi potentia) from which every essence, all power, and all wisdom
come to be. It is the dispenser of everything; and is thus rightly called “primordial
substance” (substantia primordialis).291
The second part of the Highest-Best-Fullest triad is given in I.13-18. In this section
Richard describes the internal nature of this primordial being that is from eternity and
from itself. Its substance, power, and wisdom are all identical.292 And, as seems to be a
pattern for Richard, he tends to use the second element of his triads to discuss the quality
and E-quality of the thing. Thus this section focuses on questions of greater or lesser. He
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has already established that the primordial substance must be the greatest. He then asks
whether the primordial substance can have either an “equal” partaker of its substance or
an “inferior” partaker of its substance; and he proves that neither is possible.293 He
concludes that “true Divinity is in a unity of substance, and a true unity of substance is in
the Divinity.”294 I.17 opens the possibility that despite the unity of substance in Divinity,
it is still logically possible for Divinity to have one or multiple persons. What is
important is that Divinity is nothing other than God and that there is no multiplicity with
respect to the divine substance. Without this ‘logical space’, Richard would not be able to
make the further arguments he does in books III-VI with respect to the divine persons and
their processions. He then summarizes these arguments in I.18: Regardless of whether
one looks at substance, power, or wisdom, “ . . . nothing greater and nothing better than
God can either be determined by him or be reached through intelligence.” God is the
supreme substance and has no equal.
The third part of the Highest-Best-Fullest triad is taken up in I.19-24 and focuses on
the “fullness” and “perfection” of the primordial substance with respect to its BeingPower-Wisdom. I.19-20 show that Richard moves from a consideration of what is
“better” to what is considered “best” (melius) and “perfect” (perfectius). As he says,
“Therefore, the more human thinking attains to what is best and perfect, the closer it
ascends to that which is God, even though it does not reach up to him.”295 In I.11-12,
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Richard applies the Augustinian “Principle of Perfection” to establish that the primordial
substance must be the better of what-it-is-better-to-be-or-not-to-be. In I.13-18, Richard
applies Anselm’s “Principle of ‘Maximal’ Perfection” to argue that the primordial
substance must be the being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought; it must have no
partaker and no equal. Finally, in I.19-24, Richard introduces his own “Principle of the
‘Fullness’ of Maximal Perfection” as this applies to the divine substance. And thus he
shifts from the integrity of Divine substance to a consideration of its fullness and
perfection.
Richard also resorts to a chiastic structure in I.21-24 before he summarizes in I.25.
In the outer part of the chiastic structure, I.21 and I.24, he argues that the divine
substance is supremely powerful (summe potens). This is so, first of all, because Divinity
does not lack the fullness of omnipotence; God is not merely the best of all powerful
beings that exist, but the most powerful of any being that could ever exist. He is “truly”
omnipotent: the most powerful being (I.21). What’s more, God does not lack the fullness
of omnipotence, because the omnipotence he possesses, he has from himself and not from
another. He is his own source of omnipotence (I.24), and therefore “truly” omnipotent.
Likewise, in the inner part of the chiastic structure, I.22 and I.23, Richard makes the
same arguments with respect to wisdom. God is “truly” all-wise because he is the wisest
being there could ever be (I.22) and he has his wisdom from himself, not from another
(I.23). Richard finally brings his arguments for the perfect omnipotence and perfect
wisdom of God to a fitting conclusion pertaining to the “substance” that makes them one.
Then he repeats the creedal formula he concluded with in the second section: “ . . . true
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divinity remains in unity of substance, and unity of substance remains in true divinity.”296
In book II, Richard uses triads and triadic structures to organize his material, but
with a level of detail and intricacy that goes beyond what we find in book I. And
consequently, Richard’s “expanding” of sections of his work with new material becomes
more evident in book II.297 The first two sections of book II form a large chiastic
structure coalescing around the triad he devotes the most attention to in these sections:
the three divine properties of Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable.298 II.1 and II.8 form the
outer part of the chiastic structure. In II.1, Richard argues that God is uncreated and in
II.8, that there can be only one uncreated. II.2-4 parallel II.7 to form the next rung of the
chiasm. In II.2-4 he argues that God is eternal, and in II.7 that there can be only one
eternal being. The third, final, and inner section of the chiasm consists of II.5 and II.6. In
II.5 Richard establishes that God is immeasurable; in II.6 he argues that there can be only
one immeasurable God. The chiasm uses the Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable triad in
the following way (Fig. 4.5):
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Fig. 4.5 Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable Chiasm in II.1-8
II.1-5 establish these three divine properties, and II.6-10 that they can only be
appropriated to one being. There can be no other being with the same properties. II.2-4
extend Richard’s description of the “eternal” property which entails no end (everlasting),
no decay to a worse state (incorruptibility), and no change to a better or equal state
(immutability).299 II.9-10 contain a further argument for these divine and
incommunicable properties of Divinity on the basis of how well they “cohere” with one
another. Their optimal consistency and “mutual relationships” with each other are further
evidence for their truth. II.9 demonstrates the harmony from the mutual relation of the
Uncreated and Eternal properties; II.10 from the Eternal and Immeasurable properties.300
At the end of II.10, Richard connects with his earlier material in book I where he
argued for the unity of divinity from omnipotence. Since the divine properties are
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identical to each other (because the divine substance has an ultimate, super-simplicity),
God’s omnipotence is identical to his immeasurability and eternity. In II.11 Richard
engages in a digression concerning the two properties of Divinity (e.g., Power and
Wisdom) that seem to be communicable since other rational beings participate in them;
that is, despite the fact that Richard has argued for the incommunicability of these
properties, they don’t seem to be limited to Divinity alone. In II.12 Richard introduces
the triad of General-Special-Individual with respect to substantiality (substantialitas) in
order to show that God’s power and wisdom—though we apply the same words to other
rational substances—are sui generis when used of Divinity. They should be understood
as “supreme Wisdom” or “supreme Power,” and hence incommunicable with respect to
their supreme status. In short, while “power” and “wisdom” are communicable properties
(i.e., humans and God have both power and wisdom), omnipotence and omni-wisdom301
are incommunicable and belong to God alone. Proof that II.11-14 is a digression, and
therefore added at a later date, consists of the fact that the summary for the chiastic
Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable triad comes directly at the end of the digression in
II.15.302 Richard writes:
Except for what we already said above about the singularity of the
divinity, behold how many ways we can prove that there is only
one God. One uncreated, one eternal, and one immeasurable—each
property proves and clearly demonstrates that there is only one
God.
The reason this summary is included at the beginning of II.15, which initiates a new
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See n. 7 of this work.

II.11-14 is a digression on the perplexity of the communicability / incommunicability of the
divine properties of power and wisdom.
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section of book II, is that Richard, having considered the “unity” of Divinity (divinitatis
unitate) in book I (i.e., there is one divine substance) and the “singularity” of Divinity
(divinitatis singularitate) in the last half of the chiasm of book II (i.e., there is only one
God who is uncreated, eternal, immeasurable), now wants to use a single argument to
argue for the harmony of the unity and singularity of Divinity. He sees it as a fuller
elaboration of the previous arguments he has made until now; a form that matches the
Highest-Best-Fullest triad he used in book I. In book I Richard argued that the divine
substance is supremely one (summe unum). In the last part of the chiastic structure of
book II Richard argued that the divine substance is singularly supreme (unice summum).
Now, from a single consideration of unity, and particularly with the consideration of the
creedal formula “There is one Lord,” Richard argues for the supremely simple identity of
Divinity; that is, he will take the unity of book I and the singularity of book II to argue for
the “full identity” of unity and singularity.
The section for the full identity of unity and singularity begins in II.15 with the
argument for establishing the truth recited in the Quicumque, that there is “one Lord.” In
a way that reminds of the “Divinity can have no inferior, superior, or equal” of book I,303
Richard demonstrates likewise that there can be only one Lord from a reductio ad
absurdum argument that leads to the absurdity that he-who-cannot-be-the-slave-ofanother-nor-the-equal-of-another would be the slave of another or the equal of another.
And since this is contradictory, there must be one Lord.
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Further evidence that bks. I and II form a unit in establishing the unity and singularity of Divinity
comes when Richard explicitly connects his “one Lord” argument with his argument in bk. I for “one
God”: “For, just as it is only possible for one God to exist who is omnipotent, so there it is only possible for
one Lord to exist.” Richard, De Trinitate II.15. It is likely part of an earlier sequence based on the
Quicumque. See n. 309 of this work.
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From this consideration of supreme Lordship, Richard uses the desire of he-who-isomnipotent to draw out a further argument for the “fullness” and then the “identity” of
the simplicity and unicity of Divinity. Because omnipotent, God lacks nothing that he
desires. As Richard says, “No fullness (plenitudo) and no perfection (perfectio) can be
lacking where there is omnipotence.”304 And further, “Nothing can be better and nothing
can be greater than that which is full and perfect (plenum et perfectum) in every respect
(in omnibus).”305 Therefore, “God is the supreme good and his own good to himself.”306
What’s more, this fullness extends to the happiness and blessedness of Divinity: “For
what is blessedness other than the fullness and perfection of all good things?”307 The
direction of the argument in II.16 is toward the “multiplicity” or “fullness” of supreme
goodness; in II.17 he shifts in the opposite direction to its “simplicity.” The divine is full
and perfect but also supremely simple. It is simple in the sense that it is non-composite:
there are no “distinct realities” in the supreme Good. In II.18 Richard argues further, and
in conclusion, that because Divinity’s properties are identical, “ . . . whatever is in the
supreme good and true divinity is truly, substantially, and supremely one.” We thus find
another of Richard’s fitting summaries reflecting a trinitarian form where he takes the full
multiplicity of the supreme Good on the one hand, and the total simplicity of the supreme
Good on the other, to see the intricate identity of this perfection and simplicity in one
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Divinity. This has established, from a consideration of unity alone, a supreme Good both
wholly perfect and supremely simple. In II.19 Richard makes the further point—as he did
for each of the divine properties in II.6-8—that there can be only one supreme Good. As
Richard says:
And so, as it was said, the entirely perfect good will be not only
supremely one but also singularly supreme. . . . If God is truly the
supreme good, then as there can only be one supreme good, so it is
really clear what we believe: there is only one God.
So, there is only one Divinity. This Divinity is uncreated, eternal, and immeasurable; and
there is only one uncreated, eternal, and immeasurable Divinity. Likewise, Divinity is
supremely Good in the multiplicity and identity of its properties in a single, perfect
essence. And there is only one supreme Good.
This is further evidence that Richard sees books I-II forming a unit to establish the
unity of Divinity. We pointed out that Richard conceives his entire treatise in accordance
with the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad. What is surprising, when we look to book I, is
that Richard speaks only of Substance-Power-Wisdom and nothing of Goodness. There,
he was able to show that there is only one supreme Power and only one supreme
Wisdom, but he does not show in book I that there is only one supreme Goodness, as he
does this later in II.19. In book III, Richard deliberately draws out a third argument so he
can have three ways of establishing the same truth. He uses Goodness-Happiness-Glory
to establish the plurality of persons in Divinity; and in the last one he derives a single
argument from supreme Benevolence. Here we have something similar, but it spans I-II.
We can see this by the fact that there are three distinct places at which Richard derives
the conclusion that there is “only one God.” In I.11-25 he establishes the unity of
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Divinity from the triad of supreme Substance-Power-Wisdom. In II.1-8 he establishes the
singularity of Divinity from each of the three divine properties of Uncreated-EternalImmeasurable. And finally in II.15-19, he argues for the unity of Divinity with a single
argument from supreme Goodness.
What explains this sequence of material in I-II? One has to do with the fact that
Richard takes his cues from the chronology of the pseudo-Athanasian creed. The
Quicumque states that there are not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent; not three
Gods, but one God; not three Lords, but one Lord.308 The material in I-II follows the
order of the creedal formula in the Quicumque: One Omnipotent—> One God —> One
Lord.309 But there is also the sequence in I-II of Power-Wisdom-Goodness. Supreme
Power and supreme Wisdom are taken up in I.11-25 but supreme Goodness is taken up in
II.15-19 with Richard’s chiasm of Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable in II.1-8 coming
between them. This sums up Richard’s argument to II.19. Clearly he uses multiple triads
in I-II to sequence and structure his material despite the fact that some of these have
separated as Richard added to his work.
Finally, in a way that reminds us of the digression of II.11-14 with respect to the
super-status of God’s incommunicable “power” and “wisdom,” Richard argues for a
similar super-status of Divinity’s simplicity and unity; for it transcends all unities
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Richard, De Trinitate, “one omnipotent” (I.25), “one God” (II.14), “one Lord” (II.15). I take it
that the chiastic structure from II.1-8, the harmonizing of uncreated-eternal in II.9 and eternalimmeasurable in II.10, as well as the digression on the (in)communicability of wisdom and power in
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accounts for both (1) the Quicumque sequence (i.e., Omnipotent-God-Lord) and (2) the separation of
supreme Goodness (II.16ff.) from supreme Power and Wisdom in I.11-25.

148
comprehensible to us. Thus in the same way that God’s wisdom and power transcend as
‘omni-wisdom’ and ‘omni-potence’, so God’s simplicity and identity of properties
transcend as a kind of ‘omni-simplicity’. All such divine properties elude the human
mind; they are “above and beyond” it though they can be seen partially as in a mirror.310
In book IV we discover further connections with Richard’s triadic structures in I-III,
noting that the Highest-Best-Fullest (summa-integritas-plenitudo) triad that organizes
books I and III lies in the background in this book as well. Here, Richard clarifies the
definition of ‘person’ in order to bring greater alignment between contemporary
understandings of the term and its application to the Divine. He does this with a view to
resolving the unity of Divinity he established in books I-II with the plurality of persons in
Divinity he proved in book III. The main triad Richard uses to organize his
contemplations regarding this harmony in book IV is Meaning-Difference-Definition.311
IV.1-10 pertain to the meaning of ‘person’ (i.e., that each divine person is a someone),
IV.11-20 to the difference of persons (i.e., that each person exists separately), and
IV.21-25 provide the definition of ‘person’ (i.e., that each person is distinguished by an
individual distinction and distinct property). Richard explicitly states that he organizes his
material in accordance with this triad when he writes:
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As we were able according to our own limited capacity, we
arranged this discussion concerning the meaning (significatione),
differences (variatione), and definition (descriptione) of the term
‘person’.312
In IV.1-10, on the meaning of ‘person’, Richard deals with ambiguities between
‘substance’ (substantia) and ‘person’ (persona), since the word ‘person’ is commonly
used to refer to either. He puts it in the plainest of terms: One asks either “Quid sit?” (i.e.,
“What is that?”) or “Quis sit?” (i.e., “Who is it?”).313 The answer to the former is a
general or specific name or definition: e.g., an animal, a man, a horse. The answer to the
latter is a proper name or something equivalent, such as Matthew, Bartholomew, a father,
or his son. The former refers to the quality of substance; the latter refers to the quality of
person. ‘Substance’ refers to something whereas ‘person’ refers to someone. A person is
both a something and a someone, which is why the word ‘person’ can refer to either one.
The importance for trinitarian contemplation is that the divine persons refer to the
‘someones’ of Divinity and not the ‘something’ that is the divine essence (even though,
as Richard points out, the persons are identical with the divine substance). In IV.11-20
Richard develops the second element of the Meaning-Difference-Definition triad. As we
might expect, he focuses on the quality and E-quality of the thing under consideration
with the second element in his organizing triads. With respect to divine persons, Richard
then transitions from what it is the same within Divinity to what is different. As he says:
For, a diversity (diversitas) of substances produces ‘something and
something else’ (aliud et aliud) to exist in a rational nature, and
otherness (alteritas) of persons causes ‘someone and someone else’
312
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(alium et alium) to exist. But we do find otherness (alietatem) in the
divine and supremely wise nature, yet we do not the
aforementioned diversity (diversitatem); consequently, we believe
that there is a plurality of persons in the divine nature, and we deny
a plurality of substances.314
Richard’s main concern is to steer the simple-minded away from tritheism in their
understanding. Thus regardless of how one uses ‘person’ or ‘substance’ the key is to
avoid understanding, by either term, that there are three somethings in Divinity.315 There
is only one something but three someones. And to be accurate, one must speak of
‘substance’ with respect to the former and ‘persons’ with respect to the latter. There is
one substance, but a plurality of persons in Divinity.
In IV.1-10, Richard establishes that it is logically possible (i.e., not impossible) for
there to be a plurality of persons in a unity of substance. In IV.11-20, Richard shows how
the “otherness of persons” can obtain without “otherness of substance(s)” as it typically
does for non-divine, rational beings. To aid him in this, Richard introduces the term
‘existentiae’ to distinguish three modes of being with respect to quality and origin.
Existence can be differentiated in three ways: (a) according to quality alone, (b)
according to origin alone, and (c) according to a concurrence of quality and origin.316
Humans are distinguished according to quality and origin since they are individuated by
quality (i.e., what makes this person different than that person) and by origin (e.g., each
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may have different parents). Angels are differentiated by quality alone since angels all
have the same origin.317 The only mode of being left for the “otherness” in Divinity is
that according to origin alone. Richard therefore concludes IV.11-20 with how it is that
each ‘person’ exists separately by showing that the difference consists in the fact that
“Every person has a rational being from an incommunicable property.”318 It is left to
book V to explain what those three incommunicable properties are that distinguish the
divine persons according to each one’s “origin.”319
Finally, in IV.21-25, Richard turns his attention to the definition of ‘person’. He
begins with Boethius’s definition of person as “an individual substance of a rational
nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia), and he refines it to make it more perfect
and complete.320 Thus the continual pattern in Richard we saw in books I and III we also
see at work here in book IV. In both he starts with what is “highest” (summa), then what
is the most “integral” or best in terms of quality (integritas); and finally, what is fullest
and most perfect (plenitudo). Thus here, with the third part of the Meaning-DifferenceDefinition triad, Richard turns his attention to “perfecting” Boethius’s definition of
‘person’. He writes, “However, in order for a definition to be perfect (perfecta), it is
necessary for it to cover the entire reality (rei esse comprehendat) and only the reality of
317
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the object to be defined.”321 Thus with respect to Boethius’s definition, Richard writes:
Now, Boethius defines person as an individual substance of a
rational nature. In order for this definition to be universal
(generalis) and perfect (perfecta), it is necessary for every
individual substance of a rational nature to be a person, and,
conversely, for every person to be an individual substance of a
rational nature.322
In IV.1-10 and IV.11-20 Richard establishes that each of the divine persons are
three someones and that they are distinguished in accordance with their incommunicable
properties of origin. IV.10 deals with the difference between the ‘something’ and the
‘someones’ of Divinity; IV.11-20 deals with the differentiating quality among the
‘someones’ of Divinity. Finally, in IV.21-25, Richard contends with the difficulties of
distinguishing the divine substance from the divine persons given that Boethius’s
definition is ambiguous with respect to both: Boethius definition of a person as “an
individual substance of a rational nature” applies equally to the divine persons as well as
to the divine substance itself. Consequently, one can say that “Divinity is a person” and
“the persons of Divinity are persons.” The inaccuracy is a problem. He therefore refines
Boethius’s definition to apply ‘person’ only to the divine persons of Divinity and not to
Divinity itself.323 Richard’s refinement of Boethius’s definition concludes, on the basis of
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these clarifications,324 that ‘person’ should be defined as “someone existing through
oneself alone according to a singular mode of rational existence.”325 Book V is where he
delineates each singular mode of rational existence for each of the divine persons on the
basis of each one’s “origin.”326
Do we have any evidence in book IV that Richard designs the form of his
arguments by showing how three considerations uphold the same truth? In book III we
saw Richard summarize each of his three sections with conclusions that did exactly this.
Here in book IV he does not summarize each of his sections in the same way; however he
still plays with this idea. For example, in Richard’s rehearsing of the traditional Latin
trinitarian formulas in IV.20, he gives three of them:
tres substantias et unam essentiam
tres subsistentias et unam substantiam
tres personas et substantiam vel essentiam unam
He then concludes, “Among the variety of expressions a single truth must be understood,
fact that for human substance, there is only one ‘what’ and one ‘who’; whereas for divine substance there is
one ‘What’ and three ‘Whos’ as Richard explains in IV.6-10. Furthermore, for Richard, the ‘Whos’ are so
identical with the ‘What’ that the best possible communication is also the “fullest”: One can therefore
speak of Divinity-to-humanity, Divine-to-human, Divine-to-society, and (each) divine person-to-human
person by either term (i.e., What-to-what, Who-to-who, Whos-to-who, and Whos-to-whos). Such Divine
‘super’-simplicity and multiformity enable the communication to be a conditio summa et summe perfecta.
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although the meaning of words is different with different people.” There were no doubt
other Latin formulations, but Richard chooses three and then highlights how all three
express the same truth. One truth found in three formulas; and three formulas describing
the same truth. Likewise, Richard summarizes this section in the following way:
I think that no term can be found more suitable for the divine
plurality than the word “person.” And indeed there ought to be
nothing more authentic (authenticum) for a faithful mind (fideli
animo) than what sounds (sonat) in every ear (in ore omnium) and
what the Catholic authority confirms (confirmat).327
Since Richard deals with definitions and the concepts by which things are said, heard,
and understood, he lifts this “agreement of minds,” with respect to definition, into the
realm of agreement of soul in chanting the liturgy. Thus he connects the communi animi
with the in ore omnium in a creative way that binds these three creedal formulations on
the Trinity together in a harmony that beckons faithful minds toward ecclesiastical unity!
He also concludes in IV.25, “Behold how, by its inclusion, the angelic property
arranges the contrariety of opposites as in a kind of symmetrical proportion and
composes the dissonance (dissonantiam) of alternating sounds (alternantium) into one
consonance (in unam harmoniam).”328 Subsequently he asks:
Which, in your opinion, seems to be a more appropriate order,
which, I ask, seems to be more befitting for the supreme
arrangement of Wisdom (summe sapientis dispositioni): if among
this trinity of natures—namely, the divine, angelic, and human
natures—the properties of the outer two are related to the third as
opposites through contrary natures without the intervention of an
intermediate, or if it is said that the third nature intervenes between
the outer two natures and, having been connected alternately
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(alternatim conjuncta) through the similitude of both natures,
reconciles their opposition in a harmony (in unam harmoniam)?329
The language of book III was the courtroom; there were three witnesses who testify to
one truth. In book IV the language is the liturgy. The sound must be “authentic” in the
sense that what is stated is true and firmly believed. It must also compose the “dissonance
of alternating sounds into one consonance.”330 It must be chanted in-tune. Furthermore, it
must reconcile contrasting consonances into “one harmony.”331 And these liturgical
allusions come together in the final conclusion of book IV, when Richard writes, “How
nothing is dissonant with the reason that we are ordered to venerate one God in the
Trinity and the Trinity in a unity.”332
Richard realizes at the end of book IV that his clarifications of ‘person’ and his
argument for the harmony of unity and plurality in Divinity are only “fitting” (convenit),
and therefore may be regarded as only probable and not necessary. Thus, while his goal is
to reach a perfect harmony at the end of book IV, we do well to pay attention to the
emphasis in the last line of IV.25 that “nothing is dissonant in venerating the one God in
the Trinity and the Trinity in a unity.” Book IV consists of refinements of definition and
clarifications of terms. It therefore argues for the “non-impossibility” of the harmony

329

Richard, De Trinitate IV.25.

330

Ibid.

331

Here Richard connects his “fitting necessity” with the experience of Victorine liturgical life. The
Victorine liturgies were performed in groups standing opposite one another, with their harmon(ies) coming
between them. Thus Richard “calls to mind” this liturgical image as a contextual backdrop to his arguments
of “fitting necessity” in bk. IV whereby two opposing terms are harmonized by a middle term to achieve
optimal consistency. In doing so, Richard not only gives his readers a “common understanding” (communi
animi) he also calls on them to sing it with “one voice” (una voce)!
332

Richard, De Trinitate IV.25.

156
between unity and plurality in Divinity (i.e., non-dissonance) on the basis of these
clarifications.333 Richard still has to go beyond this to argue for the actual harmony of
unity and plurality in Divinity; and he does this on the basis of “necessary reasons” in
book V.334
Book V is divided into three sections based on the triad Origin-Relation-Number.
Richard fulfills two goals in this book: first, to limit the number of divine persons to three
as the Catholic faith teaches; and second, to specify an incommunicable property for each
divine person along the way. V.1-5 argue, on the basis of the distinctions Richard first
delineates in book I, that there are only two modes of eternal existence in Divinity: (a)
one who is from eternity and from himself, and (b) another two who are also from
eternity but not from themselves.335 V.6-9 deal with the relation the latter two divine
persons have to the first divine person with respect to the (im)mediacy of their
processions. Thus one procession in Divinity is only immediate, the other is both mediate
and immediate. The first procession is required in order for the second procession to
obtain since a duality of persons logically precedes a trinity of persons. V.10-15 deal with
limiting the number of divine persons to three by ruling out a fourth. V.16-21 consist of a
single argument for these same truths on the basis of love. Here Richard introduces
333
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another triad—Gratuitous-Love, Owed-Love, Gratuitous-and-Owed Love—to show how
three distinctions of properties in supreme love can obtain with one and the same love in
every person. V.22-25 handle a concern as to whether the different kinds of love entail a
“diversity of dignity” in Divinity that would make one divine person more worthy than
another. These latter two arguments consider the same truth from two different
perspectives. In V.16-21 Richard looks at “one and the same love” from the perspective
of the distinctive love of each person (e.g., gratuitous, owed, gratuitous and owed);
whereas in V.22-25, he looks at the three persons through the prism of one and the same
love. Thus Richard focuses on the “fullness” of this supreme love distinguished by three
properties in V.16-21 and he also speaks of the “integrity” of that same love in V.22-25.
The former has to do with the source and reception of love, the latter with the equal
dignity of benevolence involved in that bestowal and reception. As Richard concludes in
V.24 before he draws it all together in V. 25: “It is certain and not at all ambiguous that,
with regard to the integrity of perfection, there is no difference in the Trinity between
love and dignity.”
Book VI and Discovering De Trinitate “In Relief”
When we get to book VI, Richard has two further goals. One is to distinguish two
modes of procession in Divinity, and the other is to find arguments for the
appropriateness of the divine names ascribed to each of the divine persons. But unlike
previous books, though there are plenty of triads in book VI (Fig. 4.6), the book is not
organized in accordance with any triadic structure.
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Fig. 4.6 Triads in Book VI of Richard’s De Trinitate
What are the reasons for this? First, book VI has the most polemical material of the
treatise. Most of these dialogical exchanges with “opponents” are found in book VI and
this material centers on the debate over how there can be both Unbegotten and Begotten
substance in Divinity without this entailing a contradiction.336 If De Trinitate began as a
dialogical exchange with real or imagined opponents on the basis of the Quicumque,337
then the bulk of this material ends up in book VI. Second, Richard “returns” to the
language of the Quicumque in a way that connects with books I-II.338 Further, there is a
higher concentration of the use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad in book VI that
336

The highest concentration of this polemical material is in VI.15-25; there is a noticeable shift to
the third person plural (e.g., they say, they deny, etc.). Parts of it are found in V.8-9, 13. The only other
places ‘begotten’-language is found is I.5, when Richard rehearses the things he finds in the Quicumque but
has not seen proven; and II.25, where he refrains from their discussion. Ribaillier also notes the difference
in style this material has when compared with the rest of the treatise: “Certains passages, par example dans
le débat sur la formule substantia genuit substantiam, tranchent par la vivacité du style sur la sérénité du
reste de l’ouvrage.” Ribaillier, 10.
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This similarity of style and language in bks. VI and I is also noted by Ribaillier: “Enfin la
méthode n’est plus tout à fait la même: au chapitre IV du livre I, Richard prétend non pas tant s’appuyer sur
les autorités que donner une démonstration rationnelle de la Trinité, non tam auctoritates inducere quam
ratiocinationi insistere; or dans le livre VI les références à l’Ecriture, à la liturgie, aux Pères sont plus
abondantes.” Ribaillier, 10.
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also connects with earlier material in books I-II.339
Second, book VI offers explicit evidence that Richard returned to insert and edit this
material. And though we provide more details of this in Appendix A, here we must treat
it because it relates to the intentionality we ascribe to Richard’s incorporating triads. At
the opening of book VI, after stating in VI.2 that the relationship of the first and second
divine persons is “ . . . entirely immediate, and it is according to the principal order of
proceeding and according to the operation of nature,” he concludes, “Because this is clear
enough from the previous discussions, there is no need for further explanation.” But he
then provides further explanation when he introduces the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad
in VI.3 stating, “ . . . if we desire to know what the singular mode of proceeding is in the
supereminent and superexcellent nature of deity, then let us think about the goodness,
wisdom, and power of the Unbegotten, and perhaps we will discover what we seek more
quickly.” But Richard gives minimal treatment of this triad in VI.3 and only returns to it
again in VI.15. The subsequent chapters VI.4-5 suddenly break into an extended
treatment on the difference between human and divine procession according to the
“operation of nature” (operationem naturae). VI.4 contends that the more worthy of the
sexes (i.e., man) shows the appropriateness of the conventional language for the parentchild relation to be that of Father-to-Son. This is where divine and human propagation are
similar. But there is also dissimilitude, since what holds true concerning the operation of
nature in humanity (i.e., male and female parents) does not hold true for the operation of
nature in Divinity (i.e., only Father-to-Son). VI.5 then engages in a speculation about
339

Further linguistic evidence for connecting this material is Richard’s use of “primordialis” found
only in De Trinitate I.12-15, II.8, V.7, VI.12, VI.18.
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what similitude would exist if it were possible for Adam to will a son who was
consubstantial with himself and equal with himself in every way, showing that the
principal relation of parent-to-child would still obtain.
Further evidence of editing is seen subsequently when Richard gives an explanation
for the distinct causes, reasons, and order of each of the processions in VI.6-7: one,
because the first divine person wants a person of equal dignity (condignum); and the
other, because he wants a partaker of their mutual love (condilectum). The first desire
precedes the second and is therefore considered to be the more principal relation. But
following this—despite the fact that he has already given an argument for the distinctness
of the modes of procession in VI.6-7—he argues for the distinctness of the modes of
procession on a different basis: that one procession is immediate and principal and the
other is immediate and not-principal. What makes each procession different is that one is
from the first divine person alone and the second is from both the first and second divine
persons. But why would Richard need a further argument that distinguishes the two
modes of procession if he already provided one “previously ascertained with reasoning”
in VI.6-7? And further, why would the condignum-condilectum language developed in
those chapters not find its way into the following argument? The only other place we find
this language is in VI.17 where Richard gives a paragraph providing an “abbreviated
account of this topic,” presumably a briefer argument for things he argued previously.
We also have Richard explicitly stating that he is inserting material in the subsequent
chapter, VI.18: “But, in order that we may return to that question on account of which we
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inserted these remarks . . . ” (emphasis mine).340 In all likelihood, then, this condignumcondilectum material in VI.6-7 and VI.17 was inserted at a later date. And if this is true,
the same applies for the material found in the latter part of V.16-25, since Richard
structures the last two sections of that book around “love” and “dignity” respectively.341
One of two things is taking place in book VI. One possibility is that Richard’s focus
in the latter part of book V, and the first part of book VI, deals with the two processions.
Thus Richard could be constructing book VI around this duality, which would account
for the corresponding duality we find in the condignum-condilectum material and the
corresponding lack of triadic structure. Another possibility is that, given more time,
Richard would have found a way to arrange the material of book VI in a triadic way.
Given what we have already seen in book III and elsewhere, the latter is more likely.
What is the evidence? We have seen Richard work with the triad of Highest-BestFullest as one of the major triads that organizes other sections of his work. What is most
notable in those sections is what he does with the “plenitude” in the third part of that
triad. But the way Richard speaks of plenitude and fullness in book VI is less developed.
With respect to “plenitude” he always and only speaks of the fullness of Divinity received
or given to one or another divine person. Here is an example:
. . . possessing all plenitude is common to every person; and both
possessing and giving the fullness is a property common to the
Father and Son; yet, possessing and not giving it to another is the
particular property of the Holy Spirit. . . . the Son alone . . .
340
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V.16-21 focus on fullness of “one and the same love” through three different properties (e.g.,
gratuitous, owed, and gratuitous-and-owed); V.22-25 focus on integrity of persons who have equal dignity.
See esp. the concluding line of V.24 where Richard clearly sees them as two different arguments for the
harmony of unity and plurality from a consideration of love.
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possesses the image, since just as the plenitude of divinity flows
from the Father, so the bestowing of the same plenitude flows from
the Son. . . . Yet absolutely no person receives the plenitude of the
divinity from the Holy Spirit, and, consequently, the Holy Spirit
does not express the image of the Father in himself.342
With respect to “fullness,” he only speaks of the fullness of wisdom and “perfect
learning” in the final chapters of book VI. Here the intricate details of the fullness of
divinity are lacking. Richard speaks only of the “plenitude” of divinity “given and
received.” When he begins thinking of his meditations in books V and VI, with his newer
contemplations on love and dignity, these more intricate details begin to flourish. But the
these are the early buds, not the full flowering of Richard’s contemplations in book III.
The love-dignity material in book VI343—especially in comparison to his treatment
elsewhere344—is less developed. As a result, we can glimpse this earlier stage in
Richard’s thought with a view to how he may have refined this theme for book VI in
accordance with his further reflections on love and dignity in other sections of his work.
And given the polish of his other writings, he may have rewritten the work in its entirety
in light of them.
Book VI therefore contains many triads but no discernible triadic structures.
Furthermore, Richard returned to this material with new insights. We are thus left at the
end of Richard’s work with a dissipating intricacy of design and a disappointing sense
that someone who could so carefully craft book III of his treatise would leave us with a
final book that “fails” by comparison. Is there anything further to this? Is there anything
342
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more constructive book VI might reveal in Richard’s articulation of the Trinity? Earlier,
we juxtaposed the “breadth” and “depth” of Richard’s De Trinitate. The breadth refers to
the bird’s-eye-view of the work; that is, how Richard structures the work according to the
Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad (Fig. 4.1). The depth of De Trinitate refers to the
intricacies of Richard’s use of triads and triadic structures in specific sections, the most
intricate of which we find in book III (Fig. 4.2). But when we consider the breadth and
depth of De Trinitate together, we discover that Richard’s method of focusing and then
magnifying on some element to draw out further arguments is a literary process by which
he returned to his own work. This becomes evident when perceive two things: first,
despite the fact that books IV-VI deal with the harmony of unity and plurality in Divinity,
the arguments “from the consideration of the fullness of wisdom” (i.e., the last part of the
Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad) don’t come until the last few chapters of book VI;
second, the language of these final chapters is simpler and less sophisticated in
comparison to the material that immediately precedes it—a pattern reflected throughout
De Trinitate.345
This simply confirms that Richard is “expanding” and “filling out” his treatise with
new insights and material. Nevertheless, these expansions do not disrupt the overall flow
since the expansions simply fill out, make more clear, or establish the same point from a
different consideration. Richard looks over his previous compositions, finds seeds to
cultivate and water, and gives them fuller treatment, fuller insight and articulation. It
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As demonstrated in Appendix A, this pattern repeats throughout the treatise: Sophisticated
reflections and distinctions precede much simpler arguments on the same topic. Further, none of the
sophisticated language in previous sections finds its way into the concluding material. See also n. 237 of
this work.
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would be the equivalent of adding pages to a section of a book without rewriting what
came before and after it. The pages simply elaborate some element in more detail but do
not disrupt the flow of the previous work.
If this is true, then we should expect to see some of his earliest material at the very
end of his work—material that connects with the language and content at the beginning
of his treatise. And this is indeed what we find. Richard started with the PowerGoodness-Wisdom triad and composed his work arguing for the unity, the plurality, and
the harmony of unity and plurality on the basis of this triad. But as he contemplated
things further, he expanded his previous work. His final argument for the harmony of
unity and plurality from a consideration of the “fullness of wisdom” at the end of book VI
was therefore an earlier stage of his writing. It was only as Richard continued to expand
and provide further details on the definition of ‘person’ in book IV, and the intricacies of
procession and generation in book V, that we find the final component of the PowerGoodness-Wisdom triad drifting further and further away from material it was originally
connected with.
The reason why this is important for us to point out is that it helps us broaden our
understanding of Richard’s “intentionality” in composing this work. It is tempting, given
what we have discovered about Richard’s intricate triads and triadic structuring to treat
De Trinitate as a finished work of art, a sculpture in its most perfect and final form. But
as we step closer, we discover it is more like a work of art “in relief”: a sculpture attached
to the block of marble from which it was carved. The picture is almost full and complete;
about as full and complete as could ever be imagined—the form is in “high relief.” And
we can be incredibly thankful for this. For unlike a sculpture detached from the mold and
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marble that gave it life, where all we see is the work of art and the feeling it evokes as we
behold its form, a relief shifts our attention to the artist and his craft. We imagine how the
beauty and craft with which the artist chipped away at those things he was able to “draw
out” from the marble might advance through those elements left untouched. It brings us
to the lines that mark the margins of the artist’s thought. We connect with the “process”
of his craft and we join him in his work with our own theological imagination.
In conclusion, Richard deliberately constructs De Trinitate with triads and triadic
structures. We see that Richard resorts to the same Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that
Anselm uses in organizing his Monologion. But unlike Anselm, we see that Richard went
to painstaking lengths to incorporate the use of triads and triadic structures within each of
his books and even within sections of each of his books. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in book III where Richard uses the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad, emphasizes
each element of that triad in each of the three sections, and brings all three considerations
together in a final argument from supreme benevolence. What remains to explore is the
way Richard uses these triads to sustain the hearts and shape the minds of his readers in
their contemplation of the Trinity. We know the “form” by which Richard molds De
Trinitate; what we want to know next is how he “forges” that form in his readers; how in
“constructing” his trinitarian theology he gave an inner shape to their souls and an outer
shape to their communal life in accordance with these “trinitarian dimensions.”

CHAPTER FIVE
FORGING THESE “TRINITARIAN DIMENSIONS” IN THE FAITHFUL
And you will find rest for your souls.
We have seen the incredible artistry by which Richard constructs his De Trinitate
with triadic structures and forms. He also returns to his work, filling it out with further
insights and intricacies. Richard gave a lot of attention and care to De Trinitate and he
surely expected a mutual devotion from his readers as they joined with him in
contemplating the Trinity. As Richard writes in Twelve Patriarchs:
O how many persons we see today, studious in reading, slothful in
work, tepid in prayer, who nevertheless take it for granted that they
are able to take possession of the peak of this mountain. But I ask,
when will those who do not have Christ as leader take possession of
it? For Christ who does not wish to ascend except with three
disciples does not lead them. Therefore let one who seeks to have
Christ as guide of the journey and leader of the ascent join the
effort of work and prayer to the effort of reading. No doubt the
mind is not lifted up to the complete height of knowledge without
much exercise, without constant effort, without burning longing.
This is because one who does not follow the footsteps of Christ
perfectly does not enter the way of truth rightly.346
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Richard, Twelve Patriarchs lxxix; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 137; Interestingly, Richard
speaks more of the humanity of Christ in Twelve Patriarchs in contrast to Mystical Ark where it is absent.
Augustine speaks in his De Trinitate IV.3 of having thoughts of Christ “after a fleshly manner.” If we are
right about the Augustinian loci the Victorines follow—outside-Temple-House of God—the contemplation
of Christ in Mystical Ark may mirror the shift in Augustine from fleshly to spiritual contemplations of
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seized on the phrase [‘to know Christ after the flesh’ (2 Corinthians 5:16)] to describe the condition of the
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Richard’s De Trinitate is a mature contemplation, that inner court of God’s temple that
very few were able to enter; and of those who did, not without an effort of consecration
worthy of approaching the throne of God. It is only after purging the soul of vices,
inculcating virtues, and of developing a “holy curiosity” and undistracted resolve for the
face of God that one would then embark upon this final ascent. In this chapter we focus
on the formative implications of Richard’s triadic structures. How, then, did these
“trinitarian dimensions” of De Trinitate shape the trinitarian consciousness of the
Victorine apprentice and consummate this trinitarian love throughout his community?
Shaping the Trinitarian Consciousness of the Individual
The stages of learning at the abbey of St. Victor parallel monastic training in
general at the time. Apprentices first focused on learning the literal sense of words. Later
they built on the quality of that foundation by exploring the allegorical and tropological
insights they could build up from it. They were called “first things” and “second things”
respectively.347 Monastic reading, we must remind ourselves, was a moral act.348 It was
not reading for its own sake, but reading for the purpose of moral and spiritual formation.
As Carruthers notes:
The essential generative process in composition was
recollection of “things,” Memoria verborum was a task best
347
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Speaking of those who read with non-formative aims, Richard says, “Surely they thirst for the
sort of thing about which they can boast but not for that by which that can be built up. Indeed, they strive
after knowledge, not sanctity.” Mystical Ark, IV.14; Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 283. By contrast,
Richard indicates that a successful read of his Mystical Ark does not consist in turning the last page, but in
learning to put such contemplations to good use “ . . . by much effort and labor, and, finally, to consummate
the work at some time and in the end to be perfect in all things” (emphasis mine). Mystical Ark IV.22; ibid.,
304. See also Hugh’s Didascalicon III.12, V.7, 10, VI.3; Taylor 94, 128, 134, 138.
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accomplished without thinking, a first task for children or for
slaves. But memoria rerum was the task that produced wisdom and
built character, and could help to perfect one’s soul (“perfect” in
the sense of “fill in,” inscribe things in all those empty tablets of
memory). It built upon matters stored verbaliter by habit, but built
up from the various cues they supplied as links in associational
chains. The goal of an education was not to become a “living book”
(by rote reiteration, the power of an idiot) but to become a “living
concordance,” the power of prudence and wisdom.349
To seek Divinity in all of its plenitude required also seeking a plenitude of soul in
accordance with that divine image. As den Bok points out:
If man is «made to» God, he is «made to» the best possible being,
which as such must be a trinitarian being. De Trinitate intends to
give a hand to anyone who desires to approach the Most High daily,
step by step, growing in understanding and love. The fulfillment of
this desire will be a perfect love for and vision of God as He is. In
its best possible form this loving and knowing is realized, according
to Richard, in the mutual and perfect contemplation of divine
persons.350
Thus, like Anselm and Augustine, as Richard “takes” his reader to God, he “re-makes”
him in the process, shaping and forming him in accordance with the imago Dei. Doing so
enables the reader to untarnish the mirror of his soul so that he can see God “as He is”: in
all of his Trinitarian splendor and glory. This should remind us that much of the
formative work being done on the apprentice in De Trinitate follows upon previous soulwork: the kind of work we read in Richard’s Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark.
Without the affective and intellective control Richard seeks to deeply inscribe in his
apprentices by those works, they lack both the purity of desire and perspicuity of intellect
to come to a “full and complete knowledge of the Trinity.”
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Richard wishes to shape the trinitarian consciousness of his reader. And to discover
how he does so, we must seek those places where he uses his triads and triadic structures
to do this. For as Carruthers cautions:
. . . the picturae and formae which we encounter in twelfth century
literature, such as those in the meditations of Hugh and Richard of
St. Victor, should not be presumed to be descriptions of pictures or
plans that necessarily existed physically, but to be prescriptions,
examplars and patterns to be “copied” by the means of rhetoric:
augmentation, abbreviation, and translation. Such ekphrastic
pictures have the role in monastic rhetoric of the plan measured out
by the angel for Ezekiel to hold in his memory, providing ways and
places for the mental task of composing prayer.351
In what follows we divide our treatment on the formative implications of Richard’s
treatise and structures between Wisdom and Love, despite the fact that they have obvious
overlaps. For shaping the trinitarian consciousness of the individual we focus on
Wisdom; for the communal significance of Richard’s triadic structures we focus on Love.
Richard himself makes this division and it will be helpful to review it for this section:
There is usually a significant difference between the pleasures of
charity and wisdom. The pleasures of wisdom are able to and
accustomed to being drawn from one’s own heart; but the intimate
delights of charity are drawn from the heart of another. For he, who
loves intimately, is not delighted but anxious if he does not draw
from the heart of his beloved the sweetness of love for which he
thirsts. But the pleasures of wisdom delight more when they are
drawn from one’s own heart. Therefore, nothing is defined in a
manner contrary to nature, if it is asserted that the fullness of
wisdom can subsist in a single person (italics mine).352
Wisdom is the crowning piece of Richard’s treatise. As we saw before, Anselm
orders his Monologion according to the order of Goodness —> Wisdom —> Power.
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Richard orders his as Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom. How do we know that Wisdom
is Richard’s point of emphasis? We know this because of the recurring pattern throughout
his treatise of introducing the first two terms of a triad only to add a third as the
intermediate and harmonizing piece—the piece that brings out the fullness of its
beauty.353 Whether we are speaking of the condilectio of book III, the divine person who
harmonizes the gratuitous and owed love of the other two persons in book V, and
numerous other examples, the third term is almost always the harmonizing piece. Thus
even though the linear order of Richard’s treatise is Power —> Goodness —> Wisdom,
the final picture he creates shows the relationship of Power <—> Wisdom <—>
Goodness, where Wisdom fittingly perfects the picture by being placed between Power
on the one hand, and Goodness on the other. Where unity is established from a
consideration of omnipotence (I-II) and plurality is established from a consideration of
supreme goodness (III), Wisdom is what brings that unity and plurality together in a
complete harmony (IV-VI). It is fitting, then, that Richard crowns his De Trinitate with
the fullness of Wisdom.354
In chapter 3 we referred to Richard’s method of fides quaerens intellectum a
plenitudine ad plenitudinem to highlight the extent to which he “fills out” the fullness of
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Divinity. We showed how Richard combines “plenitude” with principles found in
Augustine and Anselm in order to draw out further contemplations on the Trinity. We see
this, for example, in books I-II where Richard uses the triad of Highest-Best-Fullest to
speak of God’s supreme power, wisdom, and goodness. Using that triad, Richard brings
out the full, trinitarian splendor of Divinity. With each new development, one comes to
comprehend more and more of the depth and width and length of the Trinity, so to speak.
But in addition to the height of this trinitarian vision of the Divine, there is a
corresponding depth Richard seeks for his readers. As one’s understanding of God
broadens, the mind itself has to enlarge and widen. In short, if one is to see the fullness of
Wisdom, one has to make further room in one’s soul to receive—and be received by—it.
Richard is very clear about this in his Mystical Ark where he describes the enlarging of
the mind that precedes moving into the final ecstasy of Trinitarian contemplation:
And so the human mind is reminded of the first stage of its
enlarging, when it is said to it by the Prophet: “Set up a watchtower
for yourself; lay out bitternesses for yourself; direct your heart in
the straight way in which you have walked” (Jer. 31:21). You hear
concerning the second, when you read: “I will stand upon my
lookout; I will fix my position upon the fortification, and I will
contemplate what is said to me” (Hab. 2:1). This concerns the third:
“Go across to the islands of Gethim and see; and send into Cedar,
and consider vigorously” (Jer. 2:10). What does it mean to stand
upon a watchtower, except to acquire knowledge of contemplating?
For we raise up a watchtower for this: in order that we may be able
to see for a long distance from it and to enlarge our vision in all
directions. And so in these words is rightly indicated that enlarging
of the mind in which a watchtower of contemplation is raised up
and knowledge of such an effort is acquired. However, what does it
mean to stand upon a lookout and to fix a position, except to
strengthen by use the knowledge of speculating? For what one
person calls a watchtower, another calls a lookout. Whether they
are public or private lookouts, we are accustomed to raise up
watchtowers so that when looking out from them we can see
imminent dangers long beforehand. So we raise up as it were a
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spiritual watchtower, the grace of contemplation, so that we may be
able to anticipate the ambush of tempters. However, it is one thing
to ascend and set up a watchtower; it is another thing to stand on it
and even to fix one’s position. The former is by the acquisition of a
skill; the latter is by the exercise of a skill. . . . Indeed it is rightly
said and taught that the capacity of the mind increases and is
enlarged by the vigor of consideration and attention. And so, if you
pursue carefully you will be enlarged more and more to a greater
perfection of keensightedness by means of these three stages of
advancement (italics mine).355
Seeing the fullness of the Divinity in full, trinitarian splendor consists of seeing that
Divinity in three primary dimensions.356 First, it means seeing Divinity at its height—
God is the highest of all: He is the Most High. Second, it consists of seeing God as the
most integral of all—the quality and E-quality of His perfections are pure and genuine:
He is simple and true. Third, and finally, it consists of seeing God as the fullest and most
complete. He is the fullness of His perfections. He is the source and fullness of His
power, wisdom, and goodness. He is the fullest, most perfect, and most complete of all
beings. He lacks nothing. The bounty of his perfection overflows with an infinity of
riches. Nothing can be added to Him that would make Him more perfect or more
complete: He is King of kings.
But to reach this contemplation in all of its fullness requires daily exercise, of
mounting the rungs of the ladder, of ascending and enlarging the mind, and of burning
with an ardor of soul that turns that human ascent into an angelic flight. It requires
ascending each element of that triad. It requires ascending to its summit, diving into its
purity, and becoming awestruck by its plenitude. Thus as Richard describes the fullness
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of divinity in terms of what is most High, most Pure, and most Perfect, he inscribes the
elements of this triad within his readers as well. As he enlarges their minds with the
contemplation of the triune God he is simultaneously enlarging and shaping their souls in
accordance with these same divine perfections.
We begin our ascent at the base of the mountain, fully aware of the difficulty
involved in reaching the summit of the Most High God, “ . . . for the created and
corporeal things show us how distant we are from the greatness and highness (sublimitas)
of the Creator. Everything we see warns us to be humble.”357 At every point of ascent in
De Trinitate, at every place where Richard moves from visible to invisible things, from
humanity to Divinity, one reaches that elevation where language grasps at something
“above and beyond” itself. Reason and language have been trustworthy guides to the
summit. They have pointed the way. They have shown both that true Divinity is one and
triune and how that unity and triunity obtain without contradiction. But though they have
led to a fuller contemplation of the Trinity, they cannot provide full comprehension,358
because an all-critical ‘super’ guards the transcendence of Divinity.
Richard speaks of this ‘super’ at numerous places in his writings; it is the
metaphysical ground for the “above and beyond” involved in the fifth and sixth stages of
contemplation of his Mystical Ark. But in De Trinitate, he gives it some important detail:
And so, the possession of a substantial being belongs to the divine
existence—or rather the possession of a supersubstantial being
without creation and without beginning—because it is the property
357
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of every substance which receives a name from reality, to be a
composite being and to be subject to accidents. However, the divine
substance alone, which transcends the nature of substance, has a
simple being both without composition and subject to no inherent
accidents. And, for that reason, the divine substance is rightly said
to have a supersubstantial being (supersubstantiale esse) rather
than a substantial (substantiale) being (emphasis mine).359
In virtue of the fact that Divinity is a substance (substantia), it exists in the way that
everyday things exist. But it is a unique substance (supersubstantiale esse) in that its
existence never was non-existent and has existed forever without any composition or
subjection to change. God is truly the being that is, was, and forever will be (Revelation
1:4, 8, 4:8). It is this ‘super’ to Divinity that forms the upper limit at which man’s
intellectual and formative quest for the face of God ends. Without divine grace, without
breaking out beyond language to essence, from being to “being with,” man remains
“below and under” that inaccessible light.360 To rise above and beyond it requires an
alienation of mind and ecstatic contemplation, a dependence upon God whereby God
benevolently grants a “divine showing.” This is why, in IV.5, Richard points out that the
‘super’ that forms the ontological and epistemological “above and beyond” between God
and man is matched by a proportional condescension—a “here and now”—by the Spirit:
. . . the word ‘person’ was by no means ascribed to the very
sublime and supereminent mystery of the Trinity (sublimi et
supereminenti Trinitatis mysterio) without the divine impulse and
superintendence (sine instinctu divino et magisterio) of the Holy
Spirit. Consider how the same Spirit prophesied through the lips of
the prophets, formulated through the lips of the Evangelists, and
expounded through the lips of the doctors so many mysteries of our
faith, redemption, sanctification, and glorification. He who
359
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considers this will in no way be able to believe that the Holy Spirit
has subjected to human estimation, rather than ordained through his
inspiration, the supreme article of our faith, the very sacred and
secret mystery of the Trinity, and the very word that he wanted
every heart to believe and every tongue to confess.361
Seeking the summit thus requires knowing where it is as well as how to get there. One
must recognize the truth of God’s super-substantialness along with a dependence upon
divine grace in order to rise and stand with Moses in the cleft of that rock—in that
‘watchtower’ (specula) where one moves “above and beyond” oneself and awaits the face
of God.362 Consequently, God is the Most High God. He does not share this summit with
any other. It is a summit reserved for Father, Son, and Holy Spirit alone. As Richard says:
Certainly you are able to grow daily in awareness of God, and each
day you are able to be lifted up higher and higher in this lofty flight.
But above this watchtower of contemplation you are now
completely unable to find another that is higher. For it is one thing
to run about here and there in this kind of manifestation and to
enlarge one’s knowledge in knowing God; it is another thing to
want to seek above these things for other and higher things that you
cannot find in any way. There is nothing above God—nothing that
exists, that might be able to exist, or that can be thought to exist.
There is nothing higher to which knowledge might ascend, nor is it
capable of ascending higher. And so, the fullness of knowledge is
to know God.363
And reaching that summit through contemplation requires following that journey
with some of Richard’s theological predecessors. With Augustine, one discerns what it is
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better to be than not to be. With Anselm, one makes further progress by ascending in the
mind from one perfection to another until one reaches that summit and discovers the
greatest-one-of-all. Richard continues in the tradition of Augustine and Anselm by
directing his readers’ minds upward to that being-than-which-none-greater-can-exist.
Formatively, this has tremendous effect. This is because, in the process of growing
in one’s own wisdom and knowledge, one is also contemplating better and better things.
One may move from one perfection to discover that there is still some further perfection
greater and better than the first: e.g., that the mutual love that obtains between a bestower
and requiter (or a lover and beloved) is greater than a private love for oneself. This road
that proceeds from the base of the mountain and up and around various “grades”364 of
perfection eventually reaches that summit of the being-than-which-none-greater-can-bethought. But along the way it also perfects the mind of the one who seeks to live in
accordance with those newly discovered perfections. For how can one ascend to the face
of God if, after one has discovered a greater love, one does not seek to live in accord with
it? If mutual love for another is greater than private love for one’s self, how can one
continue to ascend that hill of perfection if one only has love for oneself and not for
another? Or, alternatively, if it is a greater and better thing to have a “freer
contemplation” of the Trinity unhindered by the need to return to books and empowered
by arduous memory-work, how can one continue in this ascent through meditation and
prayer if the mind is constantly drawn down to the words on a page?365
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Whether we are speaking with respect to ability, knowledge, or will, the road to the
summit of the Most High God—He who is all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good in a
‘super’-unity of substance—rises through these perfections. And as the apprentice
ascends in mind, he discovers higher and higher elevations of perfection he must live in
accordance with if he is ever to reach that summit of the being-than-which-nothing-isgreater and nothing better. As Richard says, “Therefore, the more human thinking attains
to what is best and perfect, the closer it ascends to that which is God, even though it does
not reach up to him.”366 In this way, “with unveiled face, beholding as in a mirror the
glory of the Lord” he is “being transformed into the same image from glory to glory” (2
Corinthians 3:18, emphasis mine).
Once one reaches the summit of true Divinity, however, the contemplation does not
end. As we have observed, Richard looks to the quality and E-quality of perfection with
the second element of his triads. He considers the integrity and purity of some property of
perfection. In book III Richard attends to the proper order and intensity of love along
with its pleasing quality. This connects with the formative aims of Richard’s work as
follows. Purer joy results from the proper conformity of one’s knowledge and love to the
object of contemplation. One experiences truer joy in proportion to one’s congruence of
attention and the integrity of one’s longing. In the case of contemplating true Divinity,
both knowledge and love are fixed on what is the greatest and best of all. Therefore the
that those who have not yet received the wings of contemplation may have the means by which they can
ascend.” Also Hugh: “ . . . let the student prepare himself once and for all by fixing these matters in the
forefront of his mind, in certain little formulae, so to say, so that thereafter he will be able to run the course
before him with free step and will not have to search out new elementary facts as he comes to individual
books.” Didascalicon V.1; Taylor, 120.
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apprentice must regard God as the greatest in the order of his knowledge and love.367
Loving what is less worthy with greater affection than what is more worthy is disordered
and degenerate.368 This is why the divine persons love themselves above all: The
supreme-ist of all beings requires being loved supremely. Because the divine persons are
the most supreme of all, they must love each other supremely and most of all. Because
God is the greatest being to know and love, the one who seeks His face must not only
place him in the highest place, he must also regard nothing else as more worthy of his
attention. As Richard writes in Twelve Patriarchs:
Whatever sort of soul you now may be, take action, hasten now to
bring Him into the innermost and most secret sanctuary of your
heart. For who would deny that the innermost sanctuary of the
human heart has or even can acquire recesses of such a sort that the
force of supreme and singular love cannot be torn away by any
alien delight whatsoever, when it has been fixed by affection to
something? Certainly if you seek or love your God supremely,
nevertheless you do not love Him singularly. Therefore, He is not
yet led into the innermost place; He is not yet situated in the best
place.369
Likewise, not only must one regard God as the most worthy of attention, the proportion,
the ardor, the intensity, and the longing of one’s soul must also be in accordance with
such majesty. Because God is the most majestic of things to behold, He requires the most
intense longing and ardor of the soul. The soul should want nothing more. One should
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love Him alone “with all one’s heart, with all one’s soul, with all one’s mind, and with
all one’s strength” (Deuteronomy 6:5; emphasis mine).
A good place to better understand this conformity of knowledge and will Richard
wants to forge in his reader is to look at the proximity and conformity of the Son to the
Father in book VI. In VI.21-22, Richard considers how it is that the Divine Son is called
“the figure of His substance” (Hebrews 1:3). The term ‘figura’ can be understood as
either ‘a forming figure’ or ‘a representing figure’. The former he describes as “the figure
of a human, which forms his substance”; the latter he describes as “the figure of an
image, which represents him.”370 If the divine Son’s figure forms the divine substance of
a thing, then the paternal substance would receive its form from the Son, whereas
tradition teaches that the Son’s form is received from the paternal substance. But if the
Son’s figure represents the paternal substance, this entails there being two divine
substances, which is also contrary to the faith. How does Richard solve the dilemma? He
points to the beautiful conformity of will that can exist among friends. He writes:
Now your soul is a spiritual nature. Indeed your soul is either
beautiful or deformed by its will. A good will makes your soul
beautiful; but it becomes deformed by a bad will. Its benignity
makes it beautiful; its malignity makes it deformed. From these
assertions we may consider what the figure of a spiritual substance
is. If the Lord grants it, the same form of perfection (perfectionis
forma) can undoubtedly form (informare) your soul and my soul.371
Thus, on the basis of sharing this one perfect will, Richard finds what he needs to
explain how the Son is the “figure of God’s substance.” But as he makes special mention
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earlier in VI.17, “ . . . when we speak of a conformed person, seek carefully, diligent
reader, whether perhaps this term is able or ought to refer to a conformity in which only
the Son bears the image of the Father on account of a conformity of properties.”372 There
is something unique to the Son’s being called ‘image’ and ‘figure’ of the Father, for he is
the archetype of that total wisdom and love. Nothing more immediately represents the
paternal glory than the one eternally-begotten in super-conformity to that image. He is the
fullness of wisdom. There is no earlier or later, no accretion or decretion of knowledge,
no greater or less than. He is the unique progeny of the Father, neither made nor created,
but begotten and consubstantial with the Father. And this Word—full of grace and
truth—has become flesh, offering a visible model of obedience to the Father by which
humanity can be instructed and drawn into that “same form of perfection” (eadem
perfectionis forma). As Anselm writes:
And this, then is quite clear enough: what is in the Word through
which all things were made is not the likeness to all things, but true
and simple essence. What is in the things made, on the other hand,
is not simple and absolute essence, but a pale imitation of it.
Necessarily, as a result, the Word is not more or less true,
depending on its likeness to created things. Rather it would seem
that every created nature stands at a higher stage of essence and
worth the more it approximates to the Word.373
This super-proximity of Son to Father, and likewise, of Spirit to both, means that
despite the fact that the Father is Wisdom and the Son is Wisdom and the Spirit is
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Wisdom; there is, nevertheless, only one Wisdom. As a result of this unity of mind in the
fullness of this wisdom—as a result of their clear knowledge of all worthy things in one
eternal glimpse—they have an “intimate affection of the mind” (intimus animi affectus)
and “impulse of a burning love” (aestuantis amoris impulsus).374 It is why they have
“one spirit (unam spiritum) and proceed in one spirit: there is one intention (unum
consilium) and same purpose (idem propositum), and they love the same (idem amant),
desire the same (idem affectant), long for the same with equal desire.”375
Consequently this supreme wisdom is beautiful in its fullness and the most pleasing
in its quality. As Richard says in book V, “the more fraternal the plurality of persons, the
more intimate; the more intimate, the more pleasant.”376 What can be more pleasant and
intimate than being of one and the same mind? What greater affinity can there be among
divine persons when their consubstantiality of substance and proximity of mind are as
close as the conformity of the Son to the Father, and as pure as the holiness of their
super-spiritual Breath, the Holy Spirit? Who are united in their knowledge and love of
one another by Him who illuminates and sanctifies, who refines the impurities of
ignorance and impiety in order to lead all men to the Truth?377
Two implications, therefore, exist for the formation of the apprentice in accordance
with the Wisdom of God. First, mankind has been invited—through the processions of
Son and Spirit—to return to God. Why? In order that he might taste and grow in that
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intimate affinity and fraternity of persons. Thus as one comes to what is most worthy of
his attention and purifies the intentions and desires of his soul—as he seeks the most
qualified object for his contemplation, in its most integrated purity—he must re-prove the
quality of his own knowledge and love. He must fix his eyes upon the author and
perfecter of his faith (Hebrews 12:2).378 He must move from the foundation of faith to the
fullness of knowledge. And in doing so, he “proximates” himself toward that principal
relation—where the unity of mind comes closer than the resemblance of a son begotten in
the image of his father—where, besides reaching the summit of the Most High God, one
also becomes the “friend of God” (Exodus 33:11).
The second implication for the formation of the apprentice is in his relation to his
brothers. For just as the fullness of wisdom accounts for the fraternity of divine persons,
so as brothers come to refine the integrity of their own knowledge and order it toward the
most worthy of things they come closer to one another in both mind and will. As
Augustine says:
Why then do we love another whom we believe to be righteous, and
do not love that form itself wherein we see what is a righteous
mind, that we also may be able to be righteous? Is it that unless we
loved that also, we should not love him at all, whom through it we
love: but whilst we are not righteous, we love that form too little to
allow of our being able to be righteous? The man therefore who is
believed to be righteous, is loved through that form and truth which
he who loves discerns and understands within himself . . . .379
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Like other monastic orders in the 12th century, the harmony the Victorines sought
was a purer form of the apostolica vita, and their means to it was living in communion
with God and each other. They desired, by living according to the Rule of St. Augustine,
by adopting the same habits, the same dress, the same look, by sharing the same
dwellings, the same food, the same work, that they would likewise—and most of all—be
conformed of mind. They wanted complete unity in their desire and will: to delight in
their shared knowledge of divine things. In the end, they desired that their external
disciplines would reflect their common faith, and that the integrity of their habit would be
matched by an inner integrity of soul. They desired that the “organ of their heart” and the
“drum of their flesh” might be “united to each other with suitable consonance” (sibi
confederet pari consonantia). Thus the inner harmony of one apprentice’s soul can be
united to another’s to bring about an even greater harmony. As Richard writes in his
Mystical Ark:
. . . the Spirit of the Lord daily combines them little by little in His
elect and skillfully forms them into one harmony and by the
plucking instrument of His graces fits them together in a certain
harmonious consonance like a learned harp player who stretches
these and loosens those, until a certain melody, mellifluous and
sweet beyond measure, resounds from them . . .380
Thus as the ascent toward the summit guides the soul in accordance with newly
discovered perfections, so the purity of divinity, in its knowledge and love, refines the
soul with purer and purer forms of congruity by which the contemplative can come to
enjoy an ever-increasing “confraternity” with God and others.
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The third dimension by which Richard shapes the mind of his reader is by leading
him into the fullness of divinity. This is probably Richard’s crowning achievement and
contribution to the theology of the Trinity. Applying ‘plenitude’ to Power, Richard
proves the true omnipotence and wisdom of God in book I. God has these from fullness
and not by participation in a source greater than himself. He is thus “truly” omnipotent as
well as supremely wise. Applying ‘plenitude’ to Goodness, Richard concludes that a
trinity of persons cannot be lacking in true Divinity in book III. And finally, in applying
‘plenitude’ to Wisdom in VI.25 he shows that “full learning” can be shared by three in
such a way that they have one and the same knowledge. Thus God is the highest, the best,
and the most perfect and complete of all things.
This plenitude accounts for Richard’s “filling out” these dimensions of Divinity; but
it also, concurrently “fills in” the soul of his apprentice with a wellspring of pleasures and
delights. In this way Richard makes the soul of his apprentice supreme, congruous, and
“full” in accordance with these corresponding dimensions of the Trinity. Ultimately
Richard wants to “draw out” a further fullness from the soul of his reader so that he
becomes increasingly open to the benevolence of God. For it is in this encounter with the
“supremely blessed one” that one becomes awestruck by the majesty of His riches,
graced by the outpouring and benevolence of His generosity, and drawn out of oneself to
seek the fullness of consummate love and joy with others.
Richard also uses the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad in a specific way in book VI,
showing that he not only used it to structure his treatise, but that he also intended for it to
be understood in accordance with formative aims. He repeats an argument he remembers
writing elsewhere, “ . . . why, through a special kind of attribution, power is attributed to
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the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit.”381 He says
that through our daily experience we all know what power, wisdom, love or goodness
is.382 Our experience further reveals how they exceed our human capacity. Whatever
power, wisdom, love or goodness each of us may have, we are constantly growing in
them; we thus come to know that there is a limit to ourselves: an “above and beyond”
ourselves we participate in. As such, this limitation serves as a “mirror” for
understanding the ultimate Trinity that can be discerned in these three attributes. As we
untarnish that mirror, we can better see the Divine and conform our lives in accordance
with Divine Power, Wisdom, and Goodness. Richard first considers each element of the
triad as potentially lacking to illustrate the defect it brings to both Divinity as well as the
individual’s moral life. Powers can exist where wisdom does not, as with animate objects
that can hear, see, walk, eat, etc.—they can do all of these things without wisdom. But
wisdom cannot be without power. This is because wisdom itself is a power (potentia).
Wisdom receives this power from Power, and thus wisdom does not give Power the
power to exist but Power does give wisdom the power to exist. Here Richard describes
the relationship between power and wisdom in order to allude to its further, trinitarian
significance; for similarly, the Father gives the Son the power to be but not vice versa.
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There is only one divine person from himself; the Son, though eternal, is from another.
Similarly, it is possible for power and wisdom to be present, but without goodness. As
Richard notes, consider Lucifer who had great power and wisdom but a bad will. He
serves as a witness to the possibility of having preeminent power and wisdom but “no
remaining vestige of goodness.” But goodness requires “willing the good.” It therefore
contains two components: (a) willing the good and (b) willing the good. The latter
requires wisdom; the former requires power. For one must be able to discern what is good
in order to will the good; otherwise one does not know the good he ought to choose. But
even if one knows the good, one must also be able to will it; and this requires power.
Goodness—that is, willing the good—therefore draws its being from both know-how (i.e.,
Wisdom) and ability (i.e., Power). The Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad, experienced by
every rational creature, therefore, illustrates what ought to be believed about the Trinity,
that there is only one who is from himself and not from another, a second who is from
another but not from himself; and still a third who draws his origin from the first two.
Thus Power is tied to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, and Goodness to the Holy Spirit.
Moreover, one cannot think of these three properties in the fullness of their perfection
without the others. In the same way, therefore, one can see how Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit exist in a harmony of unity and plurality, unique with respect to their causal
dependence, but united in the simplicity of their substance. They are unique and
inseparable, a Trinity in unity and a unity in Trinity.
Richard uses this trinity of properties to draw the minds of his readers toward what
they ought to believe about the properties of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.383 But unless
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the mirror reflects these properties “rightly” they cannot see God properly. Only as the
apprentice rightly orders that trinity of properties in his own soul does he come to know
God as He is. Gradually his habitual experience of growing in Power-Wisdom-Love
creates a way for him to know God more and more. Without the fullness of this trinity of
properties there cannot be a true Trinity with respect to Divinity; without a corresponding
fullness of this trinity of properties in his soul, neither is he a “whole” or “holy” person.
Godefroy confirms these formative implications of Richard’s teaching, as den Bok notes:
At the end of the twelfth century [Godefroy] of St. Victor, for one,
writes that the creating Trinity being supreme power, wisdom and
goodness creates man into a created trinity having some power,
wisdom and goodness by nature, and recreates him into a recreated
trinity having supreme wisdom and goodness and power by grace.
Such a sentence can serve as an excellent summary of Richard’s
thoughts on God’s trinitarian missions and man responding to them
(emphasis mine).384
Thus the apprentice who wants to worship God in his fullness must also seek a
corresponding fullness of his soul—a fullness recreated in him as he responds to the
exitus and reditus of the trinitarian missions.385 He cannot have power alone. Nor can he
have merely power and wisdom, “for even the demons believe and shudder” (James
the Victorine literature besides Richard’s. For example, “Andrew [of St. Victor] claims that the Trinity is
suggested (insinuare curant) in all God’s works: ‘power in creating things from nothing, wisdom in
deposing them and guiding them, goodness in sustaining and cherishing.’” Signer, 91. See also Achard’s
“Sermon 13,” in Hugh Feiss, Achard of Saint Victor: Works, 207-253. In Hugh, see Poirel, 315-344.
384
385

Den Bok, 467.

As Gilles Emery writes, “ . . . we are saved by the persons who have created us, and we are
conducted to the Father (reditus) by the persons who are also the reason of creation (exitus). The trinitarian
order of salvation thus presupposes the trinitarian order of creation that provides its foundation.” Gilles
Emery, “Trinity and Creation,” a chapter in Trinity in Aquinas, eds. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph
Wawrykow (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 71. This relationship between
the ‘work of creation’ (opus conditionis) and the ‘work of restoration’ (opus restaurationis) was important
to the Victorines (see Feiss, 49; Coulter, 40ff.); and, as evidenced by Godefroy, it was intricately united
with their understanding of the Trinity and the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad. For more on this, see esp.
den Bok, 358-365.

188
2:19). No. To be complete, he has to have a good will, a loving will. He must have a will
that both discerns the good and does the good, that discerns love and wills love. For love
draws its being from the fullness of power and wisdom and binds them together into one.
As den Bok writes, “when man’s motives are «in order» his entire willing is well-formed,
beautiful, just like that of the divine persons.”386
Without the harmony of Power-Wisdom-Goodness there can be no true Trinity; and
without the same in the soul there can be no true individual, no true “son.” The individual
must reform his counter-triad of impotence, ignorance, and malice in accordance with
Divine power, wisdom, and goodness.387 Then he shall “know fully even as he is fully
known” (1 Corinthians 13:12). For only as one comes to reflect properly upon oneself
and God, and rightly orders that mental trinity, does the gaze of the beatific vision
become more clear.
Consummating Trinitarian Love in the Community
We have seen how Richard uses a number of his triads and triadic structures to
shape the trinitarian consciousness of the individual. He seeks a proportional depth of
soul as it ascends to the summit of the Most High God. He seeks a congruity in the
individual’s knowledge and love as it conforms “from glory to glory” to the fullness of
Wisdom shared by Father, Son, and Spirit—a conformity revealed most intimately in the
conformity of the Son to the Father. He likewise seeks a corresponding fullness of joy
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For more on the counter-triad of Impotence-Ignorance-Malice and its relationship to PowerWisdom-Goodness, see Richard’s De statu interioris hominis.
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and wonder in the individual’s contemplations of divine plenitude. These are the
pleasures of Wisdom drawn from one’s own heart. But Richard desires “more” from his
readers than a private Wisdom for themselves alone. Now that they have been filled to the
brim with the plenitude of these “inner” delights, he seeks to make their cups overflow
with love for others. We turn now to the significance of Richard’s trinitarian forms and
structures for the Victorine community.
We now shift from wisdom to love, since, as Richard says, its pleasures can only be
drawn from the heart of another. Love is central to Richard’s De Trinitate. In the
Prologue, Richard opens with the love chapter of 1 Corinthians 13 along with the familiar
triad found there: faith, hope, and love. Following Augustine and Anselm, Richard sees
love as the ultimate goal, faith as its foundation, and hope as the movement from faith to
love.388 But love is the ultimate prize, and without it one cannot truly know God; for
“God is Love” (1 John 4:8). Richard writes:
Now if I do not have love, then whatever I will have profits me
nothing. You hear from the mouth of Truth what the profit of
charity is: If someone loves me, then he will be loved by my Father,
and I will love him and manifest myself to him. This manifestation
then derives from love, contemplation from manifestation, and
knowledge from contemplation. Moreover, when Christ, our life,
appears, then we will also appear with him in glory, and we will be
like him at that time, since we will see him just as he is. You see
where we begin, the destination that we reach, or the extent to
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This movement from faith to love is the basis of Richard’s fides quaerens intellectum, as is made
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necessariae” in De Trinitate. The faith-to-love motif is a common one in the 12th century and is found in
Augustine. See, e.g., p. 70 of this work where it serves as the structure for his De doctrina christiana.
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in his Speculum fidei. See William of St. Thierry, The Mirror of Faith, trans. Thomas X. Davis, ed. E.
Rozanne Elder, Cistercian Fathers, 15 (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 1979).
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which we ascend by means of hope and love from faith up to divine
knowledge, and through divine knowledge up to eternal life.389
If one wishes to behold the face of God, if one wishes to see the “true God,” then
one must love Jesus Christ. For as he promised, those who love him will be loved by his
Father and he will manifest himself to them (John 14:21). And the hope, the joy, the love
for that appearing is to appear with him in glory and see him as he is. Faith guides, hope
draws, but love compels.390 Thus as Richard uses this love to make his case for the
Trinity of persons in book III, he kindles the fire of this love in his readers with the hope
that they might consummate this Trinitarian love within their community.
In the same way that Richard elevates the mind of his readers through various
grades of perfection with respect to God’s Wisdom, he does the same for God’s Love.
But where wisdom fills the soul to its capacity, love drives the soul out of itself,
overwhelms it with such delight and longing that it can only find its fulfillment in
overflowing toward others.391 In the same way that wisdom must become supreme,
integral, and perfect, so love must do the same. And if we are to take seriously Richard’s
claim that supreme and perfect love requires a plurality of persons for Divinity, how
much more must the human possibility for such Trinitarian love require a plurality of
persons? If the “fulfillment” of Divinity requires a plurality of persons where such
fulfillment obtains, everlastingly, ab eterno, without beginning or end; how much more
must this be the case for those who have been crafted in that image, who receive their
389
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Indeed, Richard’s argument for the Trinity of persons from supreme benevolence in III.14-20 is
an argument based on the “overflow” of charity. Cf. the “pouring in and out” (infusio / effluo) of V.23.
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beginning ex tempore, and who must find their plenitude in a “full and perfect
contemplation of the Trinity”? As Richard aptly says therefore, “it is necessary that love
be directed toward another, so that it can be charity. Therefore, charity absolutely cannot
exist where a plurality of persons is lacking.”392
Richard guides his readers from the base to the summit of supreme love. The first
movement in the ascent is a recognition that there is a greater love than private love for
oneself without which one cannot have or enjoy fellowship with another. As Richard
writes, “As long as someone loves no one else as much as himself, that private love,
which he has toward himself, demonstrates that he has not yet apprehended the highest
degree of love (summum caritatis gradum).”393 Private love is inferior to love for
another. And if one is to ascend to that greater love, one must seek to love another.394
Supreme and complete love has some essential aspects. In III.2-20, Richard explains
those aspects in the most exquisite detail with the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad. In
order for love to be good it must be for another and not merely for oneself. Second, the
love must be mutual in order for it to be pleasing. The second element refers to both the
quality and E-quality of this love. With respect to equality, Richard points out that such
love must be among equals. As he says, it is not just love of another, but love of “another
392
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of equal dignity (condignum).” But for Divinity, this is not just an equality among equals
of any degree, but supreme equality. In the case of Divinity, they must be supremely
equal and equally Divine. Such supreme equality, therefore, cannot obtain for nonDivine, rational creatures.395 But what can obtain is a mutual effort, in accordance with
divine grace, to reciprocate Divine love “that has been graciously poured into our hearts
through the Holy Spirit” (Romans 5:5). As Richard says:
Without this [spiritus], none of the spirits are holy, neither human
nor angelic spirits. For, the human spirit undoubtedly begins to be
holy at that time when it loves what pertains to piety and hates and
detests what pertains to impiety. This indeed is the affection of
piety; this breath, when it blows from the hearts of many, causes
many to be one heart and one mind.396
Thus as one ‘breathes’ with the order and ardor of the Holy Spirit’s own Love—by
conforming one’s love to Love—one ascends with Him to that summit of supreme
dignity by which two, who are supremely equal, can love each other supremely. The
mutuality of love among the Victorines will be proportional to the degree that each and
every one of them perfects their power, wisdom, and goodness/love. To the extent that
some have a greater dignity and integrity of soul than others, those who are more mature
in their faith, more ardent in their love, will grieve for those who lack that same form of
perfection.397 In Twelve Patriarchs, Richard reveals the tenderness of this brotherly love:
395

“In Gregory, inferiors show reverence [reverentia] to superiors but superiors show love [dilectio]
to inferiors.” Straw, 87; Ep. 5.59 (CCL 140, 357-58). Adopting a similar distinction for Richard, we can see
that as brothers reach a consummate equality of soul they approach a form of condilectio that approximates
the perfection of Divine love.
396
397

Richard, De Trinitate VI.10.

For Richard’s teaching on stronger members of the body supporting weaker ones, see De
questionibus, in M. L. Colker, “Richard of St. Victor and the Anonymous of Bridlington,” Traditio 18
(1962): 223.

193
Certainly, while [the mind] considers more diligently the successes
of some and the failures of others, the infirmity of the latter and the
perfection of the former, the pious mind is surely touched by
various affections in turn—now this one, now that. Thus it begins
to fear for some, to grieve for others, and to hope for good things
for the one and better things for the other. It sees in others those
things it ought to love and for which it should rejoice. It sees in
certain persons those things it ought justly to abhor, and for which
it ought justly to grieve. And so in this way when good affections
sport with simple thoughts that run forth here and there out of the
examined and self-pleased discipline of neighbors—what is this,
other than that the brothers of Dina, the sons of Leah, feed their
cattle? Do you see how at one and the same time true love of
neighbor produces one thing and vain love of self produces the
other? True love of neighbor is responsible for the pastures of the
brothers for feeding their cattle.398
Only as the Victorines maximize their love in accordance with the true Spirit of the
apostolica vita will they begin living righteously in word and deed and experience that
mutual and pleasing love that can only be known by the friends of God. The Rule of St.
Augustine also serves this purpose. Like a Good Shepherd, it herds them into one fold,
teaches them the one voice of their ‘magister’ so that they might live as equals and enjoy
the pleasant delights that come from being of “one heart and mind.”
Such equality speaks to the order of one’s love and to the quality of the object or
person to whom it is directed. To have mutual love is both to be a good person yourself
and to love a brother who equally exemplifies such goodness. The greater the perfection
and dignity of something, the greater the priority it should have in your affection for it.399
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When one loves something more of lesser value, one’s love is perverse and disordered.400
This is why God—who is the most supreme and perfect—should be loved most of all. It
is also why all of the divine persons love themselves as much as they love each other.401
But there is also the ardor of one’s love—that is, not only what one loves more, but how
much more one loves it: the level of one’s intensity and longing for it. For Richard, one’s
love must not only be properly ordered but also properly “ardored.” One’s longing and
intensity for something must be in proportion to its dignity and worth. One must therefore
love the supreme God with the most supreme longing. Similarly, one must love one’s
brother or another with a proportional desire and longing. The ardor of one’s love must
be moderated in accordance with discretion.
Thus as brothers grow in their love for one another, as they come to see in each
other a proximity of wisdom and love for God, the intensity of their love for each other
increases. For they witness the same love and delight they have for God and others
coming from another. As Richard says, “For when two mutually loving persons embrace
one another with supreme longing, and are supremely delighted in each other’s love, then
supreme joy of the one is in the intimate love of the second, and, conversely, the
excellent joy of the second is in the love of the first.”402
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Finally, as this love ascends in goodness and pleasantness, it must also become full
and complete.403 For Richard this means it must have everything of perfection and lack
nothing that would make it more complete.404 Mutual love is greater and better, as well
as more pleasing, than private love for oneself405; but the fullest and most complete
love—consummate love—is the best and most pleasing.406 It is more perfect and
complete than mutual love. In a way that matches the “drawing out” of oneself by making
that love overflow toward another in mutual love, Richard further draws out the
abundance of love of a bestower and requiter to overflow for a third mutually loved.407 As
long as two remain fixed in their mutual love for each other they lack a third to share in
their love. But because each knows how great and how pleasing it is to experience the
mutual and intimate love of another; and because they are committed to what is more
perfect, they want a third to share in this love. If they did not, they would exemplify the
imperfection of selfishness and miserliness by which they hoard the riches of their love,
along with its delights and pleasures.408 In the same way that private love shows itself
selfish in the presence of mutual love, so mutual love shows itself selfish in its encounter
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with consummate love—where mutual love is shared with a third equally loved.409
The ultimate exemplification of such consummate love is the Trinity of Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit since each divine person is supremely perfect, supremely loved, and has
and enjoys (being) a third equally loved.410 Out of the abundance of this love humankind
was created—by choice and not by nature, of course411—to come to discover this love
and enjoy it. The divine ‘generation’ of this love extends to the human procession of Eve
from Adam,412 and subsequently to the whole human race. For a human person alone to
know and experience such love does not require another human person, since this love
already obtains from eternity as a Trinity of divine persons who can share such love with
a single human individual alone. But it is “fitting” that God would inscribe creation with
a human form from which he could guide, draw, and compel his little ones to approach
the throne of his majesty and invite them to enjoy its choicest of riches. Richard writes:
For, who else, except one considered completely insane, can doubt
that there is truly the same affection of piety and one and the same
love in the Father and Son? Thus, this love, which is common to
both persons, is called the Holy Spirit; this is the one who is
inspired into the hearts of the saints by the Father and Son; this is
the one through whom the saints are sanctified, so that they may
merit being saints. Just as the human spirit is the life of the body, so
that divine Spirit is the life of spirits.413
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Thus God gives consummate, divine love a human possibility. This is the place in
one’s religious ascent where one becomes “transfixed” with the cosmological,
soteriological, and eschatological significance of the two greatest commandments: Love
of God and Neighbor. As Gregory marks this with the sign of the cross: “One is lifted
high in love of God, and joined together in love of neighbor.”414 Trinitarianly conceived,
love comes to be seen as a consummate, Trinitarian abundance that freely overflows with
love for God and others. It “proceeds” out of this abundance and unites another—a
third—into its bond of love.
By forging this form in the minds and hearts of his readers, Richard not only adds to
their theological delight, he turns that delight into a wellspring of longing for that
consummate Trinitarian love supremely exemplified in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. He
makes their soul yearn and burn for it.415 Such yearning becomes the basis for the
“counter-procession” that must return “above and beyond,” where reason itself faints
with the longing of Rachel and gives birth to the ecstatic contemplation of Benjamin.
Here knowledge and love catapult the soul into the fifth and sixth levels of
contemplation. One moves from language to being, and from being to “being with.” Here
one hovers in the midst of the propitiatory between the two cherubim. One’s soul passes
over to wholly invisible things and flies with holy wings, traversing “how wide and long
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and high and deep is the love of Christ.” Here “being rooted and established in love,” one
comes to “ . . . know this love that surpasses knowledge—that you (plural!) may be filled
(plhrwqhvte) to the measure of all the fullness of God” (Ephesians 3:17-19; emphasis
mine).
That those filled with this divine love for a third would carry it out beyond
themselves to their community will scarcely surprise us. For out of this “root of charity”
they become enriched by its abundance and overflow with the sweetness of God’s love
for others. Through teaching and study they draw the minds of others to the invisible
things of God, to those eternal things that last and endure, where moth and rust do not
destroy (Matthew 6:19). Through washing the feet of those beyond their walls they seek
many “thirds” who might become the beneficiaries of this divine benevolence and be
won over to the common life. As Fassler notes:
The ministers of the altar renewed the power of consecration and
dedication in the altar-washing ritual, a power believed by them to
have first been created by Christ’s redemptive act on the cross. In
the actions that followed, it was transferred to the people, as the
Victorine community went solemnly forth to adore the lowest
members of society and to offer them gifts, not only of washing,
food, and money, but also of instruction, both through the hearing
of Mass and through the example of the canons’ humility. This
particular commemoration of the Last Supper did not attempt a
realistic portrayal; rather, it searched for the spirit of the original
event and challenged the participants to experience charity and
humility in their every day lives. Thus through their particular
interpretation of this standard ceremony, the Victorines emphasized
their ideals of instruction through deeds and words, attempting to
teach through symbolic, ritualized action.416
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All of these practices of the Victorines, all of their words and deeds, ascend and
increase in their purity and generosity as this consummate, Trinitarian love comes to be
incarnated among them. It is by means of the triad of Goodness-Happiness-Glory that
Richard forges it in them. He enlarges their minds in order to fill them with the fullness
of divine Wisdom; he draws out their hearts in order to make them overflow with love for
others. He focuses in order to magnify, that his readers might discover and enjoy that
consummate love supremely exemplified in the Trinity. Richard thus not only argues for
the Trinity “trinitarianly” with trinitarian forms and structures, he also “trinitarianly”
forms his readers with them. Thus by filling out all of the dimensions of true Divinity,
Richard ful-fills his apprentices with “a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity” in
whose image they have been made and in whom they find their true perfection.

CHAPTER SIX
OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE
But they said, ‘We will not walk in it’
We now have a very strong case for the thesis of our work that Richard articulates
the Trinity “trinitarianly” for the formation of souls. In chapter 4 we established the
structural dimension of our thesis, showing in both micro- and macro-scopic detail the
triads and triadic structures Richard uses in constructing his De Trinitate. And in chapter
5 we looked at how Richard used these triadic forms and structures for formative aims;
that is, how he used them to shape the trinitarian consciousness of his readers and
consummate trinitarian love within the Victorine community. In this chapter we consider
the most salient objections to our thesis and then defeat them.
Since our thesis comprises three main elements, it may be undermined in three
corresponding ways. The three components are (a) the “intentionality” (or
“deliberateness”) of Richard’s use of triads and triadic structures, (b) the triads and triadic
structures themselves, and (c) the claim that Richard uses these structures for formative
purposes. The first can be undermined by arguing that however intentional Richard’s use
of these triads and triadic structures may seem, it is either coincidental or less intentional
than we have claimed. The second can be undermined by arguing that what appear to be
triads or triadic structures are not so; or that if so, they do not have the trinitarian
significance we attribute to them. And lastly, the third can be undermined by arguing that
the structures do not have the formative purposes or implications we ascribe to them.
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Given that Richard explicitly states that he writes De Trinitate with formative
purposes in mind, whatever structures or structuring his treatise can be shown to have—
regardless of whether it is as we suggest or otherwise—such structures and structuring
can be shown to fit within Richard’s stated goals. Therefore any threat to the third
element of our thesis will be proportional to the success of objections raised against its
first two elements and upon which our formative claims were based. In other words,
Richard’s treatise has formative aims; these aims are met by whatever structures he
incorporates in arranging his material. But if his structures or his intentionality in using
them are not as we have suggested, then whatever formative implications we derived
from our analysis will be shown to be either disconnected from the way Richard arranges
his material or different than what we have suggested. The force, therefore, of any
successful objection to our thesis must come against its first two elements—either
denying the intentionality involved in Richard’s structures or denying that they have the
trinitarian structuring we have claimed they do.
Objection #1: Triads as Common to 12th Century
We look first at those objections that deny the intentionality involved in Richard’s
structuring. This can be argued a few different ways. We will list them first and provide
our rejoinders later. One objection of this sort suggests that these triadic structures were
common to the 12th century, can be pointed to in numerous other literary works, and that
we find them in Richard’s De Trinitate ought not surprise us.417 Furthermore, Richard
417
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employs triads in his other works.418 He is simply a man rooted in the 12th century where
triads and triadic structures were common. His use of them, at most, demonstrates he
writes within the inherited traditions of the time and within the same historical milieu as
his theological contemporaries. These structures that we find in Richard’s De Trinitate
are an adopted pattern Richard uses to construct his treatise and therefore the level of
intentionality we ascribe to his incorporation of them is suspect.419
In addition, one can point to some of the meditative practices common to the era,
and incorporated at the abbey of St. Victor, to strengthen the case. A further objection
points out that in addition to the commonality of triads to the 12th century that these
triads and triadic structures merely express the form by which the Victorines and others
pursued their contemplations. Many methods were at work in the 12th century, but two
come to mind as the most expressive of triadic appearances and forms. These are the
practice of ‘collatio’420 and the “harmonizing of opposites.”421 Let us describe each of
these in turn and then see how they might further undermine our thesis.
of Seville’s three stages of building (dispositio-constructio-venustas), ibid., 230; Adam of Dryburgh’s De
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Objection #2: The Meditative Practice of collatio
The word ‘collatio’ had a wide semantic range that can refer to either physical or
mental acts that involved gathering things together for the purpose of further study.422 At
St. Victor, it seems to have been used in three domains: with respect to communal
dialogue, scriptural exegesis, and personal meditation. With respect to dialogue, Sicard
suggests it could refer to: (a) a colloquy or conference among several persons, (b) the
spiritual reading listened to silently by the entire Victorine community (hora collationis),
and (c) the particular discussion between a master and his disciples for the purpose of
edification.423 Likewise, collatio could refer to the ‘collating’ of the comments of church
fathers or catenas of biblical texts related to the same passage or idea. So it could refer to
the gathering of people as well as the gathering of texts. But the use that interests us most
is the activity of gathering ideas together in the mind for some further purpose.424
One of the greatest benefits of this practice of gathering ideas together was how it
aided the mind in finding one’s way through the maze of a complicated set of ideas.
422
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Since collatio functioned to bring a diverse set of ideas into one place, that one place
could serve as a summary of previous contemplations, thus aiding the mind in memory
and recollection. But in doing so, that same place could also serve as a new foundation
(fundamentum) for subsequent considerations. As we have seen previously, like anchorpoints for the rock-climber, these places of condensed-thought became the footholds that
aid both the lead-climber and his apprentices in their meditative ascents. Concerning this,
Carruthers writes:
The power of this elementary technique is that it provides
immediate access to whatever piece of stored material one may
want, and it also provides the means to construct any number of
cross-referencing, associational links among the elements in such
schemes. In short, it provides a random-access memory, and also
sets of patterns or foundations upon which to construct any number
of additional collations and concordances of material. This latter
goal, the making of mental “locations” for “gathering up”
(collocare) and “drawing in” (tractare), is where memoria and
invention come together in a single cognitive process.425
Since this was a meditative practice at St. Victor that one would pursue either in solitude
or in the company of others, it is no surprise to find the same practice in their literary
compositions: their literature merely reflects this meditative practice in a written form.
The Victorines used collatio for two further purposes in their meditations and
contemplations. One is called ‘comparatio’, the other ‘translatio’.426 The first compares
ideas or concepts for the purpose of drawing out further insights and considerations. The
second consists of gathering these contrasts and “translating” them to another domain.
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Carruthers, Craft of Thought, 16.

For further examples of comparatio-translatio, see Coulter, 153; Den Bok, 131-132; Zinn, RSV’s
Three Main Works, 15.
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Richard alludes to both practices in De Trinitate VI.2, showing that they were often used
together:427
And so, we ought to examine carefully the natural order of
proceeding in humanity and, with all acuteness, search for what the
divine reality has in likeness to it (in se simile habeat). After
finding and understanding it according to the practice of theological
discipline (juxta theologicae disciplinae morem), we ought to
transfer (transumere) the terms of the proprieties from the human to
the divine according to the principle of similitude (pro similitudinis
ratione).428
The comparatio that follows consists of collating all of the modes of human
procession (e.g., immediate, mediate, or mediate and immediate at the same time). The
translatio consists of transferring what is important from this collection of truths
concerning human production to what is true for Divine procession. The key relation is
the principal relation of parent-child, for it is the immediate mode of human procession.
Like humanity, the relation of divine Father to divine Son is both immediate and a
principal relation. But unlike humanity, the production of the Son is according to the
operation of nature. The collatio of human modes of production makes it possible to
compare them and derive the necessary distinctions needed to see what is similar and
dissimilar about the divine procession that obtains between Father and Son.
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“In the actual practice of making a spiritual interpretation the interpreter would most likely
employ both where one’s translatio becomes grounded in one’s comparatio such that they may be seen as
one fluid mental act.” Coulter, 153. Richard also alludes to comparatio in De Trinitate II.7: “Among those
truths that we concluded with reasoning, we draw out some truths by analyzing the property of one
attribute, which we are discussing; and we demonstrate other truths by considering the property of another
attribute and the mutual relationship between them.”
428

Richard, De Trinitate VI.2. The theologicae disciplinae should be understood as the transumere
from humanity to Divinity, as Richard makes clear subsequently: “And so, since, according to the example
of divine Scripture (juxta divinarum Scripturarum morem), we are accustomed to transfer (transumere) the
terms of human relationship to the divine reality on the basis of the principle of similitude, . . . .”
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So collatio was a way of gathering together a couple of concepts or ideas in order to
better remember them and draw out further insights from their joint consideration.429
This might undermine our thesis when applied to either of its first two elements. With
respect to intentionality, it can be argued that this was a common meditative technique or
a common method of composing written work. Consequently, whatever triads or triadic
structuring Richard incorporated into his treatise is the result of this technique and
therefore not something he intentionally added to his work. Whatever triadic structures
appear in De Trinitate are simply places where Richard engages in collatio and such
structuring is a by-product of this method and not an intentional part of Richard’s thought
when he incorporates them into his work.
In addition, this objection can undermine the second element of our thesis by
arguing in one of two ways. First, it can be argued that such triads are not triads at all but
merely places where Richard draws together two concepts. Thus despite the appearance
of triadic structuring, they are actually dyads Richard pulls together in his collatio for
further insights and reflection. The collatio itself is what accounts for the appearance of a
third. Second, even if Richard’s collatios retain a triadic structure, it could be argued that
this technique gives them whatever triadic structure they possess. They are simply
summaries of Richard’s thoughts; they have no further trinitarian form or significance.
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Another use of collatio is Richard’s De Trinitate III.14, but since he deals with the Trinity, the
further insights come with greater difficulty: “And indeed nothing seems more credible and nothing seems
more correct than when each of these considerations and assertions is considered separately and
independently. But if we ever discuss the unity together with the plurality and consider how they can stand
together harmoniously, then whatever the various arguments has made convincing runs straight into
ambiguity, unless the steadfastness of faith stands in the way.”
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Objection #3: Richard’s Penchant for “Harmonizing Opposites”
A still further challenge to our thesis comes from the suggestion that the apparent
triads and triadic structuring of Richard’s treatise embody a pervasive method of
“harmonizing opposites.” Richard incorporates this throughout his writings and it
accompanies his use of “fitting necessity” in De Trinitate. This is what accounts for how
Richard ends his treatise with Wisdom despite the fact that the Power-Wisdom-Goodness
triad ends with goodness. Richard typically treats two things and then harmonizes them
with a third. Thus where omnipotence speaks to the unity of substance and goodness to
the trinity of persons, wisdom speaks to their harmonization. It can thus be argued that
the harmonizing element is the third term of Richard’s triads and triadic structures, and
that these structures merely reflect this harmonizing technique. Either these places are byproducts of this meditative practice and therefore not intentional; or their triadic form is
reflective of this harmonizing pattern and therefore has no trinitarian significance.
Response to Objection #1: Triads Common to 12th Century
We take each of these objections in turn. First, with respect to the commonality of
triads and triadic structures in the 12th century, Richard’s use of triads is not surprising.
Many of his contemporaries and predecessors incorporated triads and triadic structures
into their works. Thus Richard’s employment of them in De Trinitate provides one
example of how he wrote within the accepted norms of his time. But Richard’s search for
triads in De Trinitate shows him going well beyond these common norms. We have seen,
for example, that Richard opens his treatise with a litany of triads. This gives us prima
facie justification for believing he will be using more of them in his work and that he will
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be doing so in more intentional ways. We have also noted Richard’s pattern of molding
his meditations in accordance with the scriptural symbols each of his works have as their
special focus. Thus while it is common to use triads in the 12th century, and Richard does
use many of them in his Mystical Ark, the major contours of his thought break into six
stages of contemplation based on the six elements of the Ark: wood, gold, crown,
propitiatory, right cherub, left cherub. And the forms Richard’s taxonomies take in
Mystical Ark establish themselves in accordance with the elements as the contemplation
progresses (e.g., four sides, four rings, two poles, etc). Likewise, we find numerous
dualities in his Twelve Patriarchs since that work follows the sons of Rachel and Leah
and the two favorite sons of Rachel: Joseph and Benjamin. Since Richard conforms his
reader’s attention in accordance with the main objects of contemplation across his works,
his intentional use of triads and triadic structures in De Trinitate is all the more evident.
Consequently, the central object for contemplation in De Trinitate requires infusing the
minds of his apprentices with the beauty of three divine persons united in one substance.
Indeed, when we compare Richard’s De Trinitate with his other works, despite the fact
that he has no problem using non-triadic taxonomies, De Trinitate’s higher proliferation
of triads combined with an inversely proportional scarcity of non-triadic categories
makes Richard’s intentional use of them in this treatise even more conspicuous.430
In addition, we have also seen that when Richard uses triads and triadic structures
he often does a lot more than simply incorporate them. In book III, for example, we
430

Indeed, in the case of Richard’s Mystical Ark, which he constructs as a meditation around the
four sides of the Ark of the Covenant, he adds “happiness” to the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad to bring it
into alignment with his generally quadratic formulations in that work: “If every good is there, He is the
supreme good and everything is there; therefore He is the supreme power, the supreme wisdom, the
supreme goodness, the supreme happiness” (italics mine). Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 291.
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demonstrated that not only does Richard divide the content of book III into three sections
based on the triad of Goodness-Happiness-Glory, but that Richard uses that very same
triad within each of those sections and chronologically emphasizes each element of that
triad. This level of intricacy by which Richard employs the Goodness-Happiness-Glory
triad exceeds what we find in other treatises on the Trinity and cannot be attributed
simply to the commonality of triads and triadic structures being used in the 12th century.
Further, Richard claims in book III that he has neither read nor heard the plurality of
divine persons proved by means of necessary reasons. He indicates where he perceives
the existing theological tradition on the Trinity and then explicitly refers to book III as his
“bold undertaking” for the plurality of persons. Richard therefore viewed his use of the
Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad as something unique and new to the 12th century.
Moreover, Richard’s development of principles found in Augustine and Anselm provided
evidence of this new undertaking.
Response to Objection #2: Meditative Practice of collatio
What about the use of meditative practices at St. Victor like collatio and the
“harmonizing of opposites”? Is Richard’s incorporation of triads and triadic structures in
De Trinitate simply a by-product of such practices and techniques? With respect to
collatio and summaries in De Trinitate, these are clearly triads he gathers together and
not merely two concepts. In book III we saw Richard “drawing out” a third argument on
the basis of the fullness of glory to complement his previous two arguments for the
plurality of persons in Divinity. Despite the fact that the scriptural precedent only calls
for two witnesses to establish the veracity of a judicial claim we find Richard fighting for
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a third witness in order to “applaud” the testimonies of the other two. Richard elsewhere
speaks of “mutual attestations” of the truth on the basis of two claims, but in each of
these places a quest for a “third” follows immediately upon the mutual attestation.431
Richard constantly works to bind the truth in that “triple chord” not easily broken.432
Response to Objection #3: Harmonizing of Opposites
The strongest argument against our thesis is the “harmonizing of opposites,” for
Richard employs it throughout his other writings in addition to De Trinitate. As we said
before, this accounts for the fact that Richard, in contrast to Anselm, arranges the PowerWisdom-Goodness triad in the way he does (i.e., where Wisdom becomes the third,
harmonizing term of the triad). Richard treats Wisdom after Power and Goodness as a
way of perfecting the picture; it is how he crowns the work. But Richard does not limit
his use of this harmonizing of opposites to this main triad alone; he employs this method
with triads throughout his work. The strength, therefore, of this objection, lies in its
ability to account for the same triadic structural evidence but with an alternative
explanation than the one we offered. We claim that Richard is intentionally arranging his
work with triads and triadic structures because they give a trinitarian form to his content
and further reinforce allusions of trinitarian significance. This objection can account for
the same arrangement of material and it can admit that there are indeed triadic structures.
But it denies they have a deliberate trinitarian form. The triadic structures are simply part
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Richard, De Trinitate III.3,12. Bk III.4 and III.13 subsequently argue from the “mutual
attestation” in each case for the third from the fullness of glory; also III.19 “mutual concurrence” followed
by III.20 to provide the “bond of a third person.”
432

Richard, De Trinitate III.5, 20. Cf. Ecclesiastes 4:12.
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of a meditative practice Richard is familiar with and incorporates into his composition of
De Trinitate. So this objection explains the same data in an alternative way, and in a way
that has widespread explanatory power for describing not just Richard’s use of triads
within De Trinitate, but across his works as a whole.
How do we avoid the force of this objection? First, not all of Richard’s triads fit this
harmonizing of opposites practice. Book III’s Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad, for
example, does not fit this pattern as we see below. Second, this meditative practice is not
inconsistent with our thesis. It offers an alternative explanation to our thesis only if these
places of harmonizing opposites in De Trinitate show evidence that they are being done
for the sake of this meditative practice and not with a view to how such harmonizations
might “fit” structures and meaning of greater trinitarian significance. In other words, the
use of this meditative practice whereby two things are harmonized with attention to a
third that perfects the picture, as it were, can be used in accordance with the purposes of
the one employing it. And one of Richard’s purposes is to provide a “full and perfect
contemplation of the Trinity.” Thus we have two elements and a question with respect to
which one governs Richard’s method and thought as he composes De Trinitate. One is
this meditative practice of harmonizing two things with a third. The second is the
Trinitarian content of Richard’s contemplations. The question is whether Richard makes
his contemplations on the Trinity fit into this meditative practice where he can harmonize
two elements by a third or whether he makes this meditative practice fit into his
reflections on the Trinity such that they have both a trinitarian form and significance. In
short, is Richard harmonizing his trinitarian content by means of this technique or is he
“trinitizing” this practice in accordance with his pedagogical and formative aims?
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The answer is the latter. It would be one thing if Richard always and everywhere
used this practice of harmonizing opposites with a third for whatever triad he may
employ. But he does not. We see, for example, in book II where Richard uses the three
properties of Uncreated-Everlasting-Immutable to establish the eternity of Divinity. He
writes:
But if we combine those three aforementioned properties into one,
then we demonstrate that God is not only everlasting but also
eternal. . . . From these three attributes, therefore, it is proven that
God is eternal; for, without ambiguity, these three attributes grant
that God has eternity and is eternal (italics mine).433
The same is shown with the three witnesses of book III: Goodness-HappinessGlory. The harmony already exists between the fullness of goodness and happiness to
testify to the trinity of persons that must exist in true Divinity. The fullness of glory does
not, therefore, harmonize the fullness of goodness and happiness but confirms their
witness. Furthermore, in the concluding section Richard emphasizes not the harmonizing
of the first two testimonies by a third, but how three individual points establish one truth.
As he says:
Behold how the fullness of divine goodness, happiness and glory
coincide with one another in one attestation of truth, and how they
clearly show what ought to be understood about the fullness of
divine love in the plurality of persons. Together they condemn the
suspicion of any defect in the supreme love, and they proclaim in
one accord the fullness of total perfection (italics mine).434
Even in a place where Richard does employ the harmonizing of opposites for the
giving and receiving of love within Divinity (e.g., gratuitous love, owed love, and both

433

Richard, De Trinitate II.4.
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Richard, De Trinitate III.13. Zinn, RSV’s Three Main Works, 187.
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gratuitous and owed love), he emphasizes not how the trinitarian content fits this
harmonizing pattern but how this harmonizing pattern provides the three distinct
properties that relate to one and the same love. As he concludes, “Behold the three
distinctions of properties in supreme love, although it is still one and the same love in
every person, namely, a supreme and truly eternal love.”435
Finally, in book VI, where Richard gives his argument for the harmony of unity and
plurality in Divinity from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom/knowledge, the
harmonizing consists in the source from which the knowledge of three persons is gained.
The first person discovers knowledge from himself. The second person learns from the
first. The third knows from both the first and the second. The first has the wisdom
through discovery. The second has the same wisdom through reading what the first had
written down. But Richard does not go on to emphasize the harmony of the third person
receiving the same knowledge from the first two persons. Instead he emphasizes the
sameness of the understanding shared by all three:
And so, if the same truth of understanding is whole and complete in
all three persons, then surely, with respect to the essential truth, the
knowledge of one person is not different from the knowledge of the
other persons? . . . If therefore one and the same knowledge can
exist in the three persons, then why is it not believed all the more
that one and the same wisdom exists in the three persons of the
divine Trinity (italics mine).436
Therefore, the harmonizing of opposites does not govern the triads and triadic
structures Richard incorporates throughout his work. On the contrary, these harmonies
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are always being used in the service of the greater trinitarian significance Richard wants
to “draw out” from them.437
We have considered the three most significant objections to our thesis and provided
sufficient rejoinders to them. Doubtlessly, Richard writes during a time when triads and
triadic structures were widely used, and their prevalence in his work indicates he is a man
of his time. But the absence of non-triadic patterns, along with the proliferation of triads
in De Trinitate, make it more probable that Richard intentionally incorporated them.
Likewise, Richard’s “bold undertaking” in book III demonstrates that he moves beyond
his theological predecessors in deliberately drawing out and searching for a third by
which three arguments come together to support one and the same truth. Richard also
uses the meditative practices of his time such as collatio and the harmonizing of
opposites. But while these techniques are incorporated throughout De Trinitate, they do
not account for all of the triads and triadic structures Richard employs. And where they
are used, Richard always shows how their form has a further trinitarian structure and
significance—a structure and significance that show both the “craft” and “care” of his
theology.
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When Richard explicitly describes his method of harmonizing opposites, it is in sections that
have to do with comparing human and divine substance (i.e., his use of the “principle of similitude”) rather
than with specifically trinitarian-like triads. See, e.g., De Trinitate III.9, IV.25. In V.5 and V.14 Richard
uses the “harmonizing of opposites” to obtain the essential middle elements he needs for his trinitarian
purposes: e.g., mode of being from eternity and not from itself, person who both gives and receives fullness
of Divinity.

CONCLUSION
RICHARD: THEOLOGIAN AND CRAFTSMAN
And so I appointed ‘watchmen’ over you . . .
“Everything is permissible for me, but not everything is constructive”; or so the
apostle Paul wrote the church at Corinth. What does it mean to be “constructive”? More
importantly, what does it mean to a theologian like Richard? Above all, it means to
choose wisely. Like the craftsman who surveys a vast range of materials and designs
from which he must choose what is best and most fitting, so too must the theologian
bridge the divide between ‘what is available to the mind’ and what is the most ‘fitting for
its attention’. His mind ranges over the vast array of visible and invisible things,
discovering—with Augustine—that some of them are better than others. Some are better
to have than not to have. Some to be than not to be. Some to use, others, to enjoy. In the
end, the craftsman must choose something worthy of his devotion: something worthy of
his attention and care. And whatever that ‘something’ is, it surely is good most-of-all:
one-of-a-kind. For only something “magnificent” sustains the mind, draws it away from
worldly delights, and fixes its gaze on something beautiful. And a good craftsman spends
plenty of time with it. For the longer he beholds its invisible form, the more taken he is
by its elusive perfection. There, before his mind, is the object of his desire and love. “If
only I could see it more clearly? If only I could get closer?”
And so the process begins—little by little, day by day. The craftsman and the
theologian ascend in their knowledge and love. Each day brings some new insight, some
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new “fullness” they didn’t see before. They chip away. They write—bit by bit, stroke by
stroke. More and more is revealed. More and more is “drawn out.” Both are in pursuit of
a full and perfect contemplation. With each new strike and stroke, their vision enlarges
and grows. The distance between visible and invisible things nears; and the mind—aided
as it is now by the icon—moves more and more “freely” between them. The craftsman’s
love, the theologian’s joy, their delight, increases with each new flight. The visible puts
on invisibility and the invisible puts on visibility—until there is no more variation of
shadows. Today, something “good and perfect” has come down from the heavenly lights:
a holy “gift.” And there is joy, great joy. Come and see! Come and see! Dilectio becomes
condilectio; and the private preoccupation becomes a “mutual sharing.”
But with that change, the rules of “invention” and “construction” shift: The social as
well as the individual dimension to their craft now comes to light. Neither works for
himself now, but for the good of others. For the craftsman, whatever his handiwork may
be—a chair, a fireplace, a footstool, a sword—the value is weighed, not in pounds, but in
the quality of the construction and the service it renders others. Similarly, the art of the
theologian is not measured, ultimately, by how well he articulates his subject-matter, but
by how well he informs another soul with its knowability. Thus for the theologian, as for
the craftsman, the “work of creation”—the opus conditionis—demands a sacrificial act:
an offering for others. And the more conscientious the craftsman, the more compassionate
the theologian, the heavier that burden is borne. For the service now renders their tools
“instruments of righteousness,” their canvas: the souls of men. Who will be their potter?
their counselor? their ‘watchman’? “Here am I, Lord. Send me!”
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These are the “inventors,” and their “inventories” are filled with their artistic quests
for perfection. No time for pride, only devotion. These are the humble ones, who
unbeknown to themselves, serve all of humanity and not merely their students, their
schools, or their cities. Their work—to the extent that it is known and its genius
discovered—defines the artifact or subject-matter in a way that becomes a standard for
generations to come.
Richard exhibited such invention and genius in the artistry of his works and the
formation of his readers. What’s more, he never stopped perfecting them. For Richard, as
for the craftsman, a work is never “done.” For unlike the connoisseur, who stands before
a “masterpiece” and perceives only exquisite detail and perfection, the theologian and the
craftsman see much, much more. The true object of their devotion lies “above and
beyond” the grasp: where obedience condescends to “death.” Here the craftsman’s chisel
strikes the rock; the theologian’s pen descends to paper.
Admiring a work hanging on the wall of a gallery differs from seeing the same work
lying in the studio. In the gallery one seeks a “finished” form—something to be evaluated
on its own terms—in isolation from the artist and his other works. In the studio, however,
we find the artist and his materials. Here we gain a greater sense for his “craft,” his
“tools,” and his “methods.” Alongside other pieces, we may see the development of a
theme or pattern that culminates in the artist’s latest work. In the gallery, we behold the
work’s divine inspiration; in the studio, we witness its incarnation.
In order to be fully appreciated, therefore, Richard’s De Trinitate requires
placement in the studio as well as the gallery. In this work, we spent most of our time
examining De Trinitate in the gallery. There we saw Richard creatively construct his
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work with triadic structures and forms in order to sustain the hearts and fix the minds of
his readers with a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity.
Stepping back, we saw the breadth of Richard’s work: how he organized the entire
contemplation in accordance with the triad of Power-Wisdom-Goodness. Together all
three showcase the whole truth of the singularity, plurality, and harmony of the one true
God. Stepping closer, we saw the depth of Richard’s work: his dedication to triadic forms
and structures by which he focused on specific elements, then magnified their
contemplation, and drew out their trinitarian significance. With suitable time and
attention paid to each of these dimensions, we came to appreciate the intricacy of the
design and the diligent care with which Richard crafted De Trinitate.
However, when we combined the breadth of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad
with the depth of Richard’s intricate trinitarian structuring, we also discerned a “theme”
and a method by which he constructed the treatise. Richard alerts his readers that he is
“ . . . drawing out profound and hidden reasons into the open from the sanctuary of
wisdom” (emphasis mine).438 Consequently, we discovered that his way of focusing and
enlarging upon certain elements for trinitarian reflection was an editorial method by
which he returned and expanded on his previous work. In the same way that an artist later
decides to add some new detail to the foreground of his painting, or to touch up the
background to heighten some contrast, so Richard returned to perfect his De Trinitate.
And these additions, and their chronology, are not easy to discern. Nor have we
attempted a comprehensive analysis of them—a task for which the present work can only
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point the way. It took a very keen mind to construct De Trinitate; it takes a mind equal to
it to discover and appreciate all of its subtleties. As Richard himself says, “ . . . it does not
belong to any soul (cujusvis animae),” but to the “diligent one (studiosi).”439 And under
the care of a magister like Richard, that soul becomes a “sacred space” where the
theologian and his apprentice seek the Form and Face—the quid and quae—of their Love
forevermore!
Thus having discovered Richard’s De Trinitate “unfinished,” we reluctantly end our
work by taking it down from the gallery and placing it in the studio. But lest we rue its
newfound resting place, perhaps there is something more to behold there, dwelling as it
does among Richard’s lowly crafts and tools. Perhaps if we remain awhile, we may
discover something about God, what it means to be a “Trinity,” and the “artistry”
involved in trying to bring that Word to words. Should we persevere with a diligence
approaching Richard’s own devotion and care, perhaps we will discover the true art of
this theologian’s craft: allowing his words to punctuate and bleed beyond the page—from
the gallery of glory to the little studios of our souls; that place where “ . . . everything is
permissible, but not everything is constructive.” Perhaps there we can discover what it
means to do “constructive theology,” where the Craftsman returns to His work and
resurrects it, daily, in accordance with His image.

X faciebat
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APPENDIX A:
DISCERNING THE TEXTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
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Richard does not explicitly say that he uses the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad to
organize his treatise, so providing evidence for this must move beyond the obvious
emphasis he gives it at the end of his work to discovering other places in the treatise that
demonstrate him doing so.
Fortunately Richard regularly summarizes his work and prepares his readers for
what comes next. One of the most important is the opening of book III. He writes that
previously, referring to books I-II, he proved the unity and property of the divine
substance. In book I Richard argued that Divinity is supremely simple. In book II he
argued that there is only one Divinity. Now, in book III, he turns his attention to
establishing the plurality of persons.440 And he then lays out the order of questions he
will answer as he constructs the rest of his work in three steps. Step one, beginning with
book III, consists of answering the question, “Is there true plurality in true and simple
divinity and if the number of persons comes to three as we believe?” Step two, the
subject of book IV, answers the question, “How is unity of substance consistent with the
plurality of persons?” And step three, the subject of book V, investigates “ . . . whether
. . . there is among the three [divine persons] one person alone who is from himself, and
whether each of the other two persons proceeds from the other, and if there are other
questions to be investigated concerning the same considerations?”
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As Ribaillier aptly notes, this structure also reveals the “above and beyond” distinction that plays
such a prominent role in Richard’s Mystical Ark. Here in De Trinitate, bks. I-II contend with what is above
reason (supra rationem) and bk. III and following with what is beyond reason (preter rationem). Ribaillier,
16. Richard also introduces the distinction explicitly in the Prologue to De Trinitate: “For some of those
truths which we are ordered to believe seem to be not only above reason (supra rationem) but also contrary
to human reason (contra humanam rationem). Richard also frequently alludes to 2 Corinthians 2:16: “Who
is capable of these questions?” (Ed ad hoc quis idoneus?). Cf. II.22, III.8, 10 “supra intelligentiam,” VI.22.
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Richard aims to demonstrate these considerations by reason. He then adds that he
will provide further considerations related to the diverse modes of procession of the Son
and Spirit, the mode proper to each, and what can be learned from the “names” according
to the property of each person. These further considerations are the focus of book VI.441
Like Anselm’s use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad, this is the ‘loose
structure’ for Richard’s entire treatise. This becomes evident when one searches in vain
for an elaboration of the argument for the consistency of the plurality of persons with the
unity of substance from a consideration of the “fullness of wisdom” in book IV. It is not
that Richard does not argue for this harmony in book IV. We can see from the concluding
section of that book, as well as the summary of conclusions Richard rehearses in book V,
that Richard already established it. As he says in V.1:
But seeing that we are certain about the unity of the divine
substance, the plurality of persons, and the harmony and mutual
relation of plurality and unity, the occasion now requires that we
inquire about the properties of each person and specify the
particular characteristic of each person (italics mine).
The point is not that Richard lacks an argument for this consistency of unity and
plurality in book IV, but that he does so without any recourse to a consideration of
Wisdom. The concept of the fullness of knowledge shows up sporadically throughout
Richard’s treatise, but it isn’t until the very end of book VI that we encounter the highest
concentration on the subject—especially in the final three chapters from 23-25.
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Nico den Bok likewise argues that this section of bk. III provides the outline of the entire work;
he further takes this as evidence for the authenticity of bk. VI rather than a later redaction by a different
author. Den Bok 371-372. This view is shared by Ribaillier, 9.
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What we have, then, is Richard’s argument for the unity of Divinity in books I-II
from omnipotence; an argument for the Trinity of persons in book III from the fullness of
goodness; and we have the argument for the harmony of unity and plurality in VI.23-25.
There is, therefore, a large gap between books I-III on the one hand, and book VI on the
other. What is to account for the fact that Richard clearly establishes the harmony of
unity and plurality in book IV but waits until the final chapters of book VI to do so from
a consideration of the fullness of Wisdom? Richard gives us a few clues.
The first clue comes at the conclusion of book IV. Richard says “Behold, we have
now discussed this issue by means of a digression, and we have strayed far beyond our
subject.”442 And he concludes that the “pious and simple mind” should be satisfied with
what was said about how nothing is “dissonant” in venerating “one God in the Trinity
and the Trinity in a unity.” The only other place the word “dissonant” is used in
Richard’s treatise is in the opening paragraph of IV.25. So the digression refers only to
the question Richard considers with respect to the alleged corporeality of demonic spirits
in the preceding paragraph. Thus Richard’s argument for the harmony of divine unity and
plurality in book IV consists of his explanation of the similitudes between human,
angelic, and divine substances. How this connects with book VI will be made apparent
shortly.
The second clue comes at the end of book V. Richard writes:
I had intended to reveal publicly what I thought about these
issues, but because there is intense profundity in them, it will be
better to leave them to be discussed more thoroughly by those who
442

“Sed ecce hoc dum per excessum diximus, a nostro proposito longius evagati sumus.” Richard,
De Trinitate IV.25.
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have greater abilities. It will also be better to prove from the
judgment of others what sort of gratitude or ingratitude I deserve
from those things that I have said up until now.
As previous Richardian scholars have pointed out, there is suspicion based on this
comment by Richard, that perhaps this marks the end of his treatise at book V and leaves
questions with respect to the status of book VI.443
This second clue, like the first, presents a perplexity in need of a good explanation.
To what does this parenthetical remark at the conclusion of book V refer? Furthermore,
does it give us any further insight on how Richard constructed this work? The immediate
context suggests that Richard either refers to the issue of procession and the differences
between the Son and the Spirit with respect to that property; or, he refers to that plus the
appropriation of divine names. We add a third possibility: That this parenthetical
statement at the end of book VI is connected with an important distinction Richard makes
a few chapters earlier, but admittedly never develops.
Toward the end of V.22, Richard brings up the distinction of the “work of grace”
and the “operation of nature.” And while he has brought up the distinction in previous
books, it is never as problematic as it is here. The distinction in those other sections
always refers to created things444; but here, he is concerned with whether what is
perfectly appropriate with respect to human action and propagation might be thought the
same for Divinity.445 He assures his reader this is not the case. But uncharacteristically,
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Richard, De Trinitate I.9, II.8.
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Richard may have been familiar with a contemporary debate about what kind of ‘necessity’
pertains to the divine processions. As den Bok notes, “Abelard combined the principle [of divine plenitude]
with the idea of Christian love («caritas») in such a way that it not only showed its importance to the
trinitarian relations, but also, again, its impact on the relation between God and the world.” Den Bok, 287
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Richard does not go on to explain this in any more detail. Instead, he speaks of the
profundity of the mystery and the difficulty involved in trying to find suitable words for
asserting the truth. The dilemma consists of the tension between two dimensions of God’s
being: what God must be (operation of nature) and what God chooses to be (operation of
grace).446 If the divine processions are an operation of nature, then the processions are
‘by-products’ of the divine nature which seems incompatible with the Scriptures. But if
the divine processions are an operation of grace then they are not necessary to true
Divinity, which results in Arianism.
In all likelihood, the parenthetical statement Richard gives at the end of book V is
related to this section of V.22. Further evidence in support of this can be found by the
fact that this section of V.22 and the statement at the end of book V have further
similarities. They both speak of the profundity of mystery. They both speak of gratitude
or ingratitude. They both involve an articulated awareness of those who would judge the
quality of one’s work. And they both pertain to finding the right “words” to explain the
profundities. But we do not find the statement placed immediately next to that of V.22;
instead, it is found at the end of book V.
What explains all of this? V.22, and its concern with the “work of grace” and the
“operation of nature” as it relates to procession, is connected with the final section of

n. 7-8. But as Gregory of Nazianzus writes in Theological Orations 29, 2: “We do not have the audacity to
speak of overflowing goodness as one of the Greek philosophers who dares to say «as a basin that
overflows» in a passage on the first and second cause; for we are careful not to assume an origination by
natural power, a kind of natural and unforced movement that does not fit to our thoughts on the godhead.”
Den Bok, 292 n. 31. Given the tension between Gregory and Abelard on ‘what must be true’ and ‘what
could have been otherwise’, Richard’s hesitancy in V.22 is not surprising, though he obviously addressed it
when he added the first chapters of bk. VI. See also n. 455 of this work.
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Den Bok, 433. For more on the dilemma, see den Bok, 301 on “ethical necessity.”
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book V. Combined, they reveal that Richard’s thoughts at the end of book V concern
perplexities he has not yet explored. The distinction of the work of grace and the
operation of nature, and the difference of procession between Son and Spirit, still have
questions yet to be answered. As Richard says in both statements, he hopes that those
with greater minds will show “ . . . gratitude for the things he has shown up until now!”
as he would be grateful to those who might shed light on issues he still finds obscure.
When we look to book VI, we discover that Richard eventually takes up the topic of
the work of grace vs. the operation of nature as this relates to procession within Divinity.
As we mentioned, and as scholars of Richard’s De Trinitate have noted, this statement at
the end of book V leaves questions as to the relationship of book VI to the rest of the
treatise. Some surmise that book V may have have been the final book at an earlier stage
in Richard’s writing, book VI being undertaken at a later date. Most scholars agree that
book VI was written by Richard.
But consider how all of these pieces come together to help us make better sense of
how Richard constructed his work. It would be one thing if all we had was this one
parenthetical statement at the end of book V to help us decide, but we have more. First,
we know Richard conceived the overall structure of the work on the basis of the same
Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad that Anselm did. But whereas Anselm constructed his
treatise in the order of Goodness—>Wisdom—>Power, Richard constructs his in the
order of Power—>Goodness—>Wisdom. And the final consideration of wisdom comes
at the very end of book VI. When we compare the language found at this section of book
VI with the language we find at the end of book IV we find striking similarities. And
when we look at the content of books IV, V, and VI, we discover that they all coalesce
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around considerations related to explaining the harmony of unity and plurality in
Divinity. Given the “spatial distance” of the arguments from the fullness of wisdom
found at the end of book VI from the conclusion and language at the end of book IV—
along with parenthetical statements at the end of books IV and V that show evidence for
earlier and later material—we have the beginnings of an insight on how Richard went
about his work.
It seems he was in the habit of taking the final pieces of previous work and
“opening them up” to explore further nuances and details. And this “opening up” left the
earlier material on both sides of his newer insights. This explains, in part, why the
language at the end of his books is more simple when compared with newer material that
precedes it. On both sides of the newer material we can see the language that was
connected together at an earlier stage. One of the clearest examples of this is found at the
end of book II where this “earlier” material has migrated to the end of the book. At the
end of book II, Richard provides a “taxonomy of properties” in II.25:
Substance

Consubstantial

Quantity

Equal or Unequal

Quality

Similar or Dissimilar

Place

Above or Below

Time

Before or After

Situation

Sitting near or together

Condition

Possessor and Possession

[Action]

Activity or Passivity

Fig. A.1 Taxonomy of Properties in De Trinitate II.25447
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This taxonomy of properties predicated of Divinity is from Boethius’s De Trinitate IV. It was
common to the 12th century. William of St. Theirry uses this taxonomy as the loose structure for his
Enigma fidei. See Anderson, The Enigma of Faith, 57ff.
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He states, “And so, it is better at the moment to refrain from this discussion than to
attempt a study [that] we cannot furnish in a concise manner.” But when we look at the
material that precedes this in II.22-24 we see that Richard has addressed every one of
these categories. II.25, therefore, was connected with material that came earlier and
Richard inserted II.22-24 at a later time (see Appendix B).
This notion of taking a concluding point not only as a starting point for a new claim,
but also giving it an “expanded treatment” of its own—filling out further details—is a
pattern with Richard. As we noted when looking at the relationship between Richard’s
Twelve Patriarchs and Mystical Ark, the latter seems to be a full articulation of the last
stage of contemplation in the first. Twelve Patriarchs treats the knowledge of self,
leading it on an ascent to the contemplation of God. It is moral work. One must walk with
the patriarchs in an effort to purge oneself of vices, inculcate virtues, and ultimately learn
the grace of discretion. Mystical Ark picks up where Twelve Patriarchs finishes; but
rather than start a new journey, Mystical Ark “abides” at the final location of Twelve
Patriarchs. What Mystical Ark continues is the ascent begun at the end of Twelve
Patriarchs by filling it out, in rich detail, as an ascent of crafting the Ark of the Covenant
on God’s “holy hill.” There, the lessons of the grace of discretion are transferred to the
grace of contemplation. So in the relationship of Richard’s treatises we see a pattern of
seeking the “plenitude” of conclusions already established in previous work.
My suggestion is that we can see Richard looking over his previous compositions,
trying to find seeds that could be cultivated and watered—of giving them fuller treatment,
fuller insight and articulation; and once finding them, adding material that gives that
fuller detail within the existing structure of his previous work. It would be the equivalent
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of adding pages to a section of a book without rewriting what came before and after it.
The pages simply elaborate some element in more detail but do not significantly disrupt
the flow of the previous work (Fig. A.2).
Two further points are worth making with respect to this. One is another place in
Richard’s work where he indicates that he is “inserting” new material, and the second is
how all of this connects with his explicit statements of this method in book I of De
Trinitate. In VI.18 Richard writes:
But, in order that we may return (redeamus) to that question on
account of which we inserted these remarks (ista interposuimus),
with respect to God [the Father] begetting a Son is identical to
naturally producing at will a person from his own person according
to a singular conformity of his property (emphasis mine).448
This indicates that Richard is “inserting” new material to previous work and not merely
adding new books or sections to this treatise. Second, Richard explains how this method
of insertion is related to his general approach of fides quaerens intellectum. As he writes
in the introduction of book I:
It is therefore necessary for us to enter by faith into the knowledge
of truths concerning which it is correctly said to us: if you do not
believe, you will not understand. Nevertheless, we must not stop
immediately at the entrance; but we must always hasten toward a
deeper and more profound understanding and pursue it with every
effort and with supreme diligence, so that we can advance daily
toward an understanding of what we hold by faith.449
Moreover, in the next chapter, he writes, “But it does not belong to any soul to elicit
those reasons from the profound and hidden bosom of nature, and to draw them out into
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Richard, De Trinitate VI.18.
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Richard, De Trinitate I.3.
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the open, as if uprooting them from some secret sanctuary of wisdom.”450
What this indicates is that not only is Richard’s entire treatise on the Trinity an
“expansion” upon works like those of Anselm and Augustine, but it also indicates a
specific method by which Richard “returned” to his own work. The plenitude he adds to
Anselm, Augustine, Boethius, and others is a plenitude he seeks in delving into
profundities left unearthed in his previous writing!

Fig. A.2 Richard’s “Focus & Magnify” Method of Expansion
So how does this all relate to the ambiguities of the textual process for Richard in
books IV-VI of his De Trinitate? The answer is that books IV-VI are an “expansion” of

450

Richard, De Trinitate I.4.
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Richard’s argument for the harmony of unity and plurality.451 The broad structure of the
entire treatise is Power-Goodness-Wisdom. The consideration of power in books I-II
gives Richard his argument for the aseity and singularity of Divinity. The consideration
of goodness in book III gives Richard his conclusion for the plurality of Divinity. Book
IV gives the argument for the harmony of unity and plurality of Divinity. By book V
Richard has already established those three conclusions. But book IV, while giving an
argument for unity and plurality of Divinity based on similitudes, does not provide
necessary reasons nor resolve the perplexities involved in explaining the relationship
between the divine substance and the divine persons. In a word, it establishes the
coherence and logical consistency of the harmony of unity and plurality of Divinity. It
provides knowledge that this harmony is true, but it does not explain how this harmony is
to be understood. Books V and VI provide more detail in explaining the “how” of this
harmony. But we have to wait until the final chapters of book VI for Richard’s argument
from the fullness of Wisdom that fittingly completes the governing triad of the treatise.
Thus starting with this Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad, Richard composed his work
arguing for the unity, plurality, and harmony of unity and plurality; and as he
contemplated these things further, he “expanded” and “filled out” his previous work with
new insights and contemplations. His final argument for the harmony of unity and
plurality from a consideration of the fullness of wisdom at the end of book VI was part of
451

Nico den Bok sees the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad as the “rough structure” with bks. IV-VI
filling out the latter part of that triad. Den Bok, 371-372, see esp. n. 177. However, the Wisdom component
is concentrated in the final chapters of bk. VI. The important points to highlight are the following: (a) this
rough structuring based on this triad had precedents in Anselm, (b) that Richard “expanded” his work
which explains why the material for the Wisdom component of the triad is concentrated at the end of bk. VI
and (c) that the textual difficulties pointed to by Ribaillier, Salet, Bligh, and von Balthasar extend beyond a
question regarding the authenticity of bk. VI and can be better understood in light of (a) and (b).
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an earlier stage of his writing, probably directly connected with content we find at the end
of book IV. It is only as Richard continued to expand and provide further details on the
definition of ‘Person’, the intricacies of procession and generation, etc. that we find the
final component of the Power-Goodness-Wisdom triad drifting further and further away
from material it used to be connected with. And this gives us an indication of just how
much Richard added to books IV-VI.
Given that Richard’s “expanding” method is the result of making arguments fuller
and more complete, it is not surprising to find evidence of this in earlier sections of his
work (i.e., in books I-III). But for now, the important point is that there is evidence of this
method in Richard, that it connects well with how he describes his work of “drawing
profundities out into the open,” of “uprooting them from some secret sanctuary of
wisdom.” All of this has implications for better understanding the development of
Richard’s thought on the Trinity, the evolution of his composing De Trinitate, how this
method may apply to other of his works and that of his contemporaries at St. Victor. But
here we can only point it out. The detailed work of identifying where the insertions are,
when they were added, and what this says about Richard’s developing thought on the
Trinity must be left for future study.
The reason why it is important for us to point out is that it helps us broaden our
understanding of Richard’s “intentionality” in composing this work. It is tempting, given
what we have discovered about Richard’s intricate triads and triadic structuring to treat
De Trinitate as a finished work of art, a sculpture in its most perfect and final form. But
as we step closer, we discover it is more like a work of art “in relief”: a sculpture attached
to the block of marble from which it was carved. The picture is almost full and complete;
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about as full and complete as could ever be imagined—the form is in “high relief.” And
we can be incredibly thankful for this. For unlike a sculpture detached from the mold and
marble that gave it life, where all we see is the work of art and the feeling it evokes as we
behold its form, a relief shifts our attention to the artist and his craft. We imagine how the
beauty and craft with which the artist chipped away at those things he was able to “draw
out” from the marble would advance through those elements left untouched. It brings us
to the lines that mark the margins of the artist’s thought. We connect with the “process”
of his craft. He invites us to take up our own theological chisels and join him in his work.
But Richard did not anticipate leaving De Trinitate as a sculpture in relief. He was
in pursuit of a full and perfect contemplation of the Trinity and his goal was to forge its
final form in his readers. However, he never finished. He was still in the process of
carving out more to behold and ponder. Yet this unintended “incompleteness” to
Richard’s work is all the more wonderful for how well it fits with Richard’s
understanding of Trinitarian contemplation; for there is always more above and beyond
the rock. De Trinitate, like a sculpture in relief, provides comprehension but not full
comprehension. To write a treatise on the Trinity is to concentrate the mind on the most
Eternal and sublime of all things. As he says, no one can fully comprehend the triune God
though we grope at that divine light with all we can. Richard’s De Trinitate is all the
more “perfect” for having been left as a work-in-progress. For in that very form it
captures the ongoing nature of the theologian’s craft: contemplation added to
contemplation, more of the mystery disclosed and still more to pursue. Thus Richard—
like his own theological predecessors, and above all, like God—leaves us with still more
to see, more to discover, more to “draw out” from the “secret sanctuary of Wisdom.”

APPENDIX B:
COMPREHENSIVE DIAGRAM OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE
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Method of
Study

I.1-5

Demonstration-Inference-Certainty
Experience-Reason-Faith
Utility-Pleasantness-Riches
Worthy-Suitable-Diligent
Eternal-Uncreated-Immeasurable
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Neither-made-nor-begotten / Madebut-begotten / Not-made-nor-begotten
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Study

Two Modes of
Being “from
eternity”
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Highest
I.11-12
Unity
“one God”
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Best
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I.19-25

Power
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Substance
I-II

Singularity
“only one
God”
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UncreatedEternalImmeasurable
Chiasm
(see Fig. 4.5)
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UncreatedEternalImmeasurable
(1-8)
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Elements of
Chiasm (9-10)
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Goodness?
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Full Identity of
Unity &
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II.15-19

Uncreated-Eternal-Immeasurable

General-Special-Individual
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(one Omnipotent-God-Lord) and then
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Multiplicity
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Simplicity (17) connected with Power & Wisdom in
of Single
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specific use of Power-WisdomGoodness
here and above expansions
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separated them?
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supreme Good”
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Expansion

II.20-24

Previous
Material
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Above
II.25

Taxonomy:
Properties of
Relation

Goodness
Plurality

Goodness
supreme love
III.1-5

Happiness
Glory

Mutuality/
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III
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Divine Persons
are Supreme
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‘substance’
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NOTES ON COMPREHENSIVE DIAGRAM OF RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE:
This diagram represents Richard’s organization of De Trinitate as I currently see it.
The bold lines indicate trinitarian structuring. The bold line furthest left extends down
the entire work, and indicates Richard’s broad use of the Power-Wisdom-Goodness triad
that organizes the entire treatise. The break in that line between books IV to VI indicates
how the earlier, “fullness of wisdom” material migrates to the very end of book VI as
Richard expanded books IV-VI with new additions. As these bold lines progress inward
to the right, they indicate Richard’s use of more localized triads (e.g., GoodnessHappiness-Glory in book III) as he “draws them out” from each element in the PowerWisdom-Goodness triad. This is seen most clearly in Fig. 4.3.
The darkest grey sections indicate some of the earlier material in Richard’s
treatise that became “distanced” as Richard added to his work.
The lighter grey sections indicate some of Richard’s expansions. In books V
and VI one sees this in the condignum-condilectum material, the similarity of language
and thought indicating the same stage of redaction. In book II there is the “taxonomy of
properties” Richard added that distanced the earlier material in II.25 where he states that
he doesn’t have time to describe the properties but then adds a discussion of them in
II.20-24.
The greyed out diagonal shading indicates a possible third level of
redaction, where Richard adds an explanation to mitigate a logical concern (e.g.,
explaining how the communicability of wisdom and power found in rational beings
differs from the incommunicability of these properties for Divinity, II.11-14). We know
that II.11-14 was added after Richard’s insertion of the Uncreated-Immeasurable-Eternal
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chiasm in II.1-10. What’s more, the technicality of language (e.g., Danielitas) in II.12
along with distinctions he borrows from other sources (e.g., General-Special-Individual)
parallels the technicality of language found especially in book IV (e.g., person vs.
substance, subsistence vs. existence, etc.) where Richard is working with Boethius, and
for that reason may indicate the same stage of redaction.
But I must emphasize the preliminary nature of this diagram. Richard may just as
well have written the material in II.11-14 at the same time he added the chiasm of II.1-10,
his mind foreseeing the logical concern at that point. Further, I believe that the earliest
material in Richard’s work is found in books I and VI on the Quicumque and the church
fathers, and pieces of which can be found in book II, that became distanced as he added
to the work.452 But I do not use the darkest grey shading for this material in books I-II,
instead shading only the “fullness of wisdom” material found at the very end of book VI.
Thus the darkest grey sections do not indicate the same stage of redaction, but only show
where earlier material becomes distanced by Richard’s insertions. This highlights what I
wish to emphasize: I am more interested in indicating that redaction is taking place than I
am in showing exactly what material goes together or the chronology of Richard’s
additions. This diagram, and these shaded regions, help us attend to divisions of material
that may represent new stages of redaction as Richard returned to his work. The point is
to show that (a) Richard’s additions extend throughout his treatise and are therefore not
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This similarity of language and style has been noticed by others. See, e.g., Ribaillier, 10:
“ . . . dans le livre VI les références à l’Ecriture, à la liturgie, aux Pères sont plus abondantes,” and “Dans
l’ensemble du traité, on ne relève que 46 citations explicites ou implicites: la plupart se trouvent dans le
Prologue et au livre VI.” But rather than seeing this as evidence for distancing the material bk. I shared
with bk. VI at an earlier stage, the focus has been on what the status of bk. VI is to the rest of the treatise.
On the earlier Quicumque sequence, see n. 309 of this work.
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limited to book VI and (b) much more work remains to be done to discern where these
additions are and what their chronology is. This diagram merely depicts the strong, prima
facie justification we give for (a) in Appendix A and indicates places where further textcritical analysis might help us with questions related to (b).
When I first began working with Richard’s De Trinitate I discovered the triadic
structures in book III and then began an investigation into his uses in the rest of his work.
Initially, the level of intricacy in content and form in book III led me to expect a
proportionally high degree of the same throughout the rest of the work. What I found
instead is that the most crystalized employment of triads and triadic structuring is in book
III and that the triadic structuring in the rest of the work tapers off from there. Further,
once I realized where these triads were, I started to notice those places with less refined
structure and language. What became the most apparent was that the lack of this structure
and refinement is found in the final sections of Richard’s books. These are indicated by
the darkest grey sections in the diagram. In addition, this lack of refinement in language
and structure is also accompanied by a glaring omission of summaries and conclusions
found in those more intricate sections. So, for example, when one reads through the
intricacies of the triadic structures and summaries in III.1-20, one is struck by the
omission of any of the same language, content, or conclusions in III.21-25 that ends the
book. What’s more, one discovers a surprising simplicity of language in these final
sections—much simpler than the more intricate material that precedes it. This led me to
discover that Richard was not just “inserting” remarks, but that he was expanding entire
sections of his work and leaving previous material on either side of those expansions. A
good example of the evidence of this can be found in comparing the material in
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VI.18c-21 with that in VI.11. In VI.11 Richard has already made an argument for the
Holy Spirit not being called “image,” but only the Son. But in what follows in VI.18c-21
Richard makes the same argument with different language. The explanation for this is
that the latter comes with the Unbegotten-Begotten polemical material, and VI.11 must
have been inserted later. This explains both the redundancy, the placement, and the
dissonance of language in both places. Further examples of this method are the
expansions found in books I and II, especially the chiastic structure of Uncreated-EternalImmutable in II.1-10 and the “taxonomy of properties” that Richard initially says he
doesn’t have time to do in a concise manner in II.25 but obviously found time later when
he provides this in II.20-24.
The structure of books I-III have been much easier for me to discern than IV-VI
(esp. VI!).453 But there are still questions that can be asked. In book III I know this is the
final, triadic structuring of the work Richard intended and added. But it is more difficult
to ascertain whether Richard first provided the Goodness-Happiness-Glory triad in III.1-5
and then added two new ones in III.13-20 or whether he had the first two in III.1-13 and
then added a final one in III.13-20 with a “Single Argument from Benevolence.” What
does seem clear is that Richard would often take the final piece of one of his earlier
treatments and then expand that in more detail. Thus his conclusions often become
starting points for new expansions of his material.454 I am thus more likely to see Richard
453

The difficulties in bk. VI have long been acknowledged, e.g., Ribaillier, 15: “Le livre VI présente
un plan assez confus: la démonstration que le Fils est l’image du Père y est bizarrement dissociée: elle
commence au chapitre XI, puis est reprise au chapitre XX.” This thesis corroborates the difficulties that
have been noted with bk. VI, but also clarifies why this is so: Bk. VI lacks the intricate trinitarian
structuring Richard employs in the other books and consists of earlier material that became distanced as
Richard added new meditations.
454

Indeed, as indicated in chapter 2 of this work, this method extends to the relationship between
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doing this with his Single Argument from Benevolence as a later expansion. It is also
clear that Richard doesn’t hesitate to add a section after some element in his work where
more clarity is needed. So, for example, if he suddenly realizes after treating the
incommunicability of God’s divine Power and Wisdom that other rational creatures have
some power and wisdom, he knows further explanation is needed. The perplexity is that
what he just argued is incommunicable may seem to the alert reader to be communicable
as well, which is a contradiction. Thus in book II.11-14 he contends with that concern.
And the content on either side of that material reveals that it was a later expansion.
When we look to the parenthetical comments at the end of book V we know that at
least some of the content of book VI had not been written yet.455 I believe this material
consisted mainly of the “operation of grace vs. nature” questions left unaddressed in book
V. If this is true, as seems most likely from the comment in book V, then something has
to explain the “table of contents” Richard seems to provide for books III-VI in the
opening of book III; for Richard says there what he plans to do in book VI.456 It seems
more likely that the most intricate language and structuring in a work is a sign of the
more mature thought of its author. And when we look over the entire treatise of Richard’s
Richard’s treatises as well. On this, I agree with den Bok (see p. 75 of this work) and only wish to point out
that in the same way that this helps us see Richard’s Mystical Ark as an expansion of the final stage of
contemplation in his Twelve Patriarchs, here we have evidence of Richard using the same method within
De Trinitate itself (Fig. 4.3).
455

But now that we know Richard’s insertions extended throughout his treatise and were not limited
to bk. VI, it is more likely that the “problematic” statement at the end of bk. V represents an earlier stage in
Richard’s writing—material we find largely in book VI on the question regarding the operation of nature
vs. the operation of grace. Bk. VI, therefore, need not be explained as “ . . . qu’une ébauche non destinée
primitivement à la publication.” Ribaillier, 10.
456

As Richardian scholars have pointed out before, in addition to the similarity of language and
style, this allusion to the content of bk. VI in this opening outline of bk. III is evidence for seeing bk. VI as
authentically Richardian. Den Bok, 372 n. 177. Ribaillier, 9.
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De Trinitate we see that book III’s triadic structures from 1-20 are the most intricate of
all. Book III has a greater crystallization of structure and intricacy and nuance. It also has
the table of contents Richard provides at the opening of book III that includes a
description of what book VI is about (something we know he wrote—at least pieces of—
later than book V). In light of these facts, I believe book III represents Richard’s most
mature thought. And as a result, this should caution a solely linear analysis of his
argument which would fail to see the further ascent in Richard’s thinking by flattening it
in that linear flow. Even though his additions are consistent with the flow of the work
(e.g., he is simply expanding more details within an existing linear structure of
argumentation) there is more to appreciate in Richard. If we see the maturity of his
thought as he returned to composing his treatise with new insights it may turn out that the
zenith of his contemplations are not to be found at the end of his work, but somewhere in
the middle, and probably in book III.457
When we step back and look at the entire picture we discover that Richard himself
was still in the process of crafting De Trinitate. This should remind those who seek a
final, finished piece to proportion their analysis to the object of their gaze. We cannot
claim a finality for a work that was still in progress. What we can do, however, is assess

457

Den Bok, referring to bk. III says, “Richard’s notion of love («caritas») does seem to initiate a
social view of God’s trinity,” (p. 460), but rejects it on the basis of (a) constraints Richard initiates with his
arguments for divine aseity/personhood in bks. I-II, IV, and (b) the fundamental nature of divine-to-human
communication as Person-to-person, where the ‘image of God’ mediates this relation. On the final analysis,
Richard brings the fullest plenitude to Divinity within those limits, leaving only “great metaphorical value”
(p. 491) for his social trinitarian language in bk. III. But this analysis rests on a linear reading of Richard’s
De Trinitate, allowing bks. I-II / IV to rein in the “bold undertaking” of bk. III. But if bk. III contains
Richard’s most mature thought, and I-II his earliest—as seems evident in bk. III’s having the most intricate
structuring as well as the final table of contents for the entire work—then ipso facto bk. III gets the final
say and Richard’s mature trinitarianism may be bolder than den Bok suggests.
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and discern the clues to the methods and the patterns that reveal where the author was in
the process. Having spent extensive time with Richard’s work, and knowing that there is
still much work to do, my latest view is that Richard began with the material of the
Quicumque as he states in book I. This explains the One Omnipotent, God, Lord
sequence in books I and II (though it is spread apart now).458 And this material connects
with the Unbegotten-Begotten polemical material found in book VI.459 What I believe is
that De Trinitate began with the Quicumque as part of a polemical exchange on the
meanings of its terms, the teachings of the church fathers, and probably as a discussion.
Then as Richard returned to his written work he expanded with new material, arguments,
definitions, clarifications, and structures as he thought of them. Thus De Trinitate
probably began with the material of the Quicumque and a discussion centered on the
teachings of the church fathers and the debate over Unbegotten-Begotten substance. It
therefore started in an oratory setting which explains the numerous places that speak of
“hearers.” But subsequently it evolved from this oratorical setting to become a work of
written composition, one Richard expected someone to pick up and “read.”460 Given the
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See n. 309 of this work.

459

As others have noted, this Begotten-Unbegotten polemical material may have been inspired by
Peter Lombard’s Sentences and the debate over the traditional formula “substantia genuit substantiam.” If
so, Richard must have composed this material after the release of the Sentences in the year 1151. See
Ribaillier, 11, 29.
460

For more on oratorical elements in De Trinitate, see n. 129 of this work and den Bok, 99 n. 21.
While I agree with den Bok and others on the presence of these elements, they may also represent an earlier
compositional stage. Given the simplicity of language found in these sections (e.g., VI.23-25) by contrast
with the more intricate sections (e.g., refining Boethius’s definition of ‘person’), and other evidence we’ve
put forward, De Trinitate probably began by bringing the Quicumque into a composed, dialogical exchange
with contemporary ideas on the Trinity (e.g., Abelard, Peter Lombard) and developed subsequently as
Richard returned to “focus and magnify” sections with new contemplations, and refine the treatise with
more localized triads and trinitarian structures (e.g., III.2-20).
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polish of Richard’s other works, it is likely Richard would have rewritten the entire
treatise with those crystallizations as a new starting point. He simply wasn’t done
thinking about them and still believed he might have more to add. And it is fitting that we
find a work like Richard’s never ending in its contemplation of the splendor of the Trinity
since the journey from imperfect to full and perfect contemplation of Divinity is
everlasting. Richard never stopped, he just simply couldn’t finish—an appropriate gift,
given the nature of his subject and the craft involved in its contemplation.

APPENDIX C:
LIST OF TRIADS IN RICHARD’S DE TRINITATE BY BOOK
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Prologue
Faith

Hope

Love

Manifestation

Contemplation

Knowledge

1st Heaven

2nd Heaven

3rd Heaven

Immortality

Incorruptibility

Eternity

Human

Angelic

Divine

Inheritance

Merit

Divinity

Actuality

Virtue

Intellect

Knowledge by Faith

Knowledge by Reason

Knowledge by Experience

Book I
Demonstration

Inference

Certainty

Supreme Utility

Supreme Pleasantness

Highest Riches

Worthy

Suitable

Diligent

Eagerness

Longing

Happiness

Essence

Power

Wisdom

Book II
Uncreated

Eternal

Immeasurable

Better State

Equal State

Worse State

General Substance

Special Substance

Individual Substance

Happiness

Divinity

Simplicity

Unity

Simplicity

Identity

Book III
Fullness of Goodness

Fullness of Happiness

Fullness of Glory

Power

Goodness

Divinity

Permit

Undertake

Seek with Longing

Good

Better

Best

Plurality

Equality

Trinity

Supreme Mutual Love

Supreme Integral Love

Supreme Consummate Love

Established

Magnified

Consummated

One

Equal

Co-Eternal

Easy

Difficult

Impossible

Supreme Benevolence

Equal Benevolence

Perfect Benevolence

Goodness

Wisdom

Power

Divinity

Glory

Majesty

Power

Wisdom

Nature
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Book IV
Unity

Plurality

Mutuality

Immediately

Mediately

Mediately & Immediately

Eve

Seth

Enoch

Proceeds from None

Proceeds from One

Proceeds from Two

Gratuitous Love

Gratuitous & Owed Love

Owed Love

Will

Love

Goodness

Giving

Receiving

Giving & Receiving

Poured Out

Poured In

Poured Out & In

Book VI
Immediate

Principal Order

Operation of Nature

Son

Grandson

Great-Grandson

Spirit

Intention

Purpose

Same Love

Same Desire

Equal Desire

Conception

Articulation

Audition

Unbegotten

Begotten

Neither-Begotten-Nor-Unbegotten

Father

Son

Spirit

Power

Wisdom

Goodness

Discovered

Learned

Read
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